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Affect and Number in Contemporary Cricket
Sivakumar V. Arumugam
Two recent cybernetics-derived academic disciplines, biomechanics and opera-
tions research, have worked to reshape cricket. Liberalization and the consequent
large flows of money into the game have resulted in a transformation in how the
game is regulated, coached, and played. In this dissertation, I have focused on
how cricket is now being produced through an account of the use of biomechanics
in the regulating and coaching of cricket and an appraisal of the role that opera-
tions research plays in regulating interruptions to individual games of cricket. I
argue that these twin developments correspond to Foucault’s notion of a contem-
porary governmentality organized around the body as machine and the species
of body, respectively. A consideration of the manner in which cybernetics under-
pins these practices and theories broadens and deepens accounts of both how the
contemporary world is continually being shaped and being studied.
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Cricket is an old sport. The basic form of the game stabilized in the early 18th
century. A bowler bowls a ball towards a batsman who in turn tries to hit the
ball away from the bowler’s teammates—this is the micro-event at the core of any
game of cricket. There have been a number of changes in the game and how it has
been played, governed, and thought about over the last 300 years. Some of the
changes in cricket since World War II can be traced to the imbrication of cricket
with the exigencies and imperatives of modern markets. Denis Compton, a pro-
fessional cricket player before and after the War, as well as a professional football
player, was one of the first sportsmen to make a living from advertising—selling
his image as a sportsman rather than just from playing sports itself. The compres-
sion of the game in time and space in the form of “one-day” cricket in England
in the 1960’s continued this connection between cricket and commerce. The game
was structured to force a result within a single day as spectatorship for multi-day
long cricket that often ended in draws dwindled. In the late 1970’s, the media
mogul Kerry Packer persuaded the Australian Cricket Board to award his televi-
sion channel exclusive broadcasting rights to Australian cricket by constructing
a set of parallel “rebel” national teams and instituting commercially successful
games between them. This pattern has continued to the present day via the
creation of the Indian Premier League. The monies involved in this league of
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city-based franchises in India has enabled it to draw on new sources of cricketing
talent both within India and around the world.1
In this dissertation, I track some recent changes to how this international game
is coached, played, and governed. I will demonstrate that two relatively new
cybernetics-derived sciences—biomechanics and operations research—have been
applied to cricket since the 1990’s. Both sciences have reshaped the regulation of
games of cricket. Biomechanics is now woven into the regulation of what counts
as “bowling” as well changing how bowlers are coached. And an Operations
Research formula that purports to be fair and predictive of results is used to de-
termine the outcome of interrupted one-day games. I will suggest that tracking
these particular changes lends some insight into two concepts of some interest
in anthropology—affect and number. Insofar as cricket is both a part of the con-
temporary world and a simulacrum of it, similar processes may be occurring
elsewhere.
Cricket in an era of globalization, with India at its center, has been trans-
formed. A much shorter version of the game tailored for evening television view-
ing has been heavily promoted. Various aspects of the game have been stan-
dardized, with the ICC providing the mechanism to enforce those standards.
An international league has been instituted to measure national teams’ success
1For a recent account of some of these changes, see K.R. Guruprasad (2011).
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against one another in the traditional five day form of the game that aligns with
a “World Cup” involving play of the short, one day long, form. Such measures
have been designed to increase audience sizes in India and around the world.
The resulting increase in revenue to all members of the ICC—although it is worth
noting that only the cricket boards in India, Australia and England actually make
a profit, which is used by the ICC to subsidize the other boards—have in turn
been invested in increasing the competitiveness of the individual national teams.
Training academies for cricket players now specialize in breaking down playing
techniques into series’ of minute bodily gestures through computer analyzes of
video images. Such televisual technologies, adopted from the visualizations made
available to audiences, have made the efficiency of cricket players’ bodies rather
than individual playing style of overwhelming concern within India and around
the world. Furthermore, a concern over increased efficiency, in particular, of over-
seeing players’ physical fitness, has led national teams to replace their system of
ad-hoc hiring of players match by match to a contracting of players on an annual
basis. Moreover, the laws of cricket have also been reformulated around advances
in the statistical analysis of cricket. These new technologies, I argue, collectively
make available a novel form of governmentality—or the conduct of conduct—in
cricket.
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1.1 Science studies and constructivism
Studying the deployment of science in cricket suggests a science studies approach.
Science studies as such, as a not quite stable broadly defined discipline in its own
right, is part of the story that I think unfolds in cricket. I suggest in chapter 4 that
science studies shares a certain similarity to what, after Margaret Mead, came to
be called second-order cybernetics, or the study of the engagement of observers
of a cybernetic system with that very system. Making that connection between
cybernetics and science studies, and a connection between cybernetics and im-
portant recent concepts in anthropological theory, does not, however, reduce the
latter to the former. Much as demonstrating that something social is constructed
does not imply that the writer thinks it ought not to have come into being or could
cease to be, suggesting that these connections exist does not by itself undercut the
usefulness of cybernetics, science studies approaches, or indeed certain theories
of affect and number.
In The Social Construction of What? (Hacking 1999), Hacking asserts four theses
about social construction work, listed together here:
0 In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to
be inevitable (Hacking 1999, 12).
1 X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as
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it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not
inevitable.
2 X is quite bad as it is.
3 We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least
radically transformed (Hacking 1999, 6).
Hacking suggests that this list comports with grades of (this time, unenumer-





• Revolutionary (Hacking 1999, 19)
It is easy to see the correspondence between these two lists. If only condition
(0) obtains, one is most likely an historical constructivist, if (0) and (1) obtain
together, one is likely an ironic constructivist and so on, in Hacking’s schema.
The point behind these grades of constructivism comes out in his writing on
the “science wars.” Hacking assumes a disagreement between two parties: con-
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structivists and scientists. He lists three “sticking points” between these adver-
saries. The first concerns the contingency of scientific theories. Hacking notes, for
example, that Andrew Pickering, in Constructing Quarks (Pickering 1984), “holds
that the evolution of physics, including the quark idea, is thoroughly contingent
and could have evolved in other ways” (Hacking 1999, 31). Here Hacking inserts
an empirical claim: “Most physicists, in contrast, think that the quark solution
was inevitable. They are pretty sure that longstanding parts of physics were in-
evitable” (Hacking 1999, 31). The second sticking point concerns classification.
Hacking argues that “[c]onstructionists tend to maintain that classifications are
not determined by how the world is, but are convenient ways in which to repre-
sent it. They maintain that the world does not come quietly wrapped up in facts.
Facts are the consequences of ways in which we represent the world” (Hacking
1999, 33). The third, and last, sticking point, concerns the stability of scientific
theories. Hacking suggests that “[c]ontrary to the themes of Karl Popper and
Thomas Kuhn, namely refutation and revolution, a great deal of modern science
is stable. . . Scientists think that the stability is the consequence of compelling
evidence. Constructionists think that stability results from factors external to the
overt content of the science” (Hacking 1999, 33).
Hacking’s empirical claims aside, his account of the three sticking points be-
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tween the two groups—scientists and constructivists—makes clear his own under-
standing of constructivism. The first sticking point, contingency, and the third,
stability, are closely related. His argument appears to be that constructivists are
wedded to the claim that scientific theories could have been and could be other-
wise. This puts them, according to the schemas listed above, in line with thesis
1, matched to an ironic constructivism. These are the minimalist claims of the
constructivist side of the science wars. On the other hand, Hacking commits “sci-
entists” to an very strong claim with regard to putative findings in science, and
does so explicitly. He states, for example, that “Maxwell’s Equations, the Sec-
ond Law of Thermodynamics, the velocity of light, and lowly substances such as
dolomite are here to stay” (Hacking 1999, 33). The extravagance of this claim does
not lie in Hacking asserting that some theories are sometimes held to be beyond
dispute, but rather in his assertion that some theories will never be disputed. The
second of the sticking points is where the real point of this grand claim lies. He
argues with regard to practices of classification that they “do not exist only in the
empty space of language but in institutions, practices, material interactions with
things and other people” (Hacking 1999, 31). However, people—in his example,
“individual women refugees”—“can become aware of how they are classified and
modify their behavior accordingly.” By contrast, quarks “do not form an inter-
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active kind” for “[q]uarks are not aware that they are quarks and are not altered
simply by being classified as quarks.” This, he holds, “forms a fundamental dif-
ference between the natural and the social sciences” (Hacking 1999, 32).2
This is in fact the “fundamental difference,” not between Hacking’s scientists
and constructivists, but rather between Hacking’s and Bruno Latour’s accounts of
constructivism itself. In “The Promises of Constructivism” (Latour 2003), Latour
treats, as he does elsewhere (Latour 1993), science as a parliamentary process. He
notes, regarding Hacking’s four theses, that “[a]lthough it is an important step
forward to reveal the inherently political nature of the argument, Hacking’s gra-
dient is too asymmetric. . . he says nothing of the politics of those who should be
called ‘naturalists,’ namely those who need this implied stage -1, which allows
for X to be there as a permanent fixture of nature” (Latour 2003, 37). This gives
a position to those who wish that particular theories be taken to be beyond (po-
litical) dispute. Latour offers, in replacement of Hacking’s schema, a series of
guarantees meant to placate all participants in the science wars. First, for any
given X of Hacking’s, “once there, and no matter how it came about, discussion
about X should stop for good.” Second, “in spite of the indisputability insured by
the former, a revision process should be maintained, an appeal of some sort, to
2See also, “Inaugural lecture: Chair of Philosophy and History of Scientific Concepts at the
Collège de France, 16 January 2001” (Hacking 2002)
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make sure that new claimants. . . will be able to have their voices heard” (Latour
2003, 38). Third, “the common world is to be composed progressively; it is not
already there once and for all.” Fourth, “humans and non-humans are engaged
in a history that should render their separation impossible” (Latour 2003, 39).
And, fifth, “institutions assuring due process should be able to specify the quality
of the ‘good common world’ they have to monitor” (Latour 2003, 40). The last
guarantee appears to form the core of Latour’s argument about constructivism.
He suggests that the dispute that matters is one over whether any given X is well
constructed or not; rather than whether it is constructed or not.
Latour makes use of the metaphor of building construction, of architecture,
to bring out this aspect of constructivist arguments. He notes that, the authorial
claims of architecture notwithstanding, “architects’ stories of their own achieve-
ments are full of little words to explain how they are ‘led to’ a solution, ‘con-
strained’ by other buildings, ‘limited’ by other interests, ‘guided by the inner logic
of material,’ ‘forced to obey’ the necessity of place, ‘influenced’ by the choices of
their colleagues, ‘held up’ by the state of the art, and so on” (Latour 2003, 31).
Further, even this implied notion of constraint is misleading: “What is interesting
in constructivism is exactly the opposite of what it first seems to imply: there is
no maker, no master, no creator that could be said to dominate materials, or, at
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the very least, a new uncertainty is introduced as to what is to be built as well as to
who is responsible for the emergence of the virtualities of the materials at hand”
(Latour 2003, 32). Whereas Hacking “does not want peace between construction-
ist and scientist” but rather “a better understanding of how they disagree, and
why, perhaps, the twain shall never meet” (Hacking 1999, 31), Latour seeks here
to elucidate a constructivism adequate to the peace. The notion of uncertainty
is crucial to Latour’s understanding of constructivist arguments. It is this which
allows him to make central the question of how well constructed an object is.
In “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” (Latour 2004), Latour gives ex-
amples of constructivist arguments put forward for politically conservative, not
revolutionary, purposes. Constructivist arguments, in other words, that even fall
out of Hacking’s conceptual grid. He notes a New York Times quote of a Republi-
can strategist talking about global warming arguments: “Should the public come
to believe that the scientific issues are settled. . . their views about global warming
will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scien-
tific certainty a primary issue” (Latour 2004, 226).3 Latour notes that the problem
would appear to be no longer “coming from an excessive confidence in ideological
arguments posturing as matters of fact. . . but from an excessive distrust of good
matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases!” (Latour 2004, 227) Rather,
3The quote is from the New York Times, 15 March, 2003, A16.
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constructivism, and with it critique, ought be directed at how well constructed
particular objects are. Latour notes, from Heidegger, the etymology of the word
“thing”: “We are now all aware that in all European languages, including Russian,
there is a strong connection between the words for thing and a quasi-judiciary as-
sembly” (Latour 2004, 232-233). Thus, a “thing is, in one sense, an object out
there and, in another sense, an issue very much in there, at any rate, a gather-
ing” (Latour 2004, 233). The combination of uncertainty and the relation between
objects (things) and parliamentary process allows Latour to mount a successful
argument against Hacking’s postulation of a difference between nature and so-
cial, and natural and social sciences. Hacking’s looping effects argument—that
natural objects cannot know that they have been named and therefore possibly
behave differently—depends on a prior disjunct between the natural and the so-
cial. It is this disjunct that a consideration of “things” makes impossible. Latour
suggests that the Whiteheadian refusal to force a disjunct between the natural and
the social “is an entirely different attitude than the critical one, not a flight into the
conditions of possibility of a given matter of fact, not the addition of something
more human that the inhumane matters of fact would have missed, but, rather, a
multifarious inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, meta-
physics, history, sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing
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to make it exist and to maintain its existence” (Latour 2004, 245-6).
Latour’s analysis of various natural scientists at work certainly seems congru-
ent with this take on “things” and how they are constructed. This is precisely the
approach I undertake here. In this framing, cricket is a thing that gathers together
a set of multi-disciplinary endeavors. Telling the story of science in contemporary
cricket is to unfold a set of connections between cybernetics-derived disciplines
and anthropological theory.
1.2 Cybernetic things and governmentality
Aihwa Ong has suggested that neoliberalism is “a new mode of political opti-
mization” and that it is “reconfiguring relationships between governing and the
governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality” (Ong 2006,
3). Ong notes that neoliberal forms of reasoning have two different elements to
them: “both economic (efficiency) and ethical (self-responsibility) claims” (Ong
2006, 11). And Ong argues that neoliberal governmentality as a “political technol-
ogy centered on the management of life oscillates between two poles of develop-
ment,” with one pole centered, quoting Foucault, on “the body as a machine: its
disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, and the extortion of its forces”4
4Quoted from Foucault (1978, 37).
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and the other pole centering on “the species body as biological machinery and a
basis of collective well-being and reproduction” (Ong 2006, 13).
But if Foucault can be situated within the cyborg sciences, as Hacking has
suggested (Hacking 1998), then one pressing question that Ong does not attend to
concerns the kind of critical work that can be carried out when tracing the impact
of neoliberalism on contemporary forms of governmentality using a theory that
may itself be closely related to neoliberalism. Put slightly differently, could it be
that neoliberalism, as ism, consists precisely in the reordering of elements between
the two poles of “the species body” and “the body machine”? What might now
count as an element of the species-body rather than the body-machine?
Political scientists working on India have recently framed liberalization as a
shift from a centralized interventionist state to a decentralized regulatory state
(Kohli 2001). This framing dovetails nicely with anthropological and historical
work on the effects of 19th century and early 20th century colonial governmen-
tality on the political present. In the Indian context, it has been argued that gov-
ernmentality may have superseded popular sovereignty as providing the grounds
for a democratic politics (Chatterjee 2004). Certainly, a decentralized regulatory
state would have to rely upon the disciplinary effects of already present norms
to maintain rule. Taking this argument further, however, would require an in-
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vestigation of the ways in which such norms unfold through the body (Foucault
1977, Foucault and Rabinow 1997). Without this crucial step, an accurate un-
derstanding of how norms produce and reproduce themselves in a regulatory
state is impossible. I will examine the processes through which changes in bodily
cricket practices and their regulation make possible a different understanding of
the conduct of individual bodies in the contemporary world.
I argue in this dissertation that the science biomechanics speaks directly to
what Foucault called the “body as machine.” I found in the field that biomechan-
ics is now an integral part of the coaching of fast bowling in cricket. It plays a
role in both injury prevention in bowling and a role in optimizing that bowling
in cricket matches. In addition, it has come to play a crucial role in regulating the
controversial question of “throwing” in cricket.
The usual, longer, form of the game often ends in a draw, however one-day
cricket matches are designed to produce a result. I suggest that the discipline of
operations research is vital in understanding the connection between what Fou-
cault referred to as “species bodies” and the problem of how to force a result out
of a game of one-day cricket that is incomplete. The operations research model
that two scholars—Frank Duckworth and Anthony Lewis—derive has been pre-
sented by them as a fairer because scientific alternative to the previous attempts
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at a “rain rule” that all depended on various cricketing rules of thumb. It works
by probabilistic prediction of what a team would have scored if play had not been
interrupted, and was very quickly taken up by the International Cricket Council
(ICC) as a necessary part of all international one-day cricket games.
1.3 Cybernetics and theory
Norbert Wiener coined the term “cybernetics” to describe the work that he and
others had been doing during World War II and shortly afterward. He was of
course an important participant in the Macy Conferences after the war that forms
a crucial moment in the development of cybernetics. Here I focus on the concep-
tual moves that Wiener makes in connecting together cybernetics on the one hand
and what became later the disciplines of biomechanics and operations research.
There is in addition an important overlap for him between cybernetics and de-
velopments in economics during and after the war. Wiener chose the Greek term
for steersman in part to honor the work by Clark Maxwell in 1868 on governors
(Wiener 1948, 11). The feedback mechanism with ship tillers and steam engines
alike were, for Wiener, a crucial feature of what he called control and communica-
tion in the animal and machine. Feedback enables the twining together of control
and communication. Wiener notes on several occasions in his two popular books
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on cybernetics (Wiener 1948, 1954) that there were several precursors to the ba-
sic concepts underlying this constellation of theories and practices. They tied
together several existing academic disciplines, including anthropology, physics,
biology, and psychology. However, his own research interests would later fall un-
der entirely new disciplines, in particular biomechanics, operations research, and
computer science.
The specific project that Wiener first worked on during the war concerned the
automation of anti-aircraft artillery. He presented the problem as one involving
the closing of a gap between the speed of the airplane and the shells shot at them:
”unlike all previously encountered targets, an airplane has a velocity which is a
very appreciable part of the velocity of the missile used to bring it down,” from
which it follows that it is necessary to “shoot the missile, not at the target, but
in such a way that missile and target may come together in space at some time
in the future” (Wiener 1948, 5). Wiener’s example of steering a ship makes the
connection between feedback and a predicting of the future particularly clear.
Separately from the problem of any evasive action a pilot might take—subject
to the plane’s capacities—the underlying issue is that correcting the course of a
ship-as-gun to match exactly, say, a compass reading, will not work well because
the ship’s direction will overshoot the intended compass reading. Correcting that
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mistake in turn and so on may result in the ship continually yawing from side
to side. What is needed and indeed used, Wiener suggests, is a mechanism that
“carries the reading of the wheel to an offset from the tiller, which so regulates the
values of the steering engine as to move the tiller in such a way as to turn these
valves off.” Such an arrangement has the important feature of being a “feedback
system [that] tends to make the performance of the steering engine relatively
independent of the load” (Wiener 1948, 7).
The twining together of control and communication in such machines on the
one hand and in the human body on the other is immediate for Wiener. He moves
directly to an account of him reaching out to pick up a pencil. He notes first that
perhaps only experts in anatomy might have an account of the muscles and the
correct sequences of those muscles firing required to do this. Moreover, that
knowledge alone would not make a conscious decision to fire particular muscles
in sequence possible: “On the contrary, what we will is to pick the pencil up. Once
we have determined on this, our motion proceeds in such a way that we may say
roughly that the amount by which the pencil is not yet picked up is decreased at
each stage” (Wiener 1948, 7). Visual and proprioceptive signals as to success or
failure of the act to reach for the pencil themselves inform further attempts to close
the gap between hand and pencil. As Wiener notes, “[t]he central nervous system
Introduction 19
no longer appears as a self-contained organ, receiving inputs from the senses and
discharging into the muscles. On the contrary, some of its most characteristic
activities are explicable only as circular processes emerging from the nervous
system into the muscles, and re-entering the nervous system through the sense
organs, whether they be proprioceptors or organs of the special senses” (Wiener
1948, 8).
Wiener and his collaborator Julian Bigelow approached another Macy partic-
ipant, Arturo Rosenblueth, to ask if that is “any pathological condition in which
a patient, in trying to perform some voluntary act like picking up a pencil, over-
shoots the mark, and goes into an uncontrollable oscillation?” The affirmative
answer, which Wiener reports as “purpose tremor” associated with brain injury
led to a jointly written paper between all of them titled “Behavior, Purpose, and
Teleology” in the journal Philosophy of Science (Rosenblueth et al. 1943). A number
of the key concepts Wiener introduces here—feedback, the twining of control and
communication, and purpose tremors through failed proprioceptive acts—came
to form, I will argue in the next two chapters, key determinates of the attempt to
use biomechanics in cricket.
In addition to his interest in the connections between his mathematical work
on cybernetics and the nervous system of humans and animals, Wiener also
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thought deeply about control and communication at the level of human social
being, whether in terms of local interactions with machines in, say, a factory,
or across society taken as a whole. Whereas feedback was the key concept in
Wiener’s examination of individual machines and bodies, information and entropy
were the concepts that linked together those concerns with a cybernetic under-
standing of society as a whole. Wiener argues that entropy is a measure of dis-
organization and that the information contained in some messages is the inverse
of this: “In fact, it is possible to interpret the information carried by a message as
essentially the negative of its entropy, and the negative logarithm of its probabil-
ity. That is, the more probable the message, the less information it gives. Clichés,
for example, are less illuminating than great poems” (Wiener 1954, 21). Wiener,
of course, held to the theory that entropy in any given closed system increased
over time—what is known as the second law of classical thermodynamics. On
the question of what counted as “life,” then, Wiener suggested that one might
include “all phenomena which locally swim against the current of increasing en-
tropy,” even though this would include both certain machines and, for example,
astronomical phenomena not thought to be in that category. Wiener reinforces
those questions by in fact trying to avoid them in writing that it would be “best
to avoid all question-begging epithets such as ‘life,’ ‘soul,’ ‘vitalism,’ and the like,
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and say merely in connection with machines that there is no reason why they
may not resemble human beings in representing pockets of decreasing entropy in
a framework in which the large entropy tends to increase” (Wiener 1954, 32). The
very idea that information ties together life and machine, invites the notion that
society itself is a cybernetic machine, one filled up with all manner of feedback
mechanisms that invite the kinds of analysis that individual lives and machines
already engender.
Part of the wild popularity of his book lies in the deep skepticism Wiener
introduces with respect to the possibilities of the application of cybernetics to
society. After noting a considerable wariness with respect to the belief “elevated
to the rank of an official article of faith in the United States, that free competition is
itself a homeostatic process” (Wiener 1948, 158), Wiener went on to warn against
both anarchy, through too many active anti-homeostatic social processes, and the
active social enforcement homeostatic processes of the small community (Wiener
1948, 160). The underlying problem is that unlike friends with “hopes. . . for
the social efficacy of whatever new ways of thinking this book may contain,”
(Wiener 1948, 162) Wiener suggests that “whether our investigations in the social
sciences be statistical or dynamic—and they should participate in the nature of
both—they can never be good to more than a very few decimal places, and, in
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short, can never furnish us with a quantity of verifiable, significant information
which begins to compare with that which we have learned to expect in the natural
sciences” (Wiener 1948, 164).
The central difficulty, Wiener argues, is that social systems both change as they
are investigated and change because they are investigated—”[w]e are too much
in tune with the objects of our investigations to be good probes” (Wiener 1948,
164). Feedback processes working at the level of an entire society work against
the application of cybernetics because the investigation itself may cause society to
change. The point is not that society changes at all, but rather that it may change
even before a determined attempt to effect change that comes after a complete
investigation. Wiener’s denial of this possibility—the application of cybernetic
principles to the study of society—underscores precisely that such an application
was conceivable. Philip Mirowski has written about the deep influences that
these cybernetic principles have had on macroeconomics. As I will make clear
in chapter 4 operations research as a discipline has also come to be applied to
cricket. Its roots are in military logistics and strategy (Shrader 2006), but it quickly
found a secure academic home when it was applied to business practices—the
paradigmatic study is of the operations of factories, including perhaps especially
the management of the people operating in that factory (Gass and Assad 2005).
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Hacking has argued, in fact, that Georges Canguilhem had already developed
an approach that might be properly construed “cyborg” in an essay by Canguil-
hem titled “Machine and organism.” Hacking notes that Canguilhem “passed
from the thought that there is ‘no difference between teleology and mechanism’
to a more sweeping statement, that ‘tools and machines are kinds of organs and
organs are kinds of tools and machines.’ ” (Hacking 1998, 204) And, further,
that “he wants us to take seriously the idea that machines too are extensions
of the body” (Hacking 1998, 207). It is this move, argues Hacking, that makes
Canguilhem an anti-Cartesian; for Descartes, the body is a mechanical device, as
are animals: contrawise, “Canguilhem held that. . . tools and machines extend the
body. They are parts of the living organism, not parts with which it was born,
but parts which it has made.” Hacking notes, parenthetically, that those “who
want to know where Bruno Latour and other present-day French iconoclasts are
coming from, may want to read more Canguilhem” (Hacking 1998, 205). Canguil-
hem was, of course, deeply influential to both Deleuze, Foucault, and numerous
others.
Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” represents the first serious attempt
to think through the implications of Norbert Weiner and others’ work on cyber-
netic organisms. Her central premise is that “[b]y the late twentieth century, our
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time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of ma-
chine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs.” Where, a “cyborg is a creature in
a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, un-
alienated labour, or their seductions to organic wholeness” (Haraway 1991, 150).
Positing this mythic time of the cyborg is, of course, a political move: “Cyborg
politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communi-
cation, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, on the central
dogma of phallogocentrism” (Haraway 1991, 176).
One consequence of Haraway’s work, her bringing to attention the possibil-
ity that “[o]ur dominations don’t work by medicalization and normalization any
more; they work by networking, communications redesign, stress management”
(Haraway 1991, 245, n. 4) is Philip Mirowski’s Machine Dreams: Economics Be-
comes a Cyborg Science (Mirowski 2002). Mirowski takes up the metaphor of the
cyborg and suggests that “[e]conomists were present at the creation of the cy-
borg sciences, and, as one would expect, the cyborg sciences have returned the
favor by serving in turn to remake the economic orthodoxy in their own image”
(Mirowski 2002, 6). He defines “cyborg sciences” around the “existence of the
computer as a paradigm object for everything from metaphors to assistance in re-
search activities to embodiment of research products” for cyborg science “makes
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convenient use of the fact that the computer straddles the divide between the
animate and the inanimate, the live and lifelike, the biological and the inert, the
Natural and the Social, and makes use of this fact in order to blur those same
boundaries” (Mirowski 2002, 13). One of the most important consequences of this
is, according to Mirowski, that of the “pervasive influence of the cyborg sciences
in modern culture, which is to treat ‘information’ as an entity that has ontolog-
ically stable properties, preserving its integrity under various transformations”
(Mirowski 2002, 16). The general argument that Mirowski provides in this text is
that the cyborg sciences, so construed, were not by any means stumbled upon, but
rather that cyborg science is “Big Science par excellence, the product of planned
coordination of teams with structured objectives, expensive discipline-flouting in-
strumentation, and explicitly retailed rationales for the clientele” (Mirowski 2002,
17). The result is that “quotidian distinctions automatically made by almost all
Western writers between physics, biology, psychology, and economics are rather
unavailing,” and, further, that “comprehension of the trajectory of any one of
these disciplines requires one to transgress the boundaries of the others with the
same abandon and impudence as the cyborgs themselves” (Mirowski 2002, 29).
Mirowski construes the development of the cyborg sciences as springing from
thermodynamics’ “destruction of the previous clockwork conceptions of order
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that had been part and parcel of the eighteenth-century world view”5 (Mirowski
2002, 43). In particular, the notion of entropic decline, that “we were stuck in
natural circumstances that inexorably running down” seemed to require “some-
thing like ‘intelligence’ [that] stands as a bulwark against the inexorable grind
of entropic dissolution.” Mirowski suggests that Norbert Weiner’s invention of
the term cybernetics arose from his asking “[i]f mankind is endowed with this
new kind of ‘intelligence,’ this ability to process information about the world,
then why wouldn’t it also be the case that Nature also possessed that capacity?”
(Mirowski 2002, 44) Alan Turing plays a central role in Mirowski’s argument
about such a notion of intelligence—one that makes sense of entropic decline,
but is not unique to humans. Mirowski suggests that Turing, building on Kurt
Gödel’s argument that any sufficiently interesting axiomatic mathematics cannot
be rendered decidable, went on to think along these lines: “if man is really a
machine, then we can provisionally equate undecidability with ‘noise’ and pro-
vide a formal account of what is decidable in mathematics by ‘concentrating’ our
attention on algorithmic mechanical thought” (Mirowski 2002, 80). It is in this
context that Turing infamous “imitation game,” now usually known as the “Tur-
ing test” paves the way for cyborg science theories. Mirowski notes that Turing
5On the role that thermodynamics plays in neoclassical economics, see Mirowski (1989).
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wrote his article6 in direct argument against Michael Polanyi’s positing of a tacit
knowledge beyond the possibility of systemization by military science and plan-
ning (Mirowski 2002, 85, n. 55). That the Turing test is passable is obvious for
Turing himself, given his use of Gödel’s schema in his own proof that all comput-
ers are computationally equivalent to one another: if humans are computational
machines, and all such machines are equivalent to one another, then clearly an
appropriately programmed machine should be able to pass the test.
Mirowski quite correctly emphasizes that these developments make possible,
and comport well with, what he calls methodological cyborgism: “[t]he physi-
cally intact and cognitively integrated seat of autonomy—the cohesive locus of
responsibility—is rapidly giving way to the heterogeneous and distributed jum-
ble of prostheses, genes, hybrids, hierarchies, and parallel processors” (Mirowski
2002, 441). Mirowski’s central historical insight connecting cyborg sciences with
the theorization of the cyborg as such is that the “postmodernists who wrought. . .
havoc within the house that solid bourgeois virtues built. . . was itself an efflu-
vium of intellectual innovations bubbling to the surface from the cyborg sciences,
that is, originating in the natural sciences and their collateral pursuits” (Mirowski
6Outlining a test for computerized intelligence that revolved around whether contestants com-
municating through a teletype device to two others might reliably ascertain the genders of the
participants responding through the device. If a computer replaced one of the responders and yet
managed to “win,” i.e. simulate being male or female reliably, that would count as a demonstra-
tion of computer intelligence.
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2002, 448). Thus, Haraway’s and others’ work on the cyborg has enabledMirowski
to pull together a history of developments in early twentieth century mathematics,
Operations Research during World War II, the birth of the computer, and the role
of game theory and information processing in economics, as themselves making
possible a world of the cyborg theorizations.
For these varied theorists, then, the key reason that cybernetics is interest-
ing is that it gave rise to the “cyborg”—the mangling of human and machine
in a range of different fields and, more importantly, as a methodological move.
Wiener clearly talked about cybernetics in terms of both its focus on the body and
on the possibility of its application to society as a whole. In later chapters, I argue
that biomechanics and operations research as academic disciplines have come to
be applied to cricket. Tracing these interactions, I will argue, create useful sites
for examining two concepts of some concern to anthropologists, namely affect and
number, respectively. Some recent work suggests that this connection between cy-
bernetics and anthropological problems is, separately from Gregory Bateson and
Margaret Mead’s documented involvement with cybernetics, no mere accident.
The general argument is that cybernetics has been influential on what has come
to be known in the US as French theory, including readings of Lacan, Derrida,
Deleuze, and Foucault.
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Lydia Liu builds an argument about a contemporary “cybernetic unconscious
of the postwar Euro-American world order” in delineating the connections be-
tween Lacan and cybernetics (Liu 2010, 288). Liu goes on to suggest that through
an initial set of reflections on the game that occurs in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Pur-
loined Letter,” Lacan “developed a notion of language that brought him closer
to the symbolic language of mathematics that the alleged affinity with Ferdinand
de Saussure or modern linguistics” and suggests that we should “credit him for
having accomplished for psychoanalysis what the mathematicians have done for
economic behavior in game theory” (Liu 2010, 290). Liu establishes this strik-
ing hypothesis through an argument about the connection between Lacan and
the mathematician Georges Théodule Guilbaud—they were friends from 1950 to
Lacan’s death in 1981 and attended their respective classes and seminars (Liu
2010, 299). This link is especially interesting given the well-known influence of
the formal nature of the pre-war Bourbaki movement in French mathematics on
economic theory practices in the US after the war, especially through the math-
ematician Gérard Debreu. Liu emphasizes the connections between Guilbaud’s
interest in the new—in the 1950s—game theory of John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, and the heterolinguistic “supersign” jeu/game. Briefly, the “game”
of game theory entered France as “jeu,” only to travel back to the US as “play”
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(Liu 2010, 291).7 This is part of the mechanism, Liu suggests, by which “American
game theory and cybernetics became progressively unseen and unmarked through
their Frenchness” when the concepts they generated migrated back into the US
(Liu 2010, 293).
Whereas Liu suggests that a cybernetic unconscious is at stake in the suppres-
sion of the role of cybernetics in “theory” in the US, in a slightly earlier article
Céline Lafontaine points to a rather more understated possible reason: “[cyber-
netics] carried a new paradigm combining the scientific and technical discoveries
of the day.” As it carried a variety of such discoveries, “no unified definition of cy-
bernetics has been able to impose itself.” This lack of precision or “blurredness,”
Lafontaine goes on to argue, “combined with a high level of conceptual flexi-
bility, . . . has given the informational paradigm the strength to diffuse widely”
(Lafontaine 2007, 28).
Lafontaine’s use of “paradigm” here is not accidental—the accent is on cyber-
netics as an epistemic revolution (Lafontaine 2007, 32), one that played in partic-
ular a lasting role in structuralism. The article focuses primarily on Claude Lévi-
Strauss and argues that “[n]ot only did Lévi-Strauss draw from the cybernetics
universe his ‘spirit without subjectivity’ model, but the entire project of structural
7See also the translation of “stochastic” into what became and remained “aleatory” when it
returned to the US. The former is straightforward and mathematical, the latter, Liu argues, is
confusing and philosophical (Liu 2010, 305 n52).
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anthropology consisted in interpreting society as a whole according to a general
theory of communication” (Lafontaine 2007, 32). Lafontaine carefully notes the
connection between Roman Jakobson and cybernetics through Jakobson’s atten-
dance at the Macy Conferences (Lafontaine 2007, 33). Lévi-Strauss in turn was,
of course, deeply indebted to Jakobson. It is worth noting a further connection
that Lafontaine does not draw on. In trying to translate Jakobson’s new linguis-
tics theory into an account of kinship and society, Lévi-Strauss in turn came to
depend on a key contribution by the mathematician André Weil, a leading of the
formal Bourbaki movement in pre-war France.8
Lafontaine also finds a series of explicit connections between Lacan and cy-
bernetics. As with Lévi-Strauss, Lacan discussed the influence of cybernetic ideas
on his own work explicitly. In addition, and importantly, Jacques Derrida also
worked directly with and against cybernetic ideas. Derrida, Lafontaine notes,
thought of cybernetics as a field of writing and criticized Wiener for not hav-
ing thought through all its philosophical consequences. In particular, Derrida
wanted to “purge it of all metaphysical concepts” related to “soul, life, value,
choice and memory” (Lafontaine 2007, quoted from Of Grammatology, 37). Just
as cybernetics is not concerned with the meaning of a message, only its unique-
8On the connections between Bourbaki, Weil, and Lévi-Strauss, see Amir Aczel (2006). On the
connection between the latter and Jakobson, see Bernard D. Geoghegan (2011).
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ness, so also might one consider Derrida’s refusal of the second part of the dyad
signifier/signified. The philosophical consequence, for cybernetics and for decon-
struction, is meant to be a kind of erasure of the subject. For the latter, this is an
erasure that leads to, in Lafontaine’s words, the “possibility of for any uniqueness
to become a pluralization of a signifying chain that is then open to infinite and
unlimited interpretation” (Lafontaine 2007, 38).
Some of this language is likely familiar to scholars interested in Giles Deleuze.
Here too Lafontaine finds an important line of influence. Lafontaine notes in par-
ticular that the very idea of the plateau comes directly from a Macy Conferences
participant in quoting directly from A Thousand Plateaus: “Gregory Bateson uses
the word plateau to designate something really special: an infinite region of in-
tensities that vibrates unto itself and expands by avoiding any orientation toward
a culminating point or an exterior end” (Lafontaine 2007, quoted from A Thousand
Plateaus, 39). In addition to this explicit citation, Lafontaine puts some weight on
Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of deterritorialized bodies composed of machines,
immaterial and heterogeneous interconnected rhizomes, and so on, as indicators
of the deep influence of cybernetics.
The connections between cybernetics and Foucault are, in Lafontaine’s hands,
also ones of suggestiveness rather than direct citation. Lafontaine argues that
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“[i]n defining power as a system of relations and emphasizing its discursive na-
ture, Foucault is well and truly in line with the cybernetic rupture.” Moreover,
Foucault’s notion of power is “strangely similar to cybernetic control” (Lafontaine
2007, 36). Lafontaine draws on a note by Henri Lefebvre to build this connection.
Lefebvre wrote against the structuralist notion of system and characterized Fou-
cauldian theory in particular in the following way: “could it not then be cyber-
netics in the end, until now ignored . . . by the ‘pure’ philosophers, be they even
structuralists” (Lafontaine 2007, Quoted from Position: contre les technocrates, 37).
The connections that Lafontaine draws here regarding control between cyber-
netics and Foucault are certainly suggestive rather than firm. However, given the
explicit and important lines of influence between cybernetics and Lévi-Strauss,
Lacan, Deleuze, and Derrida, as well as Hacking’s account of Canguilhem and
Foucault on cybernetics (Hacking 1998), it does seem to be worth reflecting on
a situation where the ideas of the primary scholar used by anthropologists and
others in the US to build critiques of neoliberalism may themselves be partially
built out of a set of concepts–cybernetics—that was created at the same moment
that neoliberal theory was itself put together.
The question of control that was so central to Wiener’s conception of cyber-
netics comes up in another important context. One of Clifford Geertz’s early
Introduction 34
articles on the concept of culture was built directly on the idea of control and
makes the connection to cybernetics quite straightforward.9 Geertz explains in
“The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man” that “culture is
best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns—customs, usages, tra-
ditions, habit clusters—as has, by and large, been the case up to now, but as a
set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer en-
gineers call ‘programs’)—for the governing of behavior” (Geertz 1973, 44). This
passage is compatible with a cybernetic notion of control, precisely in the sense
that something that has been programmed is capable, at least in principle, of
being programmed differently.
Certainly, Geertz was clear that this notion of control comes from cybernetics.
He wrote that this idea of culture as control is not novel, but “a number of re-
cent developments, both within anthropology and in other sciences (cybernetics,
information theory, neurology, molecular genetics) have made them susceptible
of more precise statement” (Geertz 1973, 45). Geertz introduced the important
idea of the publicity of culture as follows: “The ‘control mechanism’ view of cul-
ture begins with the assumption that human thought is basically both social and
public—that its natural habitat is the house yard, the marketplace, and the town
square. Thinking consists not of ‘happenings in the head’ . . . but of a traffic in
9I owe this observation to Anush Kapadia and Poornima Paidipaty.
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what have been called, by G.H. Mead and others, significant symbols” (Geertz
1973, 45).
These two ideas, of culture-as-program and public-thought are exactly a con-
ception of a society that is accessible and reprogrammable over time. Geertz’s
influence on cognate disciplines like political theory on the one hand, and the
return to concerns with tradition and habit that Geertz marked as inadequate in
some recent strands of contemporary anthropology on the other, suggest that this
early turn to cybernetics continues to exert some effect on contemporary anthro-
pological theory.
1.4 Anthropology of sport and cricket in India
The general literature on the anthropology of sport is sparse (Blanchard and
Cheska 1985, Guttmann 1994, Sands 1999, Moore 2004), however some valuable
work on sport and techniques of the body is available (Alter 1992, Mills and Sen
2004, Wacquant 2004). This work is not directed at an understanding of the pro-
duction of techniques of the body, however, and therefore is not readily capable
of making connections from the body back to society at large. Work on cricket in
India concerns, for the most part, general histories of the game (Guha 2002, Ma-
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jumdar 2004).10 There are two important exceptions here. Ashis Nandy (Nandy
1989) has argued that cricket in India, because particularly suited to Indian cul-
ture, enabled Indians to judge their rulers against the supposed ideals of the game
and found them wanting. Arjun Appadurai (1996) provides a useful quick sur-
vey of the importance of cricket in understanding modern India and suggests that
cricket is ideal for the play of nationalist passion because it is a site within which
experiments with modernity can safely by conducted by the various interested
parties to cricket. The list of such parties is instructive:
1. The state, because cricket “offers the sense of being able to ma-
nipulate nationalist sentiment.”
2. “To technocrats, publicists, journalists, and publishers. . . it pro-
vides the sense of skill in handling the techniques of televising
sports spectacles.”
3. “To the private sector, cricket affords a means of linking leisure,
stardom, and nationalism. . . .”
4. “To the viewing public, cricket affords the sense of cultural liter-
acy in a world sport. . . .”
5. “To the upper-middle-class viewer, it affords the privatized plea-
10For a useful general note on the discipline of history and sport, see Guttmann (2003).
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sures of bringing stardom and nationalist sentiment within the
safe and sanitized environs of the living room.”
6. “To working-class and lumpen youth, it offers the sense of group
belonging, potential violence, and bodily excitement. . . .”
7. “To rural viewers. . . [it] gives a sense of control over the lives of
stars, the fate of nations, and the electricity of cities.” (Appadurai
1996, 112)
The class analysis is rather curious, not least because it is entirely speculative,
but the important point is that both Nandy and Appadurai, drawing their inspi-
ration in many ways from C.L.R. James (1963), proceed from the assumption that
Indian cricket is a stable entity that represents an engagement with colonialism,
nationalism, and modernity. One can draw out the meaning of the former for the
latter.
1.5 A summary
Rather than reading cricket for its wider resonances, my project proceeds from
the notion that an understanding of contemporary cricket—the community of
players, coaches, regulators, and spectators that collectively constitute this game
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as a thing—and the role that biomechanics and operations research as cybernetics-
derived sciences plays in it, may illuminate the connection between biomechanics
and certain arguments about affect—arguments that draw on a theorist, Deleuze,
who may himself have been in part informed by cybernetics—on the one hand,
and operations research and particular arguments about number, on the other.
The emphasis throughout is not on why these sciences have come to play the role
they have in cricket, but rather an elucidation of what that role is and the way
the technologies they have introduced are shifting as they have been introduced
to cricket while simultaneously reconstructing cricket itself.
The next chapter examines the burgeoning role of coaches trained in biome-
chanics in helping cricket players improve their bowling actions by using ethno-
graphic data from a fast bowling coaching center in Chennai called the “MRF
Pace Foundation” (MRF). My fieldwork there took place between January and
August, 2007. A large number of past and current fast bowlers who have repre-
sented India have been coached at the MRF by T.A. Sekar and Dennis Lillee. I
examine the relationship between the biomechanics they employ and the trained
to be malleable bodies of such professional cricket players.
Cricket is the only popular sport that is constituted by laws, not rules. In
general, umpires do not enforce rules on the field of play, instead they adju-
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dicate disputes between players according to the laws of cricket. The ongoing
rapid commercialization of the game has compressed the form in which cricket
is played and heightened the pressures on players to win matches. One con-
sequence has been substantial changes in the laws of the game and how those
laws are enforced. Neoliberalism has been conceptualized by Foucault as a pro-
cess that drives subjects toward a responsibility to develop one’s own “human
capital.” I argue in chapter 3 that the turn to affect in critical theory and anthro-
pology can be read as an attempt to trace that change and the effects it has had on
contemporary governmentality. I suggest that one strand of affect theory can be
read as a mechanism that articulates law with society and examine in this chapter
how cricket players train bodily affect through, in part, the use of the science of
biomechanics. This science—the study of life and the forces that act upon it—has
played a crucial role in dealing with an important and controversial question in
contemporary cricket—how does an umpire know whether a bowler has thrown
the ball, thereby gaining an “unfair” advantage? An examination of the debates
on this question and the changes in the laws of cricket driven through the labora-
tory findings on throwing illuminates, I argue, the entanglement of biomechanics,
law and affect on the playing field.
Anthropologies of post and late modernity have offered a wide array grounds
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for concern about the contemporary world predicated on crisis, anxiety, apathy,
or denial about the modern world, along with a tracing of emerging new modes
of discourses, institutions, or modes of being. I argue in chapter 4 that such
analyses of the contemporary in cultural anthropology have necessarily been or-
ganized around a concern with and prophesies about immanent futures. A paper
published in a leading Operations Research journal in 1998 offered a means to, in
effect, predict the outcome of games of cricket. This has become important given
the popularity of “limited-overs cricket”—games that by construction must end
in a win or a loss. The eponymous and proprietary Duckworth-Lewis method
introduced in that paper works by reducing the state of a game of cricket to
two factors—the number of deliveries remaining and the number of batsmen still
available. It now forms a crucial part of the laws regulating cricket through en-
suring that the winner of an otherwise rain interrupted game can be calculated
statistically.
There are a number of objections that one could make to the Duckworth-Lewis
method. On the one hand, on statistical grounds one might point out that the
formula it uses was chosen rather arbitrarily and has so many degrees of freedom
that it is easy to “fit” it to available data. On the other hand, the claim that it
is a mere two-factor model—what matters in assessing the state of an innings
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is only how many overs and wickets are remaining—itself seems to run counter
to traditional sensibilities about the subtlety of the game. I argue in chapter
5 that more recent operations research articles building upon the Duckworth-
Lewis method are not susceptible to these kinds of critique. Indeed, I suggest,
these new approaches, employing a simulation of cricket innings in order to build
non-parametric models of rain-interruptions, are novel analyses that fall out of
the kinds of arguments that scholars have made about the role of statistics in
contemporary forms of governmentality.
Chapter 2
Biomechanics and the habits of
bowling fast
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When I first met Irfan Pathan at the Madras Rubber Factory Pace Foundation
grounds in May 2007, he had already been working in the Foundation’s gym for
some weeks. As with other sports, a large part of the strengthening programs
for fast bowlers like Irfan consisted of core strengthening exercises and this was
indeed an important focus for him. Irfan had been playing for the Indian national
side since 2003, but had struggled to maintain his position in the side as his form
waned and by the end of 2006 he was out of the national team. Irfan was familiar
with the MRF grounds and personnel because he had started training there well
before his international debut and had returned to regain his form.
In this chapter, I demonstrate through an appraisal of Irfan’s training meth-
ods the imbrication of biomechanics into fast bowling in contemporary cricket.
Biomechanics works in coaching fast bowling through making bowlers’ bodies
just malleable enough to reformulate their bowling actions. This ability to make
bodies malleable comes at the cost of isolating the act of bowling from its target—
the batsman. I argue that there is an interesting tension between the authority
that biomechanics gains—by isolating bowling from batting—and the resulting
circumscribing of its usefulness—by not being able to account for why some
bowlers continue to fall out of form when playing competitive cricket.
The regular bowlers training at the Foundation were warming up on the field.
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I saw the head coach T.A. Sekar in the gym trying to set up his laptop and helped
him with that. This became a recurring motif over time—trying to stay useful
to the coaches, staff, and players by helping them get on with their work. Sekar
was a professional fast bowler himself and had playing for India in the 1980’s.
As the head coach at the MRF Foundation since the late 1980’s, he had coached a
number of the fast bowlers who had played for India since then. The interactions
between Sekar, training in biomechanics and keen to formulate what he called the
science of bowling, and Irfan form the central dynamic of this chapter. Sekar had
been setting up his laptop in order to show Irfan some video footage of him in the
MRF nets. Sekar was using software called SiliconCoach Pro to demonstrate to
Irfan that his bowling action had changed recently and needed to be fine-tuned.
The implication was that if he was successful he might be able to get back into the
Indian team and bowl successfully. Irfan did in fact regain his place in the side
by the end of 2007.
The SiliconCoach company is based in New Zealand but sell their software
product and the training to use it to professional sportsmen around the world .
They note on their website that “SiliconCoach has committed team of program-
mers, biomechanists, physical educators and marketing executives who all share
a desire to provide simple-to-use products that make a difference.”1 Indeed, the
1Last accessed 9/3/12, http://www.silionoah.om/\#produts
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founder of the company—Joe Morrison—is himself trained in biomechanics. At
its core the software program simply aids handling video footage, but this alone
is no mean programming feat as I discovered in my own amateur efforts later
during my fieldwork. The suite of programs produced by SiliconCoach consists
of a number of tools to overlay the raw video footage with marks of various kinds.
A coach uses these marks across multiple frames to measure the angles of limb
and whole body movements, compare one set of slow motion video frames repre-
senting one attempt at a particular movement to another set of frames, and so on,
in order to help a player improve on their playing technique. The program helps a
coach track any degradation of the player’s technique over the course of one prac-
tice session as they get tired and helps the coach demonstrate differences between
two or more different players’ technique. Morrison, the founder of SiliconCoach,
suggested in an interview with a martial arts coach that:
Your perception of your movements are from looking outwards from
your body but people are actually judging you externally, you need to
see what they are seeing in relation to your technique. You need to
know exactly where your limbs are not where you think they are. It’s
also a great motivational tool that accelerates development and that
always excites people (Todd 2005).
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Sekar’s use of the program with Irfan and the other bowlers made it clear
that this was the core feature of SiliconCoach at the MRF. It enabled the play-
ers to create a feedback loop between what they felt they were doing with their
bodies proprioceptively and what they could subsequently see they were doing
once “marked up” by their coach. However, the program and the associated
equipment—laptop, camera, video and power cables, etc.—were cumbersome to
use on a regular basis. In order to operate all of that equipment, arrangements
were often made to bring in SiliconCoach specialists for practice sessions. The rest
of the time, the methodology at the MRF would have been familiar to any cricket
player. Sekar or another coach would simply demonstrate what they wanted a
player to do with their bodies. The players would imitate that demonstration and
seek the approval of the coach.
An important feature of the approach to fast bowling coaching at the MRF—
one that marked it out as different from other coaching venues—was the isolation
of the act of bowling itself. The whole panoply of considerations a coach of a team
might introduce vis-à-vis bowlers, batsmen, and fielders playing a competitive
game of cricket is carefully erased in Sekar’s work with individual fast bowlers
at the MRF. My arrival at the MRF happened to mark the beginning of active use
of the cricket nets at the ground. All the players training there had been working
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largely in the gym or doing other kinds of exercises in the cricket field next to
the gym. Using the nets—that is, actually bowling against batsman and using
the netting to keep the batsmen’s shots from spreading far afield—was a separate
activity that was just starting after a period of reconditioning of the grass surface
of the nets. Yet even in the nets, Sekar’s suggestions were never focused on the
effects of a particular bowling act. He was never concerned explicitly whether
a bowler was bowling a particular line or length—the direction of the ball that
was bowled at a batsman—or the kind of delivery a bowler was working on. His
focus was on the act itself, independently of the effects of the act. Late in my
fieldwork, Andre Coley, the then coach of the Jamaican Under-19 team, who was
there to learn about Sekar’s approach said to me that he found this remarkable.
He detailed his surprise that there was no real discussion about the tactics of
bowling to particular kinds of batsmen, work on different kinds of deliveries, and
other discussions about the strategies and tactics of fast bowling in cricket—the
staple conversation, in short, of most cricket coaching venues.
It is not, of course, that Sekar thought these matters to be unimportant. Rather,
these were matters best left to the bowler and the particular coaches he worked
with when not at the MRF. Why is this the case? What does winnowing done
the dynamics of bowling fast in this way achieve for Sekar? And how did biome-
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chanics come to form the central coaching method for fast bowling at the MRF?
I argue that the biomechanics expertize produced at the MRF is based precisely
on this limiting of its field of action. Biomechanics at the MRF isolated the act
of bowling by looping it through a feedback process either through an imitation
of the coach’s gestures or through a video representation of the bowler’s own
body. Michel Callon, in theorizing economics as a form of expertize, has argued
that “economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes, and formats
the economy, rather than observing how it functions” (Callon 1998b, 2). With
respect to the question of expertise, the pertinent term here is “shapes.” I argue
through my account of biomechanics that much of the work that science does in
producing expertise over a domain has to do with shaping what may enter into it
and what may not. I suggest that biomechanics at the MRF has established itself
by shaping and limiting its field of application to the act of bowling. To bring
other forms of expertise to the MRF is in fact to try to reshape a preexisting field
of application. Describing a domain of activity helps define, shape, and limit it.
Formulating a critique of that domain, therefore, must be intimately tied to this
act of description. I argue that attending to the successes and failures in which
particular reformulated domains gather together expertise, and the seductions of
those sets of expertise is a valuable exercise. I use the term seduction here from
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Dominic Boyer to highlight that this interaction involves a kind of prior accep-
tance of the relevant doctrine (Boyer 2008). I will suggest that this is not so much
a question of access to experts—that an expert will not talk to an anthropologist
who is openly opposed to their research agenda, for example—but rather that it
is a question of language. Producing mastery of the relevant language or jargon
is already to enter into a kind of seduction of other experts. At a minimum, it
would evince a desire to belong to that group. More importantly, possessing a
facility with that language will already format the kinds of critique one might be
able to grasp.
There are various groups of fast bowlers who attended the MRF Foundation
while I was there. The key group were young fast bowlers—in many cases they
had yet to start their professional careers but their very attendance at the MRF
had resulted in or was caused by an earmarking of them as future professional
players. A second group were the regular squad of the MRF team itself. This
professional team competed locally in Chennai against other teams with similar
corporate patronage. A third set of groups—a recent addition to the MRF set up—
were players who had paid to receive some coaching at the MRF. Lastly, there
were players who were already successful at the highest levels of international
cricket who came back to the MRF to receive further coaching. Irfan Pathan,
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along with fellow international level bowlers Sreesanth and Munaf Patel, spent
varying amounts of time at the MRF during my fieldwork there.
This fact raises an interesting question. Why was Irfan a regular attendee of
the MRF? What was it that he was learning during his various workouts there or
is it that there was something he was failing to learn? As head coach, Sekar was
enormously influential at the MRF. Indeed, the lack of a formal association with
the BCCI—the private regulatory authority of cricket in India—notwithstanding, I
am sure that a positive word from Sekar about some young player would certainly
improve the odds of them being given a chance at a professional level. Sekar
himself played professional cricket as a fast bowler, including a few games for
India. However, a story often repeated at the MRF and told to me first by Sekar
himself centered on the role that Dennis Lillee plays at the MRF. Lillee, a well
known ex-player for Australia with a fast bowling record that places him amongst
the best who have ever played the game, had been coming to the MRF several
times a year since the late 1980s.
The Foundation’s importance to cricket in India rests largely on its employ-
ment of Dennis Lillee as a pace bowling consultant. Lillee was a fast bowler for
Australia in the 1970s and 1980s, but his career was marked by a sharp change in
bowling technique brought on by a severe back injury. Working with an athlet-
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ics coach and then a biomechanics expert, he remodeled his bowling action and
regained his position in the Australian team. Up until that moment, Sekar told
me, fast bowlers who damaged their backs as a result of having a “bad” action
rarely made any kind of professional level re-entry into the game. Consequent
biomechanical work on fast bowlers in laboratories—detailed below—worked on
this same kind of injury to the lumbar vertebrae, but focuses on younger play-
ers who have yet to make a name for themselves at the highest levels. Sekar’s
argument was that young talented players were unable to continue their nascent
careers because they were injuring themselves.
There was, in short, a self-selection bias at work historically. The best profes-
sional players were precisely the players who did not have the kind of problem
of technique that might lead to such injuries. Lillee was unusual in that respect.
Reworking his bowling action through the application of biomechanics and there-
fore rehabilitating his bowling career, Lillee was, in this telling, the main conduit
of the entry of biomechanics into cricket. Lillee’s training in biomechanics comes
from sports science work in Australia, particularly in Melbourne and Adelaide.
Given his stature within the game as a former player and his access to training
by the best of cricket biomechanics experts, he is, unsurprisingly, the primary
route for transfers of biomechanical knowledge from laboratories in Australia to
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fast bowlers in India in particular. The best of the compliments Sekar paid Lillee,
again repeated several times in varying contexts, was that Lillee had a “mind like
a computer”—a mind that did not need video footage and laptops—in analyz-
ing and suggesting corrections in a bowler’s action. Lillee is certainly famous in
cricketing circles as an ex-fast bowler. That alone would lend a certain author-
ity to anything he had to say about other, current, fast bowlers. This particular
compliment, however, adds to that authority a picture of Lillee as an expert not
just in the science of biomechanics but also in the manner of its application. He
is so advanced that he does not need the computer device prostheses that other
coaches rely on.
Within this story about how biomechanics came into cricket, the reason why
biomechanics has been successful is meant to be straightforward. It is effective.
This claim is not just about injury prevention—although that was certainly a re-
curring claim at the MRF—but also about the effectiveness of biomechanics as a
method of analyzing and improving bowling actions. I suspect that the implicit
claim is that the gap between the best and worst players has narrowed along with
a general improvement among contemporary pace bowlers as a whole. This claim
is probably more likely to strike cricket followers as false, but it is difficult to prove
or disprove given all the other changes that have occurred in cricket that pertain
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to the other parts of a cricket game—batting and fielding. As I shall demonstrate
in the next chapter biomechanics also came to play a role in regulating cricket
performances, not just in trying to improve such performances.
Leaving aside how biomechanics came to be applied to cricket and why it was
accepted, there remains the question of what kind of domain biomechanics carved
out for itself. I will argue in this chapter that Irfan and players like him are in part
the product of a biomechanics that authorizes itself by shaping a particular field of
application, yet precisely for that reason also produces a limit on its effectiveness
as a sports science. It both works and does not work because it limits its field of
application. The particular kind of boundary it puts in place for itself raises, I will
argue later, an interesting anthropological problem about human movement.
2.1 Liberalization and expertise of the body
Broadcasting deregulation in India in 1991 resulted in the creation of a market for
televised cricket. Audiences for some international matches involving India some-
times run into the hundreds of millions. Although there are some other cricket
playing countries that have significantly richer individual consumers available—
principally England and Australia—India’s population is large enough that the
value of access to its nascent “middle-class” consumers has made it the new fi-
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nancial center of world cricket. One striking marker of that change is the Indian
Premier League—a league instituted in 2008 that is composed of city-based teams
in India. These local teams can draw on leading players from around the world
because the salaries the teams can afford dwarf payments that those players can
garner playing for their own national teams (Cricinfo 2008).
This was a new market for cricket because televised cricket in India before
1991 was broadcast solely on Doordarshan—a public television channel—and the
concept of selling rights to cricket did not exist. In fact, on occasion, the organi-
zation in charge of cricket in India would pay Doordarshan to help defray the
broadcasting costs. Such a system of payments could come across as surprising
to Indians now, given the evidently close and deep imbrication of global cricket
and the demands of television advertising derived money from this new Indian
market.
The extra money available in cricket over the last 20 years has had an important
effect on the game. To succeed at the highest levels, players need access to a
whole infrastructure of training such as that found at the MRF that was simply
not available earlier. Cricket is a predominately visual and tactile team game
played over long quiet periods of time punctuated by repeated quick actions. As
with baseball, a hard ball is struck with a wooden bat in order that the batsman
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may score “runs.” In professional cricket the ball is projected by a bowler from
a distance of approximately 20 yards at speeds sometimes in excess of 90 miles
per hour. When the ball is struck well, it can fly at similar speeds towards the
fielders. The result is that playing cricket has come to require both a high degree
of attention (Crary 1999) and a set of instinctive habituated skills (Bourdieu 1990).
Cricket training is targeted precisely at the development of the level of attention
and correct habits needed to play well. Furthermore, visual technologies such as
the SiliconCoach programs are being deployed in this training of attention and
habit. I examine here the role of attention and habit in the formation of cricket
bodies at one important venue in contemporary cricket.
The new forms of expertise developed in cricket in India are being strongly
opposed by some other participants within the game. The example I give in this
chapter concerns the development of biomechanics in pace bowling. By experts I
refer, simply, to practitioners of a kind of securitization of life who are frequently
all too eager to pursue their craft. Here I mean “life” in the sense that Wiener
tried to capture with a cybernetic understanding of the overlapping connections
between machines and biological organisms. And by “securitization,” I refer to
the sets of techniques that Mirowski argues post-war economics has made avail-
able in contemporary financial markets that work to break up and reformulate
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prior market products. Experts have come to play a variety of roles in cricket.
They are involved in the creation and operation of markets for both broadcasting
rights for television (Raj 2004) and for the players themselves in the form of player
auctions in the newly formed private club-based and compressed “Twenty20”
version of the game (Kidd 2008, Richards 2008); and to the development of novel
visual (Scott-Elliot 2001, Pringle 2008) and statistical technologies to help both
audiences and players alike improve on their understanding of the game.
The problem presented by such experts and the field of application that they
shape that is not primarily about the possibly deleterious effects of that expertise
on the world but merely the manner of its production of a field of application.
They
The chapter explores the grounds and limits of growing expert knowledge in
cricket. But this is not an argument that is concerned primarily with examining
the negative effects of new knowledge forms on an old and storied sport. Such
a focus may simply re-circulate a familiar anxiety amongst an older and elite
cricket-watching public that cricket, with all itâA˘Z´s recent growing pains, might
cease to be the leisurely and gentlemanly sport it once was. In other words, I
want to guard against a certain nostalgia for non-commercial cricket. Instead, I
offer an account of how certain experts work so as to construct a new thing—
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biomechanically inflected fast bowling—and in doing so draw together processes
and people that were not imbricated with each other before.
Cricket followers could argue quite plausibly, for example, that the West In-
dian bowlers of the 1970’s and 1980’s were far superior to current bowlers from
various teams around the world. One kind of response might try to track the
variance of international pace bowling quality and pace, suggesting that the gap
between the worst and slowest bowlers on the one hand and the best and fastest
bowlers on the other has narrowed considerably with the advent of biomechan-
ics in cricket. My focus here is rather different from this kind of debate. I will
argue that regardless of the successes or failures of biomechanics with respect
to the changes it has introduced into cricket, its application to fast bowling is
necessarily limited by the manner of its interventions. Biomechanics is limited in
effectiveness precisely it needs to limit its field of application in order to intervene
in cricket.
2.2 Biomechanics
Biomechanists could trace their discipline’s history back to Aristotle’s De Motu
Animalium given how broadly the discipline is defined. The more typically cited
candidate for a founder of retrospectively derived story of biomechanics is Gio-
Biomechanics and the habits of bowling fast 58
vanni Alfonso Borelli and his work in the 17th century on animal mobility and the
forces generated within bodies by the activities and functions of life (Brand 2002).
However, given that biomechanics as a discipline did not exist in the United States
or in Australia until the 1960s (Drewlinger 1996), it is more useful to think of it as
an important part of cybernetics derived sciences as they were formulated during
and shortly after World War II. Certainly for Wiener there is a clear relationship
between his work on cybernetics and what became the discipline of biomechan-
ics shortly afterward. With such sciences, the accent is on the set of techniques
used to analyze and optimize the operations of not just particular organizations,
but also and in similar fashion particular organisms and the machines they may
interact with. The emphasis in this case is on using engineering principles and
theory to understand how living beings move. Subfields of biomechanics include
soft body dynamics (animal tissues, for example), locomotion and gait analy-
sis, and ergonomy. I concentrate here on human movement, specifically sports
biomechanics, which targets both improved performance and injury avoidance.
Biomechanics as a science deployed within cricket works on the first of the
poles of development that Aihwa Ong writes about. As I suggest in the Introduc-
tion, the idea that the body is a machine is constitutive of this discipline. Specif-
ically, in biomechanics the body is a machine that consists of articulated bones
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and the muscles acting upon those bones. It is principally organized around the
linear and angular kinetics—the Newtonian mechanics—of the “musculoskeletal
system.” Biomechanics as a discipline in sports in particular works by separating
a player from their own muscles and joints. The players, along with coaches, join
with biomechanists themselves to become experts in the movement of individual
limbs relative to one another. For all these participants, becoming an expert is
to carefully and continuously monitor the relationship between the experience of
having a body and the knowledge one gains of the biomechanics as a science.
In order to help players do this, I found that Sekar would continually both
explain the basic principle behind a change in habit that he suggested they em-
ploy and also demonstrate what that change looks like to the player. I discovered
that it was quite impossible to follow Sekar’s discussions with the players about
their technique without mimicking his gestures myself. Over time, he would on
occasion use me as a model for the particular movement that he wanted to high-
light to a player. In other words, these discussions about particular muscles and
when to activate them in the act of bowling inevitably threw up a “motivation”
attached to that speech. This performative aspect of expertise at the MRF was
crucial to its deployment. To be able to demonstrate an action and, perhaps even
more importantly, respond to subtle changes in the attempts of a player trying
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to mimic that demonstration was a key part of the dynamic between Sekar and
the players he was coaching. The importance of this gestural aspect of coaching
bowlers will form an important part of the argument I build about the limits of
the biomechanical expertize that Sekar is able to deploy.
To understand how those limits are formed requires a knowledge of the fun-
damental features of biomechanics as a science applied to sports. An important
textbook in the field by Duane Knudson explains that “Biomechanics has been
defined as the study of the movement of living things using the science of mechanics.”
(Knudson 2007, 3) In relation to sport, which is the principal focus of this textbook,
Knudson notes that the “applications of biomechanics to human movement can be
classified into two main areas: the improvement of performance and the reduction
or treatment of injury” (Knudson 2007, 5). Knudson’s account is useful because it
lists nine fundamentals of biomechanics. The fundamentals, that is, of the use of
biomechanics in sports. Knudson states that they are “general rules that currently
fit what we currently know about the biomechanics of human movement.” They
were selected because they “constitute the minimum number of core principles
that can be applied to all human movements and because they provide a simple
paradigm or structure to apply biomechanical knowledge” (Knudson 2007, 30).
The first three—“force-motion,” “force-time,” and “inertia”—are restatements of
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Newton’s three laws of motion. The general theme is that a change in position—
movement—of a human body can be studied through examining the forces that
must have acted over some period of time on that body to create that movement.
The fourth is the “range of movement” of a body which “can be specified by lin-
ear or angular motion of the body segments.” The fifth is “balance” and the sixth
is“coordination continuum”—the varying quantities of sequential or simultane-
ous recruitment of muscles acting on joints to execute some movement (Knudson
2007, 33-4). Knudson’s seventh principle of “segmental interaction” states that the
“forces acting in a system of linked rigid bodies can be transferred through the
links or joints.” However, Knudson notes, the “exact mechanism of this principle
of biomechanics is not entirely clear, and common classification of movements as
open or closed chains is not clear or useful in analyzing movement.” The eight
and ninth principles, “optimal projection” and “spin,” are really more about the
motion of projectiles released by players in certain sports and form little part of
biomechanical research in cricket (Knudson 2007, 34).
At the moment a bowler releases the ball, the body, in this frame, is best con-
ceptualized as a series of articulations—for a right-handed bowler, the series starts
at the toes of left foot, to the left ankle, knee, and then hip, and along the verte-
brae to the right shoulder joints, and then the right wrist and finger joints. If this
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sequence is concatenated with one another correctly, the pace bowler will release
the ball both at high speed and with sufficient control to make that speed useful
on the playing field. Knudson’s first three principles are straightforward appli-
cations of Newton’s Laws on human bodies, subject to the range of movement
that such physical bodies can undertake. The next three are the ones where bod-
ies become rather more than mere physical objects—coordinating the segmental
interaction of a player’s limbs seems exactly to correspond to what sports play-
ers commonly call “technique.” As I shall demonstrate, very little biomechanics
research addresses the problem of how one’s technique might change over time,
much less purposively improve it.
Moreover, the sixth and seventh principles that Knudson lists—precisely the
ones that he discusses the least—are I argue the most important part of the ap-
plication of biomechanics to cricket. These two principles, the coordination con-
tinuum and segmental interaction, concern the manner in which the timing and
coordination of how muscles are recruited into rotating a series of joints is crucial
to powerful movement. They help define the difference between pushing—what
Sekar called “putting” in discussions with players—the ball towards a batsman
and either bowling or throwing the ball at great pace on the cricket field (Blaze-
vich 2012, 196–98). Consider standing in an open field, holding a ball in your hand
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and “wind-milling” your arm forwards as fast as possible but at an even angular
velocity all the way around. If you release the ball on one of the occasions when
your arm reaches its highest point, the ball will fly forwards. As bowlers run
up to the wicket before releasing the ball, one might add your running speed to
whatever you can generate from simply rotating their arm repeatedly and evenly
as fast as possible. But this resulting total speed, whatever it is, will never be as
fast as what you can achieve when using proper technique. From a biomechan-
ics perspective, the angular velocity achieved by windmilling your arm over and
over is limited by the speed with which you can contract the complicated series
of muscles associated with rotating the shoulder joint forward. In general, the
more “fast-twitch” muscle fibers you have and the more of them you can success-
fully “recruit” into this exercise, the faster your shoulder joint will rotate. The
key to actually bowl fast lies rather in the tendons that connect those muscles to
the skeleton. Tendons are typically both much more elastic than muscles and they
can recoil from a stretched state much faster than a muscle can contract (Blazevich
2012, 201). The key to bowling fast is in fact to stretch those tendons using the
muscles they work with and use the recoil from them as you relax those muscles
to propel the ball forwards. The segmental interaction Knudson lists as a funda-
mental principle of biomechanics is crucial here. To bowl well is to stagger in just
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the right coordinated way a series of stretches of the tendons of your joints from,
for a right-handed bowler, the left foot all the way up to the right hand so that
they work in concert to propel the ball forwards at the batsman.
Although there were some earlier articles on biomechanics and cricket, the first
noticeable cluster of findings were all on fast bowling in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Some of these authors are precisely the scientists Lillee consulted as he
attempted to rebuild his bowling action. A review of the then existing literature
in 1996 lists two possible reasons why fast bowling had drawn the attention of
biomechanists: first, that it “may be because of the importance which this element
of the game has acquired, particularly in the last decade or so” and, second,
possibly because “it is widely considered that fast bowling in cricket is one of
the non-contact activities most susceptible to injury, as evidenced by the almost
epidemic proportions which injuries to the lower back have reached among fast
bowlers” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 403). Bartlett et al go on to argue that:
Success in fast bowling is determined by a combination of many fac-
tors, one extremely important variable being the speed at which the
ball is released. A fast ball release speed reduces the time available
for the batsman to make correct decisions about the path of the ball,
thus increasing the demands on the effector mechanisms responsible
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for executing the correct shot. (Bartlett et al. 1996, 403)
They go on to list swing bowling—that is, a particular type of delivery involving
the ability to move the ball laterally in the air as it approaches the batsman—as
another important factor, but this is downplayed in the remainder of the article
as there has not been “any quantified, systematic research into the association
between aspects of the bowler’s technique and success in bowling in-swing or
out-swing” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 418).
The key point for Bartlett is that listing speed of release as the main factor
justifies the relevance of a mechanical understanding of fast bowling. The further
implicit claim is that the faster the ball, the less time the batsman will have to
make a correct decision about the likely path of the ball and execute an appropri-
ate shot. As I will note in the next chapter, I found in the field that this assumption
is not necessarily true. The authors list “three main techniques prevalent in cricket
fast bowling, although the boundaries between them are not fixed and they exist
within a continuum of techniques” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 404). This is the biome-
chanics research that has subsequently become a mainstay of cricket coaching,
codified in manuals and cricket coaching syllabi (Woolmer et al. 2008). The first,
the “side-on technique,” the authors state “has been advocated as the correct and
most effective way to bowl.” A little before a right-handed side-on bowler re-
Biomechanics and the habits of bowling fast 66
leases the ball, the bowler’s right foot will be perpendicular to the direction the
ball will be released and both shoulders will lie in roughly that same plane that
the ball will follow between the bowler and the batsman. At the equivalent mo-
ment in action, a “front-on” bowler will have their right foot point towards the
batsman and the shoulders will be “open chested,” i.e. pointing away to the left
of the batsman and the ball’s flight path. This, the authors state, is the “technique
often used by the West Indian fast bowlers” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 404). These two
different methods were already well-known. Coaches outside the West Indies felt
obliged to teach bowlers not to bowl with a chest-on action, yet were faced with
a West Indian team that had dominated world cricket over the previous 20 years
with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of fast bowlers with exactly that kind of
action. Bartlett’s framing of a discussion of the biomechanics of fast bowling by
reference to West Indian bowlers suggests the possibility that one of the initial
motivations for studying fast bowling in Australia and in England was out of a
desire to produce more injury-free fast bowlers in those countries.
The signal contribution of biomechanics to fast bowling comes from an identi-
fication of a “mixed” bowling action. As the name suggests it consists of a mix of
the first two bowling action techniques. Typically, the lower half of the bowler’s
body is as with an open chested action, but the upper half of the body is side-
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on. So the bowler’s back foot points down the pitch towards the batsman, but
the bowler’s shoulders are in the same plane with each other and the batsman.
But this, as with the descriptions of the other actions, is just a snapshot of one
moment somewhat before the ball is released. The key point about the mixed
action lies in its dynamics. A mixed action is “characterized by bowlers adopting
a front-on foot and shoulder orientation at back foot strike, which is followed by
a realignment of the shoulders to a more side-on position during the delivery
stride” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 405). Yet in all three cases, at the moment in which
they release the ball, bowlers are in a chest-on position. So a mixed action bowler
has started chest-on, rotated to a side-on position to some extent, and then rotated
back again. All along, their feet have been pointing at the batsman. As the article
notes: “This technique is believed to be more likely to lead to a high incidence
of lower back problems (bony abnormalities such pedicle sclerosis, spondylolysis
and spondylolisthesis; disc degeneration and bulging)” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 405).
In a continuation of description that is near impossible to imagine unless one
is already familiar with cricket, the article divides up the act of fast bowling into
four stages of run-up, pre-delivery stride, the delivery stride, and the follow-
through, and they write that a “[p]articular emphasis will be placed on the effect
of various kinematic parameters upon the ball release speed” (Bartlett et al. 1996,
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405). Given the importance of idea of segmental sequences in biomechanics, the
article lists only two studies, one of which they deemed rather inadequate. The re-
maining study, measuring “peak linear speeds of important joints in the kinematic
chain from right hip to right (bowling) hand” found only, and rather unsurpris-
ingly, that adult bowlers had higher peak speeds than the teenagers they studied
(Bartlett et al. 1996, 414). The authors conclude that “[m]ore research is needed
into segmental contributions to ball release speed, including energy transfers be-
tween segments and aspects of segment kinetics” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 414-5). The
key finding, however, seems to be independent of this particular lack of data:
“[f]ast bowling has been implicated in a multitude of injuries, which include a
few to the upper extremity” and to the far more common “lower extremity” such
as “groin strains, hamstring strains, wear and tear of the front knee” and so on
down to “chronic bruising of the big toe, its nail and the heel” (Bartlett et al.
1996, 418). The greatest impact of biomechanics on injury research in cricket is
undoubtedly about the lower back: “[m]any elite fast bowlers have been reported
to have had serious lower back injuries, including stress fractures of the third,
fourth or fifth lumbar vertebrae. . . A research team at the University of Western
Australia has identified spondylolisthesis, pedicle sclerosis, disc degeneration and
bulging as serious and common problems for the fast bowler” (Bartlett et al. 1996,
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418).
The article identifies overuse at a young age as a contributory factor, sug-
gesting that “a possible reason for the high incidence of injuries was that young
athletes were being forced to train longer, harder and earlier in life to excel in their
chosen sports, and that the hours of repetitious practice may produce gradual de-
terioration in specific parts of the body” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 419). Aside from
over-training, there is the question of technique. Here the research, principally
from one study, is treated as unequivocal:
Finally, bowlers who used a technique that combined a front-on back
foot placement and a side-on shoulder alignment (the mixed tech-
nique) were more likely to show abnormal radiological features in the
lumbar spine. These findings provide the most conclusive evidence the
mixed technique is dangerous and places the spine in an unnecessarily
awkward and potentially injurious position at a time (front foot strike)
when ground reaction forces are at their greatest.” (Bartlett et al. 1996,
419)
In their conclusion, the authors highlight this finding, arguing not only that
“[s]cientists and coaches should avoid young bowlers acquiring this technique
and should seek to eliminate it when it is found in a bowler” but also that the
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“same collaborators should ensure that the cricket coaching manuals and litera-
ture are rewritten to feature the front-on technique as an acceptable alternative
to the side-on one, but to caution very strongly against the mixed technique and
provide clear guidelines on this” (Bartlett et al. 1996, 422).
This initial and signal moment of the entry of biomechanics into cricket has
been very effective. Coaching manuals do indeed now give equal weight to side-
on and front-on bowling techniques, whilst admonishing coaches and bowlers
from adopting a mixed technique (Pont 2010, Woolmer et al. 2008). Furthermore,
a number of countries now have formal policies in place to actively limit the
amount of bowling a young player can deliver in matches—in England a 15 year-
old bowler, for example, is not allowed to bowl more than 2 6-over spells (England
and Wales Cricket Board 2009). The article makes no mention at all of the perfor-
mance of fast bowlers on the cricket field. That is, the findings on fast bowling all
look to the problem of injury or merely collect data on how current bowlers bowl.
It is not clear how a bowler looking to biomechanics to improve on their speed
might do so. More importantly, there is little in this arena of cricket biomechanics
on how to manage changes in bowling technique, nor on the relationship be-
tween bowling technique as a manipulation of coordinated segmental interaction
of a bowler’s body and performance on the field of play. The claims that Sekar
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and Lillee make at the MRF on behalf of biomechanics are in fact not directly
supported by the key biomechanics articles on fast bowling, yet they do garner a
great deal of support from them by emphasizing, first, the findings on injury pre-
vention and, second, by making use of the principles that authors like Knudson
have put together as forming the fundamentals of biomechanics in sport.
2.3 The MRF Pace Foundation
The Madras Rubber Factory was established over fifty years ago and is primarily
involved in the production of rubber tires. In cricket, the company is probably
best known for having sponsored Sachin Tendulkar over a number of years—
Tendulkar was one of India’s major cricket players during the 1990s and remains
so today. They put their logo on his bat, so it was impossible to watch him play
without being reminded of them. The corporation also sponsors a professional
club team in Chennai. This form of corporate patronage links the company to
the very beginnings of cricket in India. Princely patronage of cricket formed the
bedrock of “native” Indian cricket (Cashman 1980). I write here instead, how-
ever, about the MRF Pace Foundation which has been in operation for more than
twenty years. The Foundation coaches young fast bowlers who have been se-
lected from around India for their potential as professional fast bowlers. They
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do so without charging the players any fees. And although the Foundation is
wholly unconnected to the formal organization that controls cricket in India, it
nevertheless plays a central role in the production of fast bowlers for the Indian
cricket team. To give one example, Gatorade India’s “Pacers” promotion which
consisted of an all-India talent search for young pace bowlers with nearly 4000
participants had as its prize a “specialized training programme” at the MRF Pace
Foundation for the top 10 winners (Veera 2008).
As I noted earlier in this chapter, Dennis Lillee is an important source of pres-
tige for the MRF Pace Foundation. But Lillee only comes to the MRF Pace Foun-
dation a few times a year and each visit is usually for a fortnight or so. During my
fieldwork, T.A. Sekar was the head coach and in charge of day-to-day training. I
was introduced to Sekar through Rahul Mammen. Mammen is the eldest son of
the chairman of MRF, K.M. Mammen, and a key executive in the business.2 Sekar
met me in his office at the MRF headquarters. I told him that I was interested in
the use of biomechanics in cricket and he immediately started looking for what he
called a “pamphlet” on cricket that he thought would answer my questions. Wor-
ried that he was looking to end the conversation as quickly as possible, I started
speaking a little about the biomechanics literature I had been reading as he con-
2MRF is a large family-owned business house typical of the interaction between business-
oriented groups (in this case Mappillais) and colonial-era corporate governance structures. See
Birla (2009).
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tinued to rummage through his desk. He stopped, looked a little surprised and
then started talking me through the intricacies of the various findings on “mixed”
actions and the like. Sekar is a very tall ex-fast bowler who had played briefly for
India in the early 1980s. Now, perhaps frustrated by my inability to follow what
he was saying he got up and demonstrated a couple of different actions in his
office.
It is nearly impossible to convey what these matters are about without the ap-
propriate accompanying gestures. Indeed the term “gesture” seems inadequate
because it privileges speech—gesture is used to illuminate or express the emo-
tions associated with speech, but here the motions of his body were the things
he wished to communicate. Throughout my stay at the Pace Foundation, Sekar
would repeatedly use speech to illustrate his gestures in coaching the players
who sought out his advice. Indeed, his coaching related speech in the playing
field “nets” was largely hortative. In this context, writing and speech are always
estranging forms of communication. To convey how to bowl without gesture is
an exercise in immense frustration, as perhaps the previous section of this chapter
on biomechanics demonstrates.
On some continued prompting from me, Sekar went on to explain that by the
late 1980s, he had already started coaching (while still playing professionally) and
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that Lillee had already told him about the dangers of mixed actions—principally
bowlers trying to force themselves into a sideways-on upper body position with
their feet and hips in a front-on position. By the early 1990s, Lillee, now consulting
for Sekar at MRF, had started saying that semi-open positions are acceptable. The
key being that the feet, hips, and shoulders be aligned with one another. Any
amount of variation from fully side-on all the way to fully front-on is fine as long
as those joints are closely in sync with one another.
The Pace Foundation is set in the well-to-do neighborhood of Chetpet, in
Chennai, in the grounds of the Madras Christian College school. The grounds
were set deep within the school, away from the nearest road and up against the
main train line heading south from the nearby Egmore Railway Station. The
Pace Foundation has a well-equipped weight training gym, a swimming pool and
changing rooms, a small well-trimmed grass area for fielding practice and a large
bank of nets for bowling and batting practice. These turf pitches were the key area
of interest for everyone there. And the constant use of them meant that keeping
those pitches in good condition was very important.
At the Foundation, under Sekar’s direction, players would often be asked to
simply practice running at a gentle pace or even just walking. The fitness coach
Ramji Srinivasan—he is currently a trainer for the Indian national team in addi-
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tion to running a busy private fitness gym in Chennai—would correct their gentle
running or walking technique. The biggest problem here seemed to bowlers al-
lowing their shoulders to get tense while running. As the shoulder joint is a key
to bowling fast and accurately, muscle tension at this joint well before it would
be needed for delivering the ball was clearly not useful. The key here seems
to be what biomechanists refer to as segmental interaction. If the some muscle
group is tense well before it is required, the bowler will not be able to concatenate
their joints—precisely to “articulate” them—in a productive way. At the Foun-
dation, running in, stride length, arm positions in the “load-up” phase coming
into and beyond the moment of back-foot strike, and then the movement of the
non-bowling arm, bowling arm, and the direction of the follow-through were all
key elements that Sekar emphasized when working with the players there.
As I noted earlier, four classes of cricket players came through the Foundation
regularly. First, there is a collection of young players selected for their promise
as professional cricket players for India. Their training, housing, and so on, over
several years in most cases were all paid for by the MRF corporation. Second, and
this appeared to be a recent introduction to help with financial support, teams
of players paid to attend for short durations of time and looked for intensive
coaching from the staff there. Third, the professional players from the official
Biomechanics and the habits of bowling fast 76
MRF-sponsored club team were there everyday during their cricket season. For
them, the grounds were their regular training area. Their home ground in a local
college was just across the train tracks abutting the Foundation. And, fourth, and
easily highest profile, professional players who had played, or were playing, for
the national team, periodically came to the Foundation to work with Sekar, Lillee,
and others on their bowling action and fitness training. The Indian bowlers in
this category usually had a long history with MRF as they were initially in the
groups of younger players spending months to years there. The language used
at the MRF was English. Indeed, on one occasion I heard Sekar on the phone
talking about a possible new Hindi-speaking recruit from North India to the set of
young Foundation players. He recommended, possibly speaking to that player’s
current coach, that he learn some English as quickly as possible so that he could
attend the MRF. English is an official national language of India, but most of
the players at the Foundation who were from northern India had to improve on
their knowledge of English because Sekar and the staff at the MRF knew very
little Hindi. More importantly, and the coaching at the MRF certainly seemed
to reinforce this dynamic, English remains the standard language of professional
cricket around the world.
My initial interaction with Sekar in his office seemed to me to be formed
Biomechanics and the habits of bowling fast 77
around a negotiation about my status. Was I a journalist? A student of biome-
chanics? A friend of the key patron of his position and the Foundation? Over
the next several months this uncertainty came up several times. Not only did I
impute an uncertainty in his and other people at the Foundation’s minds, but,
perhaps more to the point, I was unsure myself as to my role there. Was I do-
ing “fieldwork”? Or just learning, slowly and ineffectively, how to coach fast
bowling? Certainly, Sekar himself repeatedly introduced me to the players and
coaches at the Foundation as an expert in “anthropometry” despite several at-
tempts at correcting him. It soon became apparent to me that the point was not
that he understood that I was interested in studying the deployment of expertise,
but simply that there was no role available for anyone but experts at the Founda-
tion. I perforce had to be an expert in something of value to cricket. As I shall
argue in the next chapter, I took on, or tried to take on, the role of an expert on
cricket.
2.4 Irfan Pathan
Irfan Pathan is a left-arm swing bowler—a player who specializes in moving the
ball laterally in the air as it approaches the batsman—who made his debut for
India at the end of 2003 at the age of 19, playing on tour against Australia. This
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is a relatively young age for a bowler to make his international debut. There are
a number of important connections between this early period of his career and
the communal riots that occurred in early 2002 across his state of Gujarat. The
riots had put under considerable tension the balance between secularist politics
and the demands of a Hindu majority-led political system. One key question had
been whether state officials had been complicit in the violence against Gujarati
Muslims by the Hindu majority. Most of the dead during the riots were Muslims.3
Early reports on Irfan Pathan highlighted the fact that his father was a muezzin
at the Jama Masjid in Vadodara, Gujarat, and that Irfan had in fact learned to play
cricket inside the mosque.4 Although he played fairly well on debut in Australia,
he really garnered a lot of media attention on playing on tour against Pakistan in
2004. This was India’s first set of matches in Pakistan since 1989. India ended up
winning the three Test match series 2-1, with Irfan doing well in all the games. The
much celebrated series win was India’s first against Pakistan since 1979. A report
in the magazine Outlook India cited an SMS in Hindi—”Congratulations on the
victory, a dream has come true. Kashmir was ours, now Karachi and Lahore
too are”—that had apparently been “flying thick and fast through the bylanes of
3The literature on the riots is now extensive. For one take on these events, see Jaffrelot Jaffrelot
(2007).
4A BBC News report, for example, framed the announcement of his inclusion in the team being
sent to Australia around there being “very few cricketers whose path to international recognition
began inside a mosque” (Sandhu 2003)
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Gujarat . . . As the celebrations began, there was frenzy in Vadodara’s Mandvi
area in the walled city, with cheering crowds trying to enter the Jama Masjid
where Irfan Pathan’s family lives.” The report goes on to quote a politician and
links nation’s victory over Pakistan to the state’s complicity with the riots:
“It is unfortunate that we see Pathan in Gujarat in a different light just
because he is a Muslim. But then, it is this identity which has to be
reminded to a larger Hindu middle class, the sense that we too are
Indian citizens and as loyal as them, especially in Gujarat,” says Kadir
Peerzda, a Congress leader from Surat.
It was also a rich sight to see the police preventing mobs from entering
the masjid to join in the celebrations with Pathan’s family. This is the
same police that was accused of standing by, if not directing violent
communal mobs to Muslim religious places and homes in 2002. (Desai
2004)
Irfan, then, as a Muslim resident of Vadodara, stood as both an example of
a perceived Muslim threat and as the savior of a struggling India playing Pak-
istan. A key bowler for Pakistan over many previous years, Wasim Akram, had
recently retired from professional cricket. Akram was himself a left-arm bowler
who swung the ball at great pace so comparisons to Akram were easy for journal-
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ists and the like to make. The implication was that India had found a bowler who
might be able to dominate Pakistan and other countries the way that Akram had
over many years for Pakistan. This analogy was both furthered and troubled by
reports that “Pathan idolises Wasim Akram, and has moulded his bowling action
on him” (Pandya 2003). This same report and others linked Irfan’s selection and
performances for India in part to his coaching at the MRF Pace Foundation for
several years. Rahul Bhattacharya, a well-known cricket journalist, wrote that:
During these years Irfan spent time at the MRF Pace Foundation,
where Kiran More had referred him. “His action was past side-on,
with his right foot pointing towards the slips instead of at the stumps,”
says TA Sekhar [sic], head coach of the foundation, “but that could get
him into back and groin problems. We modified it to side-on.” (Bhat-
tacharya 2004)
Irfan’s promising start was now, in 2007, long behind him. What had hap-
pened in the intervening time and why was he now back at the MRF? Could
Sekar help him rework and rebuild his bowling action?
On my first day of observing them both at the MRF Foundation, Sekar was
using the SiliconCoach program to impress on Irfan that the load-up phase of his
bowling action was happening much earlier in his approach to the wicket than he
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thought it was. The load-up for a left-handed bowler like Irfan should occur as
he jumps off his last right foot step before arriving at the crease. The next time his
right foot lands, he should almost be ready to release the ball. As a result of an
early load-up—roughly when his left foot was landing prior to that penultimate
right foot step— his left hand was coming around and behind his head and that
was leading to his left arm whipping down and across his body, rather than
towards the batsman. I thought through the significance of this problem much
later.
Going through the various deliveries that he had recorded, Sekar pointed out
which ones he thought were better. Irfan then left to warm up with some func-
tional exercises. In the meantime Sekar spoke to me about what he was trying to
do, saying that the key thing is that all the energy developed by the bowler up to
ball release should be directed at the batsman. He went to say simply that what
he was trying to do is get to a scientific approach to bowling.
The question of directing one’s energy to the batsman is deceptively easy to
understand conceptually. What else would a bowler want to do? The difficulty
of putting this understanding into action involves precisely the same difficulty
that the biomechanics of spinal injury prevention in fast bowling is focused on.
Imagine an axis running through your body from the crown of your head down
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through the center of your spine and into the ground at a point equidistant from
your the centers of your two feet. Walking, running, and bowling all work through
rotations around that axis as you move forward. Try, for an example of how not
to walk, moving slowly forward by swinging each of your arms in time with each
leg movement forward—as your right leg swings forward, swing your right arm
with it, and as your left leg takes over to move forward, swing your left arm
along with it. This is of course an extremely ungainly motion. As you move
forward, you should have become aware of a large rotation around the central
axis dropping down from your head along your spine to the ground. Now try
walking normally and notice that your left arm swings forward as your right leg
swings forward (there should in fact be a slight delay before the left arm swings
forward) and vice-versa as your left leg swings forward. What is happening here
are two different rotations around the same axis. Looking down at the ground,
your right leg swinging forward is a counter-clockwise rotation of the central axis
of your lower body. Almost simultaneously, your left arm swinging forward is a
clockwise rotation of your upper body. This twisting motion rippling up from the
ground as you walk or run your entire body forward is possible only because the
lower vertebrae of your spine are able to twist along that central axis. Walking,
running, and bowling forward, towards the batsmen, is only possible through a
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series of twists of your body directed away from that forward direction. There are
of course a number of other axes of rotations exerted in part through the spine;
however this particular axis of rotation is the one that is now considered crucial
to the development of fast bowling in cricket.
The emphasis at the MRF was to minimize rotation along that axis from the
beginning of a bowler’s run-up to the bowling crease. Ramji, the trainer, worked
on walking and running technique with all the players. One movement that he
focused on was shoulder relaxation and arm movement. Typically, and this cer-
tainly applied to Irfan, players tended to swing their hands up and towards the
center of their bodies when swinging them forward. From that position, the arms
would then swing back and out, with the elbows swinging away from the body as
well as backwards. One of Ramji’s favored metaphors was that the player should
run as if they are on train tracks. The implication being that the arms should slide
forwards and backwards only, not also towards and away from the center of the
body. Doing so would enable the player to match their arm movements with the
swinging back and forth of their legs. The net result was certainly meant to be
less rotation along their central, spinal, axis.
Irfan started with some short, slow paced run-ups to the wicket. He did not
have a cricket ball with him but was simply practicing a change in load-up. He
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then practiced a few gentle deliveries with a ball, again off a very short run-up. In
the meantime a laptop running the “Timewarp” variety of SiliconCoach’s software
had been set up behind the net where Irfan was bowling. SiliconCoach Timewarp
is structured to ease immediate review of digital video footage. A video and
laptop operator can set up the system to automatically playback a delivery sec-
onds after it was made in the nets. A batsman arrived from the MRF team itself
and Irfan switched to bowling in earnest to that batsman if still relatively slowly.
Sekar was speaking to Irfan after all every ball. After a few iterations of just
encouraging words, he suggested to Irfan that he concentrate only on his lead
arm. He suggested that he turn his hand palm upwards, facing the sky, rather
than fingertips upward with the palm facing to his left. This is the moment when
a left handed bowler has landed on his right foot and the left arm is extended
back behind him and is ready to continue accelerating forward and up to the
ball release point above and slightly in front of his head. The suggestion had
already been mentioned during the earlier video review session and surprised
me quite a bit. Most bowlers do not position their leading arm in that manner. I
wondered whether and how Sekar thought that this unusual position might help
Irfan with directing his bowling energy towards the batsman. As Irfan continued
to practice this particular change in technique, Sekar quite openly elicited from
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the batsman—who was playing the deliveries from Irfan with ease—agreement
that Irfan was now bowling at a slightly sharper pace.
Sekar then instructed Irfan to try forming a fist with his right hand instead
of using an open palm facing upwards and to pull it down sharply just after his
arm was almost fully extended (without the elbow locked straight). This would,
he said, allow him to crunch down with his core. An immediate improvement
was apparent. Sekar took the time to elicit that pronouncement from both the
batsman and from me, as he and Irfan reviewed the new footage on his laptop.
One part of this apparent change is easy to explain. Irfan had been working on
the position and orientation of his leading arm. In particular Sekar had requested
that he try pronate his arm such that his palm faced the batsman. Thinking about
this away from the field, I realized that pronating the forearm results in the outer
bone of the forearm—the radius—wrapping over the inner bone—the ulna. As
a result the radius pulls on the elbow joint, simultaneously straightening and
exerting a medial force on the joint to bring it closer to the body. It is easy to
test this for yourself. Simply raise your right arm up in front of you up to head
height, with the hand directly in front of your face and the palm facing to the
left. Your elbow is likely protruding out to the right of your body. Then rotate
at the elbow joint so that the palm is now facing outwards, away from your face.
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You should be looking at the back of you hand. In doing this, you should notice
that your elbow will tend to be pulled in towards the centerline of your body and
simultaneously straighten out.
The net result is a straighter arm at extension and a pull-back of the arm
straight behind him as Irfan’s left-arm rotated around at the shoulder into the de-
livery position. The pronation of the forearm like this is not a bowling technique
one generally sees in match situations. This is because most bowlers flex their
non-bowling arm at the elbow as they snap it back towards their midriff. The
arm will then straighten again as it continues swinging up and behind their body.
Pronation tends to work against the first part of that movement.
I suspect that once Irfan had established that pattern of movement, Sekar then
allowed him to form a fist with his non-bowling right hand (now in a relatively
relaxed supine position) and told him in effect to snap back on it harder than be-
fore by telling him to crunch his core area muscles. This change—that crunching
the core enabled Irfan to bowl faster—is certainly a central tenet of biomechanics
in cricket and across a number of other sports. One part of this aspect of a bowl-
ing action is easy to understand. Flexion of the spine along an axis parallel to
the ground and perpendicular to the plane the ball will follow as it travels to the
batsman will add to whatever angular velocity they are able to generate at their
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shoulder joint. An other significant aspect to crunching the core while releas-
ing the core is best understood through the example earlier in this chapter about
the difference between “windmilling” your arm freely and using your muscles to
store in and then explosively release from the tendons connecting your muscles
to your skeleton. Crunching the core allows a bowler to store that energy in the
tendons wrapping around their shoulder joints.
At the beginning of the following week, the temporary gym trainer Mahendra
Gokhale who was about to move on to coach the Baroda first-class team, em-
phasized strongly the need for a focus on core strengthening along with regular
cardio-vascular workouts for all the bowlers at MRF. He had also constructed a
series of running technique exercises in the swimming pool, including full slow-
motion run concentrating on moving the arm well and keeping the core upright,
side steps, front steps with the leg held straight to emphasize hip flexion, and
sideways cross-over steps. Practicing these movements in water meant that the
players could concentrate on technique because being buoyant in effect reduced
their body weight. Thinking about this aspect of their training regimen, I suspect
now that these were exercises meant to emphasis the way that a crunching of the
core itself depends on prior movements at the hip joint, and so on back down
what biomechanists call the kinematic chain to ankle and foot.
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Later that day, Irfan warmed up and then spoke with Sekar. He had a series of
questions about his leading hand position, rather than its orientation. Should his
left hand end up to the left side of his eyes as he looks at the batsman or more or
less directly in line? Sekar was non-committal in response. Irfan went on to the
nets to practice bowling at one of the MRF team’s left-handed batsmen. This was
in fact the general pattern of his practice sessions in May and June in the practice
nets—a brief conversation with Sekar in which he raised a question or two about
technique and then a bowling session at one or more batsmen.
A few days of practice later, it seemed to me that he had not shown much
progress. Sekar gathered the all the foundation bowlers together along with Irfan.
He emphasized to them the importance of the leading, i.e. non-bowling, arm and
using it actively, especially as it swings down moments before ball release. I asked
him if it was correct that the arm should go straight up—a leading question from
me because I could see some players practicing that gesture as he was speaking—
and he replied that that was absolutely incorrect. He raised his own arm straight
up and said that from that motion the only thing one can do easily is bring it
straight back down again, rather than forward and up which will allow you to
snap down and back behind you fluidly. Irfan again asked him about his leading
hand position. This time around Sekar had a precise answer for him. The issue,
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he said, is that he had been until now lining up his leading arm elbow joint with
the batsman, which is fine, but his elbow was flexed. This meant in turn that as
he snapped down with the leading arm, the arm could go directly behind him
but would instead swing out to the side of his body in an arc.
A young player at the MRF Foundation, Varun Aaron, was one of several
bowlers who did not effectively use their leading arm. Although Sekar was cer-
tain about the importance of this part of a bowling action, founded entirely on
biomechanical principles, it remains the case that Aaron is both the latest MRF
player to make his debut, in 2011, for India and is bowling almost as fast the best
of current fast bowlers around the world. Aaron continues to make little use of
his leading arm. This fact alone could hardly be grounds for skepticism about the
role biomechanics at the MRF, however, because the counter-factual is impossible
to prove—perhaps Aaron would bowl even more effectively if he stretched out
his leading left arm more before crunching it down hard as his right arm swung
up to release the ball. What this example does illustrate, given how hard bowlers
like Irfan tried to incrementally change their bowling technique, is that significant
changes in technique are difficult to come by.
In a separate later conversation that day, Sekar indicated to me that he thought
Irfan’s technique was 95 percent correct now. He emphasized that players should
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be thinking cricketers so that they can understand what they’re doing wrong
and why so they can continue to work on those problems. The result is that
“your brain will make you get things right.” The players at MRF have access to
a specialist in sports medicine, Gopal Ramanathan, who was listening in on the
conversation. Sekar gestured towards him and added that it’s important that a
bowler have a natural action. I took the hint and asked Ramanathan what counts
as natural movements of the body. He used the example of swimming and stated
that the front-crawl is an unnatural movement because it requires the arm to move
above the shoulder, whereas the backstroke is the most efficient stroke—thereby
implicitly equating efficiency with naturalness—because it does not make that
demand.
I found this all of this rather perplexing. If the front-stroke is unnatural then
surely bowling is also an unnatural movement. Yet, Sekar was most certain that
naturalness was the key to good bowling technique. Irfan later volunteered on the
topic that he can feel when his action is right because his body feels more relaxed.
To which Sekar added that your brain will find out what is the right movement for
you. After this particular bowling session and a follow-up turn at batting, which
he had been doing more and more regularly over time, Irfan was then interviewed
by S. Dinakar writing for The Hindu. Irfan emphasized repeatedly that he was
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feeling much better about his action with Sekar’s guidance. He also said that
the mistakes you develop while you are in form—playing well—are the most
dangerous because those are the ones you don’t immediately correct. Indeed, he
had just finished going over exactly that message with the MRF team batsmen
a few minutes before the interview. This was a novel account, to me, of how
one develops ingrained mistakes in the first place. It certainly had an intuitive
appeal even as it seemed to help explain why he had to think so carefully about
and struggle to make corrections to his technique over countless repetitions in the
nets. It also implicitly gives one set of reasons for Irfan’s continuing training at
the MRF over his professional international career—away from the MRF in the
heat of competitive action, his technique changes, perhaps especially when he is
doing well.
At the beginning of July, a Gatorade sponsored event was held at the Foun-
dation. Javagal Srinath, a now retired fast bowler who had played for India with
great success, and Sekar had been hired to help select two winners from a search
for young fast bowlers out of tens of thousands who had applied. They ended up
selecting three players who were here to receive their prize, namely being trained
by them both at the MRF. Srinath was himself a product of the MRF system. On
that day, Srinath was in fact working only with Irfan. After introducing myself, I
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asked him what he thought about Irfan’s action. He responded instead with an
account of how he thought change happens. He said that change all starts from
the mind, a cognitive understanding from what you are able to see, from which
you get a blueprint for the change you should make. Only after that can you start
working on changing muscle movements effectively. Muscles, he said, have mem-
ories and that’s why it is difficult to make changes. I asked him about the ability
to make changes—is that something that can itself be developed over time? He
replied that bowling experience helps a great deal, because you become better at
recognizing that change is required. He added, however, that being always ready
to change is also a bad thing because it could lead to keeping on changing simple
things unnecessarily. He ended this near soliloquy on the relationship between a
bowler’s mind and the habits of their body with a firm “there is always change.”
The nets were pretty busy at that time because, in addition to the Gatorade
sponsored training, the Asian Cricket Council (ACC) had also set some players to
MRF for training, and Dennis Lillee, Troy Cooley, and two Australian players—
Mitchell Johnson and Grant Sullivan—were also in attendance. The ACC players
were being trained, largely separately, by two Sri Lankan coaches. Troy Cooley
was at that time the fast bowling coach for the Australian national team. He
had previously been the fast bowling coach for England. Mitchell Johnson is a
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very fast national level bowler for Australia and Grant Sullivan was a state level
bowler in Australia. The proliferation of coaches all looking at the various bowlers
in action, including Irfan and Munaf Patel—who had played for India for some
time but, like Irfan, was currently out of the national side.
With all these coaches around, and some small differences in emphasis be-
tween them regarding what each player should work on, in a private conversation
I asked Irfan how he handled different people telling to do different things. He
looked at me guardedly and then said that he’s willing to trying different things
but that each thing should be tested properly by himself for its suitability. I then
asked him how he handles multiple suggested changes, from one coach, all at the
same time. He said that he usually worked on one or two things at a time and as
he felt more confident about that change, he would try additional adjustments in
technique. He was offering a layered account of the development of new bodily
habits. As one set of changes became more “solid,” another set of changes could
be laid on that new foundation.
What, in a competitive situation, could lead to destabilization of those layers
of habit? Many sports involving projectiles are about hitting some target and
being evaluated on accuracy. Even in those cases, playing against someone else
necessarily involves a set of pressures that would not be availa
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or coaching setting. In cricket, however, the connection between competition and
possible changes in the deployment of one’s body is far more direct. A bowler
bowls the ball at a batsman. As I have indicated, this is the central moment of
action in a cricket. As with baseball and very few other sports, it is a team sport
that nevertheless is built out of an interaction at some given moment between two
particular players.
2.5 Cybernetics and biomechanics
I have argued that biomechanics as it is applied to cricket has no account of
the role that coordinated segmental interaction in response to another body’s
movement plays in cricket. No account, in other words, of cricket as a game
rather than a set of choreographed movements. As I suggest in the Introduction,
biomechanics is a cybernetic discipline. As such there is a rich set of references
for thinking about the relationship between players, their bodies, the technologies
that enable the application of biomechanics in cricket, and the resulting, I argue,
subjectification of cricket players through biomechanics. One strand of the set of
changes around World War II involves precisely a theory of metaphorical and real
games.
In an article on the role that the metaphor “game” plays in the history of
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economic thought, Robert Leonard argues that “thinking in terms of strategic in-
teraction is now second-nature to an entire generation of contemporary theorists.”
Leonard speaks here, not just of the connections between game theory and eco-
nomics, but also suggests that “the mutation wrought by [John] von Neumann
and [Oskar] Morgenstern can be better understood when it is related to several
related contemporaneous shifts in other disciplines, including linguistics, mathe-
matics, ethics, and anthropology.” (Leonard 1997, 305) For my purposes, I would
specify here the anthropology of the body in particular.
Leonard’s focus is on Karl Menger, von Neumann and Claude Lévi-Strauss.
Leonard argues Ernesto Zermelo’s paper in 1912 on chess, in which Zermelo
proves by induction that the outcome of chess is fully determined, can be seen
as part of the common root of Menger, von Neumann and Lévi-Strauss’s work.
Zermelo’s proof is to the effect that both players in a game of chess can play at
least one perfect game—or sequence of moves—given whatever it is that their
opponent is doing. As with simple games like tic-tac-toe, in a fully determined
game, if both players are playing perfectly, either all games should end in a draw
or either the first to move or the second to move should always win. He notes that
such a proof about chess might now seem trivial, but that “what is significant for
us is the fact that Zermelo turned to the mathematics of games at all, and, more
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importantly, that this was presented as an act of demystification: chess was being
stripped of its psychological dimension, being reduced to a mathematical formal-
ism with a determinate outcome” (Leonard 1997, 305). In this manner, Leonard
lays out a short but convincing case that “Menger’s ethics, von Neumann’s games,
and the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss are all indicative of a shift in the
way mathematics was used as a tool of social theory” (Leonard 1997, 320).
The turn to a mathematical approach that Leonard outlines was crucial to cy-
bernetics in the sense that it provided a common language in which the variety
of disciplines represented in, for example, the Macy Conferences, could be pulled
together. The push against structuralism and structural-functional approaches in
Anthropology focused, however, on the question of the agency of a subject not on
the question of mathematics. I will argue in chapters 4 and 5 in any event that a
critique through the supposed objectivity or abstractness of mathematics depends
on a particular kind of reading of mathematics that may not be particularly ten-
able.
Sherry Ortner, student of Clifford Geertz, argues regarding agency that it “is
an indispensable theoretical category,” and suggests that what is needed is “to
provide it with further specification, and hopefully to de-fetishize it as well” (Or-
tner 1999, 77). Ortner argues that a heuristic distinction between an agentic mode
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of domination and resistance—of power—, and a mode “that is closely related to
ideas of intention, to people’s projects in the world and their ability to both formu-
late and enact them” matches up well with fundamentally ethnographic nature
of Anthropology. Agency-as-power concerns “the forms of power people have at
their disposal, their ability to act on their own behalf, influence other people and
events, and maintain some kind of control in their own lives” (Ortner 1999, 78)
and agency-as-intention concerns “projects that emerge from and of course repro-
duce different socially constituted positions and subjectivities” (Ortner 1999, 79).
Ortner goes on to suggest that this second agentic mode is “about (relatively ordi-
nary) life organized in terms of culturally constituted projects, projects that infuse
life with meaning and purpose.” This is not a question of free will, Ortner makes
clear, but of the “cultural desires or intentions. . . [that] emerge from structurally
defined differences of social categories and differentials of power” (Ortner 1999,
80).
Although Ortner’s conception of Anthropology is not meant to accommodate
the non-human, the distinction drawn here between agency-as-power and agency-
as-intention corresponds exactly to the distinction drawn by Andrew Pickering in
The Mangle of Practice. Pickering argues that one could recognize the agency of
the non-human, yet insist upon the intentionality unique to the human world.5 I
5See, in particular, Pickering (1993) and also the introduction to Pickering (1995). Ortner’s
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would argue, however, that neither Ortner nor Pickering provide any substantial
arguments for the distinctions they make.
A denial of the opposition agent–structure seems to require something like
a “poststructural” position, one in which the notion of immanence takes prior-
ity. Judith Butler has argued, following Foucault, that subject-formation ought be
understood through a process of subjection. Butler states that “one inhabits the
figure of autonomy only be becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which
implies a radical dependency” (Butler 1997, 83). Further, “[s]uch subjection is a
kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form of
domination, but also activates or forms the subject” (Butler 1997, 84). However, the
“Foucaultian subject is never fully constituted in subjection. . . it is repeatedly con-
stituted in subjection, and it is the possibility of a repetition that repeats against
its origin that subjection might be understood to draw its inadvertently enabling
power” (Butler 1997, 94). Butler’s interpretation of Foucault is rather at odds with
that of Gilles Deleuze, however, its emphasis on difference and repetition notwith-
standing. Deleuze, in a conversation with Clare Parnet on Foucault, suggests that
“[i]f there’s a subject, it’s a subject without any identity. Subjectification as a pro-
cess is personal or collective individuation, individuation one by one or group
attention to history as an important method in Anthropology further corresponds to Pickering’s
argument about the importance of an attention to temporally emergent phenomena in science stud-
ies.
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by group.” Moreover, “[t]here are subject-type individuations (‘that’s you. . . ,’
‘that’s me. . . ’), but there are event-type individuations where there’s no subject:
a wind, an atmosphere, a time of day, a battle. . . One can’t assume that a life,
or a work of art, is individuated as a subject; quite the reverse” (Deleuze 1995,
115). There is, therefore, in Deleuze’s reading of Foucault a four-fold possibility:
personal/collective and subject/event individuations. For Butler, however, there
is only one possible process of individuation: a personal, subject individuation.
Deleuze develops this interpretation of Foucault through the notion of the
fold, “[t]he outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peri-
staltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are
not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside,”
(Deleuze 1988, 96-7) and uses it to develop a critique of intentionality: “[t]he idea
that consciousness is directed towards a thing and gains significance in the world
is precisely what Foucault refuses to believe” (Deleuze 1988, 108). These ideas
themselves seem to fit in readily with the broad narrative broached by Leonard
and do so, in my reading, by positing the moment of a bowler and batsman
interacting with one another as a collective event—a moment with a subject.
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2.6 The limits of biomechanics
Biomechanics is a post-World War II discipline. Moreover, it is organized directly
around the figure of the cyborg—both in the sense that it is concerned explic-
itly with the development of the body through technology, but also in the wider
sense that is it is methodologically cyborg. As I have demonstrated through the
example of Irfan Pathan, it works precisely by bearing down on divisions between
the player and the player’s body through the use of video feeds manipulated by
computer programs. In the hands of a trained coach, the programs help close the
feedback loop between what a bowler feels they are doing and what they can see
they are doing. But the moment of ball release for a bowler is precisely, I would
argue, a Deleuzian collective event. In terms of biomechanics, it involves not just
a Newtonian mechanical understanding of individual limbs, joints, and the mus-
cles that exert force on them, but also the coordination of a segmental interaction
between all of a player’s body. It is observation of that interaction that helps a
batsman ascertain where the ball released by a bowler is likely to go. As these
are repeated events, the bowler bowls the ball to the batsman repeatedly, there is
a further segmental interaction between the batsman and the bowler.
However, as Andre Coley, the Jamaican coach, observed to me, fast bowling
coaching at the MRF works on the isolated moment of a player bowling a ball,
Biomechanics and the habits of bowling fast 101
not a player bowling a ball to a batsman. The biomechanical expertise deployed
on the cricket practice fields at the MRF seem incapable of addressing that crucial
moment. This is an exclusion within cricket training that enables the effectiveness
of biomechanics as a science. In anthropological theory, there is a term for this
kind of limit. In the next chapter, I address both the role this term plays in
anthropology and how one might think about it in biomechanical cricket.
Chapter 3
Spinning affect: the science and laws
of cricket
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In a tour of Australia beginning at the end of 1995, M. Muralitharan was play-
ing for Sri Lanka in the Boxing Day Test match against Australia. Muralitharan
had started playing for Sri Lanka three years earlier. He was already well-known
for having an unusual action for an off-break bowler. Such bowlers—who try to
spin the ball such that it turns from the left to the right, from the bowlers point
of view, after it lands—are typically unable to make the ball turn much. It was
thought to be impossible to deploy a lot of rotation at the wrist joint to add to
whatever spin one could get on the ball by twisting one’s fingers and shoulder
joint. Muralitharan was, however, different. He could spin the ball prodigiously.
One of the umpires in that game, Darrell Hair, called “no-ball” several times when
Muralitharan was bowling. There are multiple reasons why an umpire might de-
clare a “no-ball.” Hair’s was the most dangerous for a bowler and his career. He
thought that Muralitharan was throwing the ball—an illegal delivery—at the Aus-
tralian batsman, not bowling it. The Sri Lankan captain, Arjuna Ranatunga, fully
supported the legality of his bowler’s action. The International Cricket Council
took the opportunity to detail its previous concerns about his bowling actions
(The Independent 1995). Muralitharan’s body had already been the subject of
much discussion. He was able to generate far more spin than all other bowlers of
his type and it seemed as if this might have something to do with the different-
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looking bowling technique he employed. The key point was whether his body was
itself simply different from “normal” cricketing bodies and whether that conse-
quently played a role in the legality or illegality of his action. The Sri Lankan
cricket board and the ICC looked to scientists to adjudicate on the matter. Mu-
rali’s career did not end at that point, nor on the other occasions when he was
called for throwing. Instead he was sent for testing by biomechanics scientists,
first at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and then at the Uni-
versity of Western Australia. The scientists “cleared him” of throwing, yet as we
shall see, the status of this finding once back on the field of play was itself rather
opaque. At least initially, umpires were still obliged to call “no-ball” any delivery
they thought illegal, previous off-field tests notwithstanding. By being called on
to examine Muralitharan’s bowling technique, the scientists had opened up a gap
between official off-field laboratory testing of a bowler’s action and the on-field
immediate determination by the umpires.
The usual understanding of throwing in relation to off-spin bowling has to
do with such a bowler being able to disguise a change in the pace with which
they release the ball. In Muralitharan’s case, however, he added to that mix the
possibility that the large amount of spin he was able to get might also be an
outcome of throwing. A batsman playing a spinner has to make a judgment about
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 105
howmuch spin the bowler has put on the ball and how quickly the ball will arrive.
Much of the joy spectators get from watching batsmen play spinners comes from
observing this battle, especially if the bowler manages to deceive the batsman
decisively. Both of these judgments are meant to be made initially before the ball
is released and then constantly revised as one sees the ball in flight. In this typical
conception of the relationship between batsman and off-spin bowler, fast reflexes
and the general direction of the ball as it travels are not a major determinant
of success. Rather, a batsman would look to accurately predict the amount and
direction of the spin on the ball and how fast the ball is. The spin on the ball will
certainly have an effect on the direction of the ball. Through the physical Magnus
effect on spinning balls, the more off-spin on the cricket ball, the more it will drift
away from a right-handed batsman—this similar to the lateral movement in a
slider in baseball— and the more top-spin on the ball, the more quickly it will dip
down and bounce before reaching the batsman—the extra downward movement
of a curveball in baseball. The later one determines these factors accurately, the
less effectively one can play the ball. Changes to that dynamic introduced by
bowlers flexing their elbow joint in addition to all the other aspects of their action
make it much more difficult for a batsman to predict where the ball will now go
and how much spin it has. This is what makes throwing seem so unfair. The
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opprobrium attached to it—at one point the Prime Minister of Australia, John
Howard, felt driven to weigh in on the issue by accusing Muralitharan of being
a “chucker” (Ryan 2004)—is attached to both the ability to bowl better and, as I
detail below, the seeming difficulty of not noticing whether one is flexing one’s
elbow or not.
This chapter is about two things—the manner in which biomechanics has come
to play a crucial part of contemporary cricket, including precipitating changes
in the governance of cricket, and an account of the limits of biomechanics that
became evident during my fieldwork at the MRF. I suggested in the last chapter
that the act of bowling to a batsman is a Deleuzian collective event. It is not a
moment of subjectification—that occurs in the hard work of training that precedes
such events—but rather an unfolding of two bodies in relation to one another.
The sense of anticipation, for both bowler and batsman, is crucial to this event
and although biomechanics has a theoretical account of it, as a science employed
in cricket it does not address that anticipation directly.
I will argue in this chapter that the concept of affect can be applied to this col-
lective event. The particular notion of affect that is derived in part from Deleuze
is, I suggest, what biomechanists might call the “coordinated segmental interac-
tion” of the human body. But what is this concept of affect? Critical theorists
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latched on to this idea in the mid-1990’s. The concept has since migrated, rather
forcefully, into anthropology and cognate disciplines. This strand of the literature
on affect, rather unlike the form which it has taken in psychology, takes its cues
from Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, and Baruch Spinoza. The key feature of this
strand of literature lies in its focus on unintended and unconscious movement
as being formative of intention and will in human being. In this framing of the
relationship cricket players have with their bodies in the act of bowling, some of
the ethical charge of behind throwing rather than bowling drops away. Throw-
ing becomes something that occurs during the event of bowling to a batsman in a
cricket match, a thing that may or may not be amenable to remediation in training
sessions.
I argue that theorists of this kind of affect have deployed the term to help
demarcate areas of human life—of becoming—that are not in principle susceptible
to the vagaries of contemporary capitalism. I suggest that this is not the case—
biomechanics combined with other sciences could develop a better understanding
of coordinated interaction in the future. But I also suggest that it is the case
that biomechanics as it is applied to cricket presently does not deal with this
important arena. Foucault’s historical account of neoliberalism emphasizes the
importance of the idea of “human capital.” I argue that, on the one hand, bowlers
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thinking that they are bowling whilst actually throwing, and on the other hand,
and batsman unconsciously anticipating the ball’s trajectory, are in fact a genuine
affective mystery to biomechanics. This mystery is matched exactly by the opacity
of the process by which human capital can come to valorize itself in a training of
the cricketing self.
In 1998, after suffering a defeat by Sri Lanka largely based on Muralitharan’s
bowling, the then manager of England’s cricket team made headlines when he
declared that “I have my opinion and will make it known to the authorities. That
is as far as I will go. We have a leg-spinner with an orthodox action. They
have an off-spinner with an unorthodox action” (quoted in Searle 2001, 87). His
rather oblique comments were taken as an indirect accusation of throwing and
were condemned by the England and Wales Cricket Board. Chris Searle writes
convincingly about how Muralitharan’s action was described during that series
of matches. For example, he notes that “the official Souvenir Programme of the
Oval Test Match introduced Muralitharan as a ‘cricketing freak’ ” (Searle 2001, 88).
Searle also quotes Peter Roebuck—a well-known former player and columnist—
from an article by him titled “Sri Lankan Sorcerer”:
At any moment one expected a black cat to fly by or a witch to start
stirring a brew. This was not the sorcerer’s apprentice; it was the
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sorcerer himself, weaving spells, uttering his odes. . . At times he might
have been working to the beat of jungle drums. . . and all the while
creating the impression of malevolence (quoted in Searle 2001, 89).
Roebuck’s obvious Orientalism has been a familiar refrain, both for Muralitharan
and for other innovative cricket players from the South Asia. Perhaps less obvious
is the role that Muralitharan plays for Searle. Writing about a further incident
back in Australia in early 1999, in which Muralitharan was again called “no-ball”
for throwing, Searle notes that Sri Lanka’s captain Arjuna Ranatunga “rallied
the entire team and led them to the edge of the field of play in protest at the
umpire’s decision, which had been taken in the face of the ICC’s clearance of
the bowler’s action.” He argues that in publicly defending Muralitharan, the
Sinhalese Ranatunga had “challenged and defied communalism and separation in
his nation’s sporting culture, as Muralitharan himself had done symbolically over
200 times—in every test match wicket he had taken in the company of his Sinhala
team-mates over the previous four years” (Searle 2001, 92). Further complicating
matters, the ICC became aware of the possibility of legal action. If scientists,
brought to the matter by the ICC itself, were satisfied that Muralitharan was not
throwing but umpires on the field of play were preventing him from pursuing his
professional occupation, could this form grounds for legal action?1
1See for example, Sydney Morning Herald (1996).
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In a speech in July 2011 a Sri Lankan player and erstwhile captain, Kumar
Sangakkara, detailed a history of cricket in Sri Lanka. The speech was dissected
in some detail as it laid some serious corruption charges against the current Sri
Lankan cricket board while simultaneously tying together cricket and contem-
porary nationalism in Sri Lanka. The passage detailing Muralitharan connects
together his body, team unity, and the nation quite clearly:
Murali came from the hills of Kandy from a more affluent background.
Starting off as a fast bowler and later changing to spin, he was blessed
with a natural deformity in his bowling arm allowing him to impart so
much spin on the ball that it spun at unthinkable angles. He brought
wrist spin to off spin.
. . . Although winning the 1996 World Cup was a long-term goal, they
needed to find a rallying point, a uniting factor that gave them a sense
of “team,” a cause to fight for, an event that not will not only bind the
team together giving them a common focus but also rally the entire
support of a nation for the team and its journey.
This came on Boxing Day at the MCG in 1995. Few realised it at
the time, but the no balling of Murali for alleged chucking had far-
reaching consequences. The issue raised the ire of the entire Sri Lankan
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nation. Murali was no longer alone. His pain, embarrassment and
anger were shared by all. No matter what critics say, the manner in
which Arjuna and team stood behind Murali made an entire nation
proud. In that moment Sri Lanka adopted the cricketers simply as
“our boys” or “Ape Kollo.” (Sangakkara 2011)
The stakes were clear. On the one hand, Muralitharan was understood to
stand-in for all Sri Lankan Tamils in a predominately Sinhalese nation and na-
tional cricket team. A defense of him by his own team could only then be read as
an allegory of national inclusiveness. On the other hand, that he might not be able
to play had direct financial implications both for the team and for him as an in-
dividual professional sportsman. It was science that tied the two together cricket
and finance, for biomechanics could prove that Muralitharan was not cheating for
personal gain, but was rather a uniquely gifted individual who, for that reason,
ought to be folded fully into the Sri Lankan nation.
The recent emphasis in critical theory and anthropology on affect forms, I
argue, an attempt to track the same phenomenon—the increasing responsibility
placed on individuals to increase their own stock of human capital at every oppor-
tunity. One small indicator of this multi-decade long phenomenon is the increas-
ing monetization and privatization of education over the same period. Increasing
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emphasis on higher education and sports training alike are, on this view, part
of the same process of human capital valorization. On the cricket field, bowlers
looking to improve their technique and therefore effectiveness have turned to the
science of biomechanics.
Biomechanics—the study of live bodies and the physical forces that act upon
it—has been used to optimize the application of forces on bowlers’ bodies such
that they are able to release cricket balls at higher velocities and/or higher torque
towards batsmen whilst retaining or improving on the accuracy of such deliver-
ies. It has also simultaneously been used to monitor those bodies on the cricket
field to try to ensure that bowlers remain within cricket law. It is this maneuver
that I call “regulating affect.” However, the laws of the sport themselves has been
found to be inadequate to the task. One important and controversial question in
cricket centers on whether the bowler has “thrown” the ball towards the batsmen
or not. The seeming impossibility of a player not themselves knowing—by feel-
ing their elbow move as they release the ball—whether they have thrown the ball
means that allegations of throwing unavoidably carry a connotation of cheating
or unfair play. But how would an umpire on the field know whether a bowler
has thrown the ball or not, thereby gaining an illegal advantage over the bats-
man?2 On this matter, umpires can only go on what they see. Or so has been
2In pace, or fast, bowling, this advantage largely takes the form of an unexpected increase in
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the case until recently. Biomechanics scientists have intervened on precisely this
point. The result has been a wholesale change in both the laws of cricket and
how it is applied on the field in the name of regulating the affect of cricketing
bodies on the sports field. The collective event of bowling to a batsman—and the
sense of anticipation crucial to this event—is also amenable to a framing through
affect. I suggest that both of these examples can be understood readily through
an examination of affect theory. The debates on this question and the changes in
the laws of cricket driven through the laboratory findings on the biomechanics of
throwing illuminates, I argue, the entanglement of law, biomechanics, and affect
on the playing field.
3.1 Broadcasting deregulation
Deregulation of television broadcasting in India in the early 1990s certainly fits
easily under what has been called the “Washington Consensus”—that set of gov-
ernance techniques packaged and ported across the world by institutions such
as the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank. This deregulatory move by the In-
dian state had a profound impact on the game of cricket around the world. The
standard figure used by many commentators is that 70 percent of all advertising
speed of delivery of the ball. In spin bowling, throwing enables the bowler in addition to increase
the amount of spin that can be put on the ball.
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money for cricket comes directly from companies based in India. Players, per-
haps particularly in the Indian subcontinent, may now be thinking about a career
in cricket from a financial point of view, rather than only picking up cricket as
children as a form of leisure (Guruprasad 2011). The result over the last two
decades has been a greater and greater presence of players from well outside the
middle-classes in both regional and national teams. The impact has been simi-
lar in a number of other cricket playing nations. Certainly, most national boards
now depend on arranging regular games against India in order to buttress their
own balance sheets. More importantly, this influx of money around the world
also means also that experts have been employed to help improve both individual
players and teams as a whole through the employment of a variety of primarily
visual technologies.
In this chapter I concentrate on the increasing use of biomechanics to govern
the game of cricket. Before doing so, however, I will highlight the particular aspect
of recent market-based reform that matters here. This will help set the framework
for understanding how Foucault’s argument about neoliberalism and human cap-
ital dovetails with the recent interest in affect in critical theory and anthropology.
David Harvey has suggested that impetus for neoliberal policy reform came from
a crisis in capital accumulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, listing such
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political figures as Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping (Har-
vey 2005, 2). This same notion of crisis was at the root of deregulation in India
starting in the early 1980’s and impacting cricket in particular via broadcasting
deregulation in 1991. Harvey persuasively locates the genesis of neoliberalism as
policy reform in the aftermath of World War II, specifically highlighting Friedrich
von Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, and in general all the figures
associated with the Mont Pelerin Society. At the core of Harvey’s argument lies
what he takes to be a “tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual
pragmatics of neoliberalization.” This is because, Harvey argues, the “scientific
rigour of its neoclassical economics does not sit easily with its political commit-
ment to ideals of individual freedom, nor does its supposed distrust of all state
power fit with the need for a strong and if necessary coercive state that will defend
the rights of private property, individual liberties, and entrepreneurial freedoms”
(Harvey 2005, 21). Harvey correctly identifies the contradiction at the heart of the
neoclassical program—the state is necessary to the functioning of markets and
the development of more markets, but recognizing that fact is strongly at odds
with widening the scope of market power. The very impetus for bringing more
and more aspects of life under the sway of markets is belied by the consequently
increasing need for a strong state to underpin those markets.
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The problem with Harvey’s approach is that it takes at face value the idea
that neoliberalism is constituted out of a simple adding of neoclassical economic
doctrine to liberal political values. He then combines that understanding with
a mistaken sense of the genealogy of neoclassical economics itself. This lack of
precision about the historical determinants of neoliberalism, I suggest, leads to an
inadequate understanding of how it works and what its effects might be.
Harvey assumes that neoclassical economics is, as its adherents aver, a doc-
trine that covers the academic discipline of economics from the late 19th century
to the present, with no pertinent ruptures in that continuity. He is by no means
alone in taking as given that neoliberalism as doctrine follows largely from the
neoclassical economics of the late 19th century. In the introduction to a “critical
reader” on neoliberalism, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston assert that
the essays in their reader by a range of economics thinkers, including Gérard
Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Thomas Palley, Simon Clarke, Costas Lapavitsas,
and so on, “offer a radical critique of neoliberalism” in showing that it is “part of
a hegemonic project concentrating power and wealth in elite groups around the
world, benefiting especially the financial interests within each country, and US
capital internationally” (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, 1). Critique notwithstand-
ing, they assert that neoliberalism is impossible to define theoretically because it
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is not a mode of production, it is tied up with imperialism and globalization, and
because “the roots of neoliberalism are long and varied, and its emergence cannot
be dated precisely...[it] amalgamates insights from a range of sources, including
Adam Smith, neoclassical economics, the Austrian critique of Keynesianism and
Soviet-style socialism, monetarism and its classical and ‘supply-side’ offspring”
(Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, 2). This is the reverse side of the claim that neo-
classical economics as a whole is dated to the late 19th century in the sense that it
begs a question of roots to the “classical” economics of the likes of Adam Smith.
This approach to the critique of neoliberalism by Harvey and others obscures
the effects of innovations in economic theory that occurred after World War II.
One aspect of that rupture can be summed up under the rubric of “game theory.”
The game theoretic notion of equilibrium is not at all like the notion of equilib-
rium made use of by the marginalists of the late 19th century. The former tracks
equilibria that occur through discrete actions by individual agents whereas they
latter models continuous macro-economic adjustments between uniform classes
of actors.3 Although von Neumann and Morgenstern’s seminal work on game
theory during World War II is addressed directly to economics (von Neumann
and Morgenstern 1944), it was not picked up within that discipline until much
3The post-War equivalent of the latter—dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory—is dif-
ferent again.
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later (Amadae 2003). Perhaps more importantly, I will argue that it is impossible
to understand the relationship between neoliberalism and post-World War II neo-
classical economics without paying detailed attention to the changes in and de-
velopment of a variety of other disciplines following that war, not least including
anthropology. My argument here is principally about rupture, the set of changes
occurring in that period that fundamentally reshaped a variety of disciplines and
gave birth to entirely new ones.
Neoliberalism as ism is of course as much a political project as an economic
one. State and inter-state institutions play a crucial role in promoting the creation
or “freeing” of markets where none existed before. The techniques that are pro-
duced by the amalgamation of neoclassical economics and politics are perhaps
best exemplified by the particular financial variant called “securitization.” In-
deed, the aggressive use of this technique in the US residential mortgage market
and the subsequent crash was often rather prematurely heralded as marking the
end of neoliberalism. I take it to be the paradigmatic technique of neoliberalism
in action. With securitization, instead of a claimed rolling back of the state, one
sees a rolling out of securities and therefore markets to trade them that depend
directly on a newly strengthened state. These new markets cover aspects of hu-
man life that, strictly retrospectively, are suprisingly amenable to such treatment.
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What might have been hard to conceive of becomes immediately natural and even
obvious. Once something has become securitized, it can then become subject to
an explicit rendering as part of, or related to, each individual’s own stock of hu-
man capital because it would have become a black-boxed technology ready for
any use. In the context I explore here, then, the point is that recent changes in the
tenor of training available to cricket players is best conceptualized as being about
helping them increase the value of their human capital.
Philip Mirowski has argued that the apparatus that makes this rolling out of
the state and markets possible depends on a diverse set of reformulated scientific
disciplines that he calls the cyborg sciences (Mirowski 2002). Mirowski calls these
sciences cyborg—rather than cybernetics-derived—in part, I think, to underscore
the manner in which they reshape boundaries between what counts as nature
and what counts as the social. He, and others, also place the genesis of much of
what we now call neoclassical economics in the post-World War II era (Amadae
2003). It is possible that much of the impetus for the neoclassical program comes
precisely from the pretense within economics toward a much longer genealogy.
Critiques of such approaches, then, would do well to be attentive to the possibility
of a more recent, and cyborg, origin of neoclassical economics and therefore of
neoliberalism.
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The specific process of liberalization in the early 1990’s in India under Nara-
simha Rao’s Congress-led minority government gave private television broadcast-
ers, including foreign companies, operating rights in India. This development had
a big impact on cricket around the world. Private broadcasting companies oper-
ating in India could “uplink” signals to communications satellites and therefore
provide Indian households with the ability to consume such locally-generated
satellite television signals. The impact of this change on the Board of Control
for Cricket in India (BCCI), founded in 1928, was enormous. Although BCCI’s
name mimics colonial government organizations, the BCCI was in fact a “soci-
ety,” now registered in Tamil Nadu under the Societies Registration Act, with
which individual cricket clubs could affiliate themselves. The BCCI organized
cricket games between “India” and other nations via what was initially called
the Imperial Cricket Conference. The ICC—the acronym now stands for “Inter-
national Cricket Council”—was and is the apex body that individual cricketing
boards representing a nation may affiliate with. The ICC has long been under the
control of cricket clubs in England and, perhaps to a lesser extent, clubs in Aus-
tralia, through their respective national cricket boards. In both those countries the
national bodies are also privately run.
After Independence in 1947, television coverage of cricket games in India was
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arranged between the BCCI and the national government-run broadcaster, Door-
darshan. The BCCI often had to help defray the costs to Doordarshan of televising
cricket because Doordarshan had no direct revenue mechanism from such activi-
ties. They later came to frame televising cricket in India as a question of national
and public interest. With liberalization in the early 1990’s, the BCCI began con-
ceiving of “broadcasting rights” that could in fact be sold to the highest bidder
from a now rapidly growing pool of television broadcasters. The private com-
panies could sell advertising slots during such coverage and therefore were able
to out-bid Doordarshan. The consequent influx of money into the game, via the
BCCI, has changed how cricket is thought about within India and, perhaps more
importantly, the status of the BCCI and Indian cricket in relation to other cricket-
playing countries around the world. Advertising revenue is the main conduit
for money into the game. In other words, the BCCI is now in a much stronger
position with respect to other cricketing bodies—the England and Wales Cricket
Board and Cricket Australia, in particular.4
In a remarkable insiders article, Peter Hutton—Senior Vice President at Dubai-
based Ten Sports and a former Managing Director at IMG Asia—writes about the
manner in which the BCCI came to monetize television access to cricket in India.
4For a set of interviews covering this well-known but interesting terrain, see Boria Majumdar
(2012).
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Jagmohan Dalmiya and I.S. Bindra were in control of the BCCI in the early 1990s.
Bill Sinrich of TransWorld International (TWI) was “invited” to purchase the tele-
vision rights to an upcoming tour of India by England in 1993. Sinrich had used
precisely that approach in the West Indies, making available coverage of England
playing in the West Indies to an English home market with great success (Hutton
2008, 140). This link is itself quite telling. Doordarshan had in part been founded
on the model of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in England. A newly
liberalized television market in England enabled the nevertheless contentious li-
censing of the national cricket game—formerly the province of the BBC only—to
private companies. In his initial move Sinrich packaged rights to and televised
England playing in the West Indies, rather than games held within England, as
this was not something the BBC was itself interested in. TWI purchased the rights
and Doordarshan in turn paid TWI for broadcasting rights within India, STAR
Sports for the rest of Asia, and Sky Sports for England. The resulting monies
paid to the BCCI—about $600,000 US dollars—enabled it to overcome an ongoing
internal fiscal crisis (Hutton 2008, 141).5
Later that year, a constitutive member of the BCCI, the Cricket Association of
Bengal (CAB), organized some games to celebrate its diamond jubilee. Doordar-
5The fiscal crisis that the Indian state supposedly underwent in the early 1990’s was the reason
that Narasimha Rao’s government gave for liberalization.
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 123
shan failed to match the bids for rights by other broadcasters so, with the support
of the Information and Broadcasting Ministry, it “refused to allow foreign broad-
casters to telecast matches played on Indian soil.” Further, “[c]laiming an exclu-
sive right to do so under the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, Doordarshan accused
the BCCI and CAB of being ‘anti-national”’(Hutton 2008, 141). The Supreme
Court gave judgment on the ensuing case in 1995. Hutton argues persuasively
that its judgment that airwaves in India could no longer be a state monopoly,
“gave legal basis to the satellite revolution that was engulfing India since the early
1990s and [that had] changed the face of Indian broadcasting itself” (Hutton 2008,
142). In a concurring note to the judgment, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy makes an
explicit argument for a distinction between private or government control of the
airwaves and public control. He notes that a “[d]iversity of opinions, views, ideas
and ideologies is essential to enable citizens to arrive at informed judgment on all
issues touching them” and that, therefore, this “cannot be provided by a medium
controlled by a monopoly.” Arguing that “private broadcasting stations may per-
haps be more prejudicial to free speech rights of citizens than the government-
controlled media...The broadcasting media should be under the control of the public as
distinct from Government” (Reddy 2000, 260). The eventual result was the creation
of Prasar Bharati. This is a public broadcasting entity within which Doordarshan
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operates. The court ruling helped develop a distinction between cricket played in
India that touches upon the citizenry—cricket in the public interest—and all other
cricket games. This distinction continues to play an important role in determining
which cricket matches must be made available to Doordarshan for simultaneous
broadcasting by them and which need not be, with almost inevitable differences
in those determinations decided in court.
Tracking changes in cricket as a way of delineating the effects of neoliber-
alism is useful because of its wild popularity in India. It stands in for, or is
in a metonymic relation to, contemporary Indian society. “India” plays cricket.
Cricket ties together the nation and law. Similarly, the moment of Muralitharan
being no-balled is significant because it becomes the site on which Sri Lankan
players and their publics can locate a fully elucidated notion of “our boys.” The
boys who bind together, by performing, the nation and cricket law. This is also
why cricket in India is held by the courts to be so important as to be held in the
public, as distinct from state, hands. The nation then is receptive to and in turn
transformative of neoliberalism as a set of practices. But what does that trans-
formation look like? Examining the relationship between sciences being applied
to cricket under the rubric of human capital valorization may give some useful
answers.
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3.2 Cricket and fair play
Cricket is by far the oldest of contemporary mass sports in the world today. All
the other popular sports were formalized or invented in the late 19th century
or early 20th century. It is also one of the only sports that has laws, not rules.
Specifically, one can imagine a game of Test (5 day) cricket proceeding from a
coin toss all the way to its conclusion with the umpires on the field not making
any contribution at all. The reason is straightforward: it is only in the event of a
dispute between the players about a putative dismissal of a batsman—an “out”—
that an umpire is “appealed” to and then has to make a judgment. If, for example,
the ball has been hit, the batsmen run, and the fielding team does not appeal to
the umpire about a possible “run out,” the game proceeds without any signal
from the umpire.6 All other popular sports, even those that explicitly have laws
rather than rules, typically require the active intervention of umpires and referees
to mark important events on the field. This is true even in cases where the players
have all already accepted that the putative event—a goal in a soccer match, an out
in a baseball game, etc.—has taken place.
The distinction is between teams of cricket players who are self-governing
with respect to the action on the field of play, unless they find themselves unable
6There are some situations that require active participation from the umpires. Almost all of
these exceptions have to do with “extras”—runs awarded automatically to the batting side for
certain kinds of infringements.
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 126
to come to an agreement about some event, and other games in which players
are actively surveilled for rule infringements by their umpires or referees. This
emphasis on laws and appeals, rather than rules and enforcement, has been the
case since at least the 1720’s when the first attempt at formalizing cricket was
made. This first attempt—an “articles of agreement”—make specific provision
for the nobles playing the game to argue with the umpires about the latter’s
decisions. The provision disappears quickly and the umpires then have the final
and only say on all matters on the field. In 1744 the actual “laws of cricket” were
put together for the first time (Underdown 2000, 158). This was not done by a
central authority, but rather by a series of different gentlemen’s clubs that worked
together on the document. It is clear that the high level of gambling on match
results undertaken in these clubs must have necessitated some clarity on which
team had in fact won or lost a game fairly. In this period games were regularly
played for 200 pounds a side or more in salaries alone for professional players,
so the level of gambling was probably substantial. In 1787, the newly founded
and privately run Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) was put in charge of the laws
of cricket. It remains in that position and has periodically modified the laws
of cricket. Until recently, the biggest change involved codifying the distinction
between underarm, roundarm, and overarm bowling during the 19th century.
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Cricket had been from the start a game that emphasized batting over bowling.
Batsmen were generally amateurs, while bowlers were professionals. The result,
argues Derek Birley, was a set of laws that favored batsmen and consequently
attempts by bowlers to push the boundaries of accepted practice in order to gain
an advantage over batsmen. At several turns, then well-known bowlers like John
Willes were simply told to stop raising their arms higher. In 1816, the MCC
officially declared that:
The ball must be delivered underhand, not thrown or jerked, with the
hand below the elbow at the time of delivering the ball. If the arm is
extended straight from the body, or the back part of the hand be up-
permost when the ball is delivered, or the arm extended horizontally,
the umpire shall call no ball (quoted in Birley 1999, 64).
As Birley quickly notes, the problem was that if umpires barred the likes of John
Willes from bowling, matches might come to an unruly end with players and
spectators alike figuratively, and perhaps literally, at odds with one another (Birley
1999, 64). A few years later, bowlers gained strong support in the shape of an
MCC member, G.T. Knight. He organized a series of three matches between an
“All-England” team and Sussex. The latter team had several bowlers who, their
opponents claimed, were “throwing.” Birley notes that not “only would the new
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bowling be put to the test, but to add further spice to the contests [the games]
were played for 1000 guineas.” Sussex won the first of two games. However,
nine members of the England side “signed a statement refusing to play in the last
match, ‘unless the Sussex players bowl fair; that is, refrain from throwing’” (Birley
1999, 65). Bowlers around the country nevertheless started imitating the new
method. Finally, in 1835 the MCC caught up with the trend and distinguished
between raised arms and throwing. They legalized any ball which was not thrown
and in which the hand or arm did not go above the shoulder (Birley 1999, 67).
Literature on cricket has for some time also spoken about the “spirit of the
game.” This spirit is usually described as involving a sense of fair play that ex-
tends beyond the written laws. It is the basis of the often used phrasing regarding
some behavior on the field that it is “not cricket,” understood to mean that it is
not acceptable even if legal. In cricketing history, perhaps the best known exam-
ple of this involved a series of matches between England and Australia, played in
Australia, in which the English team deliberately targeted the bodies of some of
the Australian batsmen. One such batsman is reported to have informed the man-
ager of the English team that “there are two sides out there; one is trying to play
cricket, the other is not.” A strongly worded telegram was sent from the Board
of Control in Australia to the MCC which stated that the behavior of the English
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bowlers was “unsportsmanlike” and “likely to upset relations existing between
Australia and England.” The MCC replied that they were convinced that the En-
glish captain and team would “do nothing to infringe either the laws of cricket
or the spirit of the game.” But also that if the “Board of Control wish to propose
a new law or rule it shall receive our careful consideration in due course” (The
Times 1933). The laws did later change, but only after another team’s bowlers
tried the same approach against England’s batsmen.
In 2000, the MCC took the novel step of actually specifying what the “spirit” of
the game was in a new revision of the laws. Aside from some statements about the
responsibilities of each side’s captain and that the umpires were the sole arbiters
of fair and unfair play, this document also specifies that “it is against the Spirit of
the Game: to dispute an umpire’s decision by word, action or gesture” and also
“To indulge in cheating or any sharp practice, for instance: (a) to appeal knowing
that the batsman is not out; (b) to advance towards an umpire in an aggressive
manner when appealing (c) to seek to distract an opponent either verbally or
by harassment with persistent clapping or unnecessary noise under the guise of
enthusiasm and motivation of one’s own side” (Marylebone Cricket Club 2010).
These instructions clearly evince an interest in the comportment of cricketing
bodies on the field of play. In its commingling of physical and mental behaviors it
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 130
is an excellent example of laws that seek to work through disciplining the conduct
of cricketing bodies. But why did the MCC think it necessary to specify what the
“spirit” of the game is? This move seems likely to form an instance of a general
shift from a game governed by “natural justice” to a game governed by rules
enforced through a panoply of technical devices and procedures.
3.3 Affective batting against bowling
One of the key questions I raised in the previous chapter is the role of bowling
in relation to a batsman, rather than the biomechanical treatment of it as a exer-
cise unto itself. The latter makes a certain kind of conventional sense. Abstract-
ing away from general tactical considerations—bowling to a particular batsman’s
weakness rather than their strengths, bowling more or less aggressively depend-
ing on the overall match situation, and so on—it would seem like it must be pos-
sible to treat any particular delivery separately from the act of batting against it.
After all, bowling comes first temporally. It is only once that event has happened
that the batsman can then choose what shot to try to make.
There are two ways in which this is wrong. The first is game theoretic. Simple
games like Prisoner’s Dilemma suggest one kind of response if the game is a one-
off, and an entirely different space of possibilities if the game’s participants know
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that the game is to be repeated many times. In the latter case, a strategy that
emphasizes cooperating is likely to be more successful. Indeed, as is well-known
in game theory literature, a strategy labeled “tit-for-tat” usually does very well
and is evolutionary stable. This strategy simply defects if its opponent defected
on the last turn, otherwise it cooperates.7 In the case of repeated deliveries to
the same batsman, a similar dynamic seems to be at work. This is very easy to
see with respect to one of a fast bowler’s most dramatic options—the bouncer.
This is a ball usually bowled with extra effort and pitched short, that is the ball
is released very late and therefore angled sharply downwards into the wicket,
bouncing much farther away from the batsman than normal. On a fast, firm
surface, the result is a ball that will bounce up high and arrive at the batsman
at shoulder or head height. Such deliveries are regulated by the umpire in part
because they are considered quite dangerous—the usual rule in contemporary
one-day cricket is that only one such ball is allowed per six-ball over. This means
that an aggressive bowler bowling to a batsman they think susceptible to such
a delivery has to think about when in a six-ball sequence they should deploy it
(if at all). Likewise, for any number of other varieties of deliveries at a bowler’s
disposal.
The second reason is more difficult to describe. I first started thinking about
7For a basic introduction to these issues see Douglas Hofstadter (1985).
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it when a collection of batsman and bowlers arrived at the MRF in late June
2007. They came there under the auspices of the Asian Cricket Council, who
had selected to former Sri Lankan players as coaches—the bowling all-rounder
Rumesh Ratnayake and the batsman Roy Dias. Ratnayake and Dias were there
to coach a variety of players from the non-Test playing countries in Asia. The
coach of the MRF team and Sekar were also expected to coach the players. The
former, M. Senthilnathan, had been a player at first-class level for Tamil Nadu
State. The older players of the MRF team all vouchsafed his talent as a batsman to
me—he appeared to be in that crowded category of highly talented players who
played below the standard that they seemed capable of achieving. At the first talk
they gave before the practice session began, Senthilnathan, Ratnayake, and Dias
took turns talking the players through the basics of good batting. First, having
a balanced stance with the feet about shoulder-width or a little farther apart.
Senthilnathan spoke specifically about what he called “locking” the knee joint.
This was not about straightening the leg—very few batsmen would do that—but
rather, he explained briefly, about tensing the muscles around the knee joint. He
said that the result would be that you would not be able to move freely. The
others then spoke about the kinds of grip—the hand positions on the bat—that
were advisable, as well as how the bat should be picked up in preparation for
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hitting the ball.
None of this discussion, even Senthilnathan’s comment about not locking the
knee joint, was framed as a scientific discussion. Rather this was about for-
mer players simply advising current—lower-level largely amateur—players about
what they took to be basic technique. This framing became especially evident
when Ratnayake said to the ACC players that when stepping back to play a short
ball—a ball that bounced well before the batsman and therefore arriving at waist
height or higher—it was okay to turn the back foot towards the ball. In the con-
ventional batting stance, the batsmen’s feet are perpendicular to the line of flight
of the ball—they are standing side-on and, for a right-handed batsman, looking
over their left shoulder at the bowler. Ratnayake was suggesting that when step-
ping back with the right foot, again for a right-hander, it was acceptable to turn
the foot so that the toes were now half-way to pointing towards the bowler. On
being challenged by Dias and Senthilnathan on this point, Ratnayake cited con-
temporary Australian batsmen as support on this point. Senthilnathan responded
that the foot turning like that might be fine as the shot was played, but not before
in preparation for the shot.
The discussion was not just about preparation for one particular kind of shot
because most contemporary batsmen in fact use precisely that movement, the
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back foot sliding farther back, as a “trigger” for playing the ball. Up until recently,
cricket coaching books suggested that a batsman stand still when preparing to
play a shot as that would allow them to keep their head, and therefore eyes, still
as the ball was released. Keeping your head still should in theory allow you to
judge the trajectory of the ball more accurately. I asked Senthilnathan about this
discussion during a match a few days later. He said that turning the foot like that
might be a good idea in Australia because Australian pitches are faster and more
bouncy than in India. He was implying that on such pitches, turning the foot
inwards would help a batsmen set up for playing pulls or hooks—aggressive cross
bat shots played to short-pitched deliveries—but that short-pitched deliveries are
less likely in India and the batsman would have more time to respond to them.
These kinds of discussions about batting were typical at the MRF. I suspect that
this is the case elsewhere too. A recent article on the biomechanics of batting cites
a mere five previous articles on the subject (Portus and Farrow 2011, 296). Portus
and Farrow frame batting as a sub-second and dynamic “interceptive skill”—in
the sense that the batsman is set up to intercept a ball in flight (Portus and Farrow
2011, 295). This implies that batting is defined in relation to the bowler, unlike
a biomechanical framing of bowling as something independent of the batsman.
The authors link both the paucity of research in this area and the lack of interdis-
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ciplinary work—in this case they urge the combining of “[s]kill acquisition-motor
control specialists” grounded in either neuro-motor control or behavioral learning
and biomechanics specialists (Portus and Farrow 2011, 295). The latter’s emphasis
on accurate measurement of movement and forces means that most such studies
are in laboratory settings. As an example of the confusion that results from strictly
disciplinary research, they cite a study (Stretch et al. 1998) suggesting that front
foot driving shots—played with a vertical swing of the bat similar to a golf drive
to balls that pitch near the batsman—involve the “front upper limb (shoulder,
wrist, elbow joints) working in a multi-segmental series of levers in a simulated
match environment” (Portus and Farrow 2011, 297). However a later study of
live match play (Stuelcken et al. 2005), rather than simulated play, finds rather
the “front upper limb working in a unitary fashion for the same stroke.” They
surmise that in match conditions, batsmen playing against high quality bowlers
might need “a technique exhibiting ‘push-like’ control, rather than a summation
of forces to produce power” (Portus and Farrow 2011, 297).
This is a remarkable disagreement about a fundamental component of batting
technique that corresponds roughly to the question I discussed in the previous
chapter of—as Sekar phrased it—“putting” the ball rather than bowling it. There
are two basic types of front foot drives taught even at a most basic level in cricket.
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The checked drive where the batsman’s arms are held in a cradle-like structure
and the bat itself does not travel above shoulder height after making contact with
the ball, and the full drive which has a flowing quality to it, leaving the bat
wrapped all the way around and over (for a right handed batsman) the left shoul-
der. But this distinction alone does not help resolve the biomechanical dispute.
Although it is not possible to play the latter, full, drive without the individual arm
joints working in a concatenated multi-segmental series of levers, it is possible to
play the checked drive in exactly that manner.
It seems likely that some professional batsmen switch easily between these
two modes of driving the ball depending on the match situation, or the spe-
cific type of practice they are concentrating on in training situations. The move-
ments a batsman makes before playing a shot—what cricket players call “trigger”
movements—lay the ground work for hitting the ball in a concatenated manner
or simply putting or pushing the ball out. As Ratnayake and Dias were arguing
about what might be acceptable in terms of foot placement in discussions with
the ACC players, I noticed that in demonstrating different foot movements with
a bat in his hands, Ratnayake was picking up the bat behind him in preparation
for a pretend shot and then flexing his wrists even further. I asked him about that
kind of trigger movement—whether it was acceptable—and he said that he now
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 137
thought that that movement was not useful as a trigger but that it had been used
as such by professional batsmen up until the early 1990s.
A few days later, I was watching the “star” player for the MRF team at the
time, Y. Venugopal Rao, batting in the nets against some gentle throw-downs—
balls throw down gently from a short distance in simulation of a full bowling
action, but which much greater control. Throw-downs are a useful way of work-
ing on some particular aspect of one’s technique because the person throwing the
ball should be able to throw the ball down onto the ground in the same place
every time. I stood behind the thrower and fielded any balls coming past him.
Venugopal had just joined the team and was no doubt looking to rebuild his
international career through playing for MRF—he had played for India recently
but had not broken through to a regular place in the national team. I noticed in
the process that Venugopal was occasionally, intermittently, flexing his wrists af-
ter picking up the bat—exactly what I had spoken to Ratnayake about. After the
practice session was over, I picked up his bat and demonstrated what I had seen—
with of course some trepidation and explicitly rendered doubt about whether I
had seen what I thought I had seen. The batsman mimicked my own gestures
with his bat when I handed it back over to indicate that he understood. A week
or so later in the nets, after a three day game that the team had finished, he asked
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me to videotape him in the nets, which recording I would copy and to give to him
as I had been doing for other players, and added that he had reviewed some old
footage of him batting in a match and saw the same hesitation in pick-up from
time to time. Each time it happened, he said, he had played at and missed the
ball.
The matches MRF and its opponents were playing did not draw public spec-
tators. Indeed, the grounds had no seating other than whatever the teams them-
selves brought with them. This made for many quiet opportunities to talk to
coaches and players alike. At the second three-day game I attended, I noticed that
the opening batsman for MRF, Juzer, had the odd habit of picking up his toes—
with all his body’s weight on his heels—from time to time. Indeed, he did this
as the bowlers were preparing to deliver the ball. On asking Senthilnathan about
this, he replied that Juzer was just a little nervous. At the next break in action
however, I heard Senthilnathan admonish Juzer for not getting his feet moving. I
brought up the topic again shortly afterwards and Senthilnathan replied that he
would look at him properly in the next practice session.
As it turns out, I ended up speaking to Juzer at the next session. Simply
pointing out this habit was enough as it was a rather basic technical problem—
it is hardly possible to moving effectively when balancing on one’s toes. The
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underlying cricket thinking about both feet and bat movement before the ball is
released has changed quite a bit over the last twenty years or so. As I noted earlier,
earlier cricket coaching books emphasize stillness and even weight distribution
before the ball is released. The idea is that when a batsman’s head is still they
will be able to pick up the trajectory of the ball more easily, and having balanced
feet will enable them to move easily either forward to get near the point at which
the ball bounces or back to give them enough space to counter any movement as
it bounces.
Senthilnathan spent a great deal more time with the MRF batsmen on these
kinds of initial movements and with all the players on tactical matters—where
to bowl to particular batsmen, which bowlers to attack, different possible field
placings, etc.—than on the technique involved in particular batting strokes. The
latter is perhaps rather too basic a set of considerations for professional bats-
men. Moreover, these considerations—not locking the knees, moving your feet
as a way of “triggering” a shot quickly and efficiently, picking up the bat in a
supple way but without any moments of hesitation—all seemed work in relation
to the bowler, rather than abstracting away from that encounter. One of the re-
curring concerns that Senthilnathan had with batsmen was that they were getting
ready—triggering—too late and as a result they had to rush through the shot they
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wanted to play. He told me that this was down to bad coaching—players are told
constantly to “play late,” so as to not pre-commit themselves to a particular shot
but as a result ended up missing the ball entirely far too often.
Thinking about this aspect of coaching batting, one that was notable by its
absence when it came to coaching bowling, I thought of constructing a video
based computer program that would act as a tool to help batsmen anticipate
the trajectories of the ball from different bowlers. The question of anticipation
is ever present in cricket with respect to the types of deliveries a bowler might
release. In the case of fast bowlers, one would typically be concerned with out-
swingers, in-swingers, leg-cutters, off-cutters, slower balls, and bouncers. In the
case of off-spinners like Muralitharan, the choices are between regular typical off-
spin delivery, in which the ball tends to drift away a little before spinning back
in towards a right-handed batsman; top-spin, where the ball bounces up much
higher (and quicker) than normal; and the relatively new “doosra” delivery that
looks like the off-spin delivery but turns in the opposite direction, away from the
batsman. It is rare to find a bowler who uses all of these types of deliveries in
match situations. The last on the list for fast bowlers, the bouncer, is the only one
which involves a clear directional component. Bouncers are balls that are released
from the hand extremely late in the bowling action so that they bounce nearer the
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 141
bowler than the batsman. The result is that the ball is arrive at the batsman at
shoulder or head-height and will therefore a very different kind of stroke from
that typically played at fast bowlers.
When I first started my fieldwork at the MRF, I tried assisting Sekar as he
coached the bowlers at the Foundation through using my video camera to pro-
vide visual feedback to the bowlers as to what it was that Sekar wanted them
to change in their bowling technique. The Foundation has its own cameras of
course, but they had to be mounted on tripods and were connected to comput-
ers running SiliconCoach motion analysis software and were therefore difficult
to move around quickly. The flexibility I provided by being able to get different
viewing angles seemed to help a little. Viewing themselves bowling in an imme-
diate way helped both Sekar and the bowlers identify the parts of their actions
that they wanted to work on. As one aspect of their technique seemed to have sta-
bilized in the desired manner they would add another correction and so on. This
concatenation of corrections would, over the very long time period required to
form bodily habits, amount to an wholesale remodeling of their bowling actions.
Computer engineering, both in terms of hardware, the silicon stuff of a mod-
ern computer, and in terms of software, work through layers of abstraction. In
software, for example, an operating system provides the grounds on which appli-
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cations programmers can do their work, but the operating system is itself typically
dependent on another software layer of “firmware” that more directly regulates
the functioning of the already itself layered hardware. Ideally, an engineer or
programmer working at one layer need not concern themselves with the imple-
mentation details of any other layer. There is then, a certain resemblance between
the layers of habit that bowlers produce in training sessions and the layers of
abstraction crucial to the functioning of computers. In order to construct a suit-
able game, I used a high-level programming language called “Python” and some
software libraries, mostly “pyGTK” and “mplayer”. I collected a stock of video
footage of MRF bowlers in their practice sessions by standing behind the batsmen
they were bowling at. I then cut the video footage into fragments—from the start
of their run-up to shortly after the batsman plays the ball. The program presents
the player with some choices as to the expected line and length of each delivery
after cutting the video playback at a fixed point. Having made a decision about
the trajectory of the ball, the player is then presented with what happened. The
point at which the video was cut varied according to the difficulty setting of the
game.
I showed Senthilnathan and Sekar the game in the hope both that it would
be useful as a tool for the batsmen in the team to think about different now ex-
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plicitly made anticipation strategies and also, indirectly, as a tool for coaches to
think about different kinds of bowling actions. The program closes a certain kind
of feedback loop between a batsman and a bowler. The batsman gets to focus
on the specificities of a particular bowling action in order to start thinking con-
sciously about how to anticipate line and length. The bowlers get in return some
sense of whether their own actions are predictable or not, and therefore whether
to spend time trying to disguise what they are trying to do with the direction of
their deliveries. It is commonplace knowledge amongst cricket players that bowl-
ing machines—mechanical devices constructed usually from two spinning rubber
disks that squeeze out cricket balls at user-designated speeds and directions—set
at a particular speed in practice sessions feel much faster to a batsman than a
bowler bowling at the same speed. Indeed, this particular thought formed much
of the motivation for the computer program I put together. The MRF players who
tried using the program however seemed quite surprised that they were able to so
successfully predict the line and length of their team-mates deliveries even when
the program was set to cut the video clip five frames before ball release, using
video taken at 30 frames a second.
The issue of predictability of bowling actions strikes at a central concern of
worries about biomechanics and bowlers, in the sense that cricket followers worry
Spinning affect: the science and laws of cricket 144
that over-coached bowlers might end up all looking alike because of that excess
of training. I was not at all successful in “selling” this program to the bowling
coaches for, I suspect, precisely that reason. I had observed in journalist inter-
views on multiple occasions Lillee denying carefully that he produced bowlers
who “looked the same” and in conversation with me, he was careful to reiterate
the point forcefully. In fact, the only part of the bowling action that he allowed
had some similarity across all his bowlers was in the preparatory phase—the run-
up—of the bowling action taken as a whole. This set of concerns seems like a
near inevitable outcome of the kinds of expertise that biomechanics has enabled.
On the one hand, coaches drew a great deal of authority from their access to
and training by biomechanists working on cricket. On the other, this same train-
ing seemed to limit the kinds of performance of expertise open to them because
bowling is treated by them as an isolated event, not one that happens in relation
to a batsman.
3.4 Muralitharan and the ‘throwing’ controversy
The laws governing cricket target cricket players like Muralitharan via affect. The
domain of the ethical has receded, hence the need for a specification of the “spirit”
of the game that explicitly lists prohibited gestures toward the umpire. The inten-
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tion of the player is clearly the target, but the only means to reach that target lies
within a regulation of gesture and the affect that that may transmit. In the case
of throwing, the locus of the change from cheating to affect lies wholly within the
science of biomechanics. Critics of Muralitharan’s bowling action argue that the
laws of cricket were reshaped to fit his specific case. The implication being that the
changes were chosen to fit his particular bowling action. On this score they may
in fact be correct. It was only relatively recently, after significant changes in both
the law and how it is implemented, that biomechanists published a finding that
all, or very nearly all, bowlers in cricket do in fact use their elbow to jerk the ball
forward, thereby suggesting that throwing was not an ethical matter, but merely
a technical question. These are all matters of degrees: Muralitharan appeared to
bowl one kind of delivery in his repertoire using about 14 degrees of straightening
of his elbow. Other famous current bowlers also straighten their elbows by 10 or
more degrees (Kesavan 2007, 105–12). Such is the opprobrium attached to throw-
ing that this finding was met with no little consternation by current and former
players, journalists, and fans. The study of Muralitharan’s action conducted at the
University of Western Australia after his second tour there has been published as
a journal article. The authors note a key feature of Muralitharan’s anatomy:
Muralitharan has a restricted range of motion in his elbow joint in that
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he is unable to fully extend his elbow—that is, at full extension, his
elbow is bent. Therefore, when bowling with a fully extended arm,
his elbow may appear to extend or flex by just viewing the elbow
at different angles as the upper arm rotates internally or externally.
Consequently, a three-dimensional kinematic analysis would be the
most appropriate way of assessing his bowling action (Lloyd et al. 2000,
975).
While they go on to ask whether biomechanics “can be used to assist umpires
in determining the legitimacy of a bowler’s action” they also argue that “the
exact time-frame for which the elbow must remain extended before ball release
must be clarified, as the relevant cricket law states that ‘the arm must remain
straight during that part of the delivery which directly precedes the ball leaving
the hand’ ” (Lloyd et al. 2000, 975). They note that Muralitharan’s range of motion
is significantly different from “normal”: his maximum extension is down to 37
degrees (compared to 0 degrees) and his forearm carry angle8 at full flexion is up
to 18 (compared to 0 degrees) (Lloyd et al. 2000, 977). Using multiple high speed
video cameras and the “Vicon Bodybuilder” software program to construct a 3D
model of Muralitharan as he bowled several balls, the authors state that “[d]uring
8With the arm hanging vertically down, fully extended, and with the palm facing forward, the
“carry angle” is the angle between forearm and the upper arm in the direction of the thumb, i.e.
laterally away from the body.
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the 0.06 s before and immediately after release, the elbow angle was stable. . .
In fact, for many of the deliveries, the elbow angle was marginally reducing in
size (i.e. flexing), a clear sign that throwing has not occurred” (Lloyd et al. 2000,
977-78). These biomechanists have proved in the laboratory that Muralitharan
was not throwing the ball. In concluding the article, they note that although
replays from live TV coverage have now been used for other elements of the game,
“video images can give an erroneous perspective of elbow joint angles as the arm
rotates in- and out-of-line with the image plane of the camera” (Lloyd et al. 2000,
979). They argue that 3D analysis in laboratory conditions must nevertheless be
compared with 2D TV video from cricket on the playing field. More importantly:
If kinematic analyses are to be performed, a more precise definition
of what constitutes a legitimate bowling action must be developed.
The laws of cricket should be modified to clarify the words ‘directly
precedes the ball leaving the hand’. This period, the ‘delivery phase’,
could be defined as that part of the delivery action in which the ‘arm
must remain straight’. The start of the delivery phase should be deter-
mined from the upper arm orientation because, as in Muralitharan’s
case, the forearm orientation would be quite inappropriate because of
the structural abnormality to his elbow. The delivery phase should
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be from when the upper arm is aligned horizontally to release (Lloyd
et al. 2000, 979).
The current law, following exactly this strongly worded injunction, states un-
der the heading of “Definition of fair delivery – the arm” that “A ball is fairly
delivered in respect of the arm if, once the bowler’s arm has reached the level of
the shoulder in the delivery swing, the elbow joint is not straightened partially
or completely from that point until the ball has left the hand. This definition
shall not debar a bowler from flexing or rotating the wrist in the delivery swing”
(Marylebone Cricket Club 2010).
Yet it would now be extremely unusual for an on-field umpire to call a bowler
for throwing under this law. This is because the ICC, not the MCC, controls the
actual implementation of the laws. The ICC has a long document titled “ICC
Regulations for the Review of Bowlers Reported with Suspected Illegal Bowling
Actions” that covers what is supposed to happen if a bowler is called for throwing
or is “suspected by the Umpire or the Match Referee of bowling with an Illegal
Bowling Action.” It immediately notes, however, that “Umpires and Match Ref-
erees, in deciding whether to cite a Player under these Regulations, should use
the naked eye viewing the action live and/or on television at normal speed” (In-
ternational Cricket Council 2009, 350). The document goes on to indicate the
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procedures by which an “human movement specialist” who is not domiciled in
the country that the player is from should examine the player’s bowling action in
a laboratory after he has been cited for suspected illegal bowling (International
Cricket Council 2009, 351). The important caveat, wholly unsupported by the law
as the MCC states it, is what the document calls an “acceptable level of elbow
extension,” specifically that “[t]his should be set at a maximum of 15 degrees
‘Elbow extension’ for all bowlers and types of deliveries. This specifically refers
to extension of the forearm relative to the upper arm to the straight position”
(International Cricket Council 2009, 363). This 15 degree threshold comes in fact
from a report by biomechanics “human movement specialists” specifying that 15
degrees is the lower limit at which elbow extension becomes visible to the human
eye and, moreover, such a level forms an upper bound covering almost all pro-
fessional bowlers playing today. It is under this regulation that Muralitharan’s
action was cleared again in 2005 after he had developed a new delivery that ap-
peared to involve more flexion of the elbow that his previous kinds of deliveries
had demonstrated.9
Driven by the controversy over Muralitharan’s bowling action, cricket officials
had recruited biomechanists to investigate the matter. The result has been a re-
working not just of the laws of cricket themselves, but also a redistribution of
9He was tested again at the University of Western Australia in 2004. See Island Cricket (2010).
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authority between the laws overseen by the private MCC and an expanding set of
rules overseen by the ICC. The incommensurability between these procedures has
been papered over by the specification that flexion of the elbow below 15 degrees
is not discernible with prostheses like video replays. An umpire may feel that a
bowler is throwing, and has the authority to call a “no-ball,” but will no longer
do so. Instead, the bowler is referred to biomechanics experts.
3.5 Affect
I did in fact eventually fall into the role of an expert at the Foundation, although
it would be better to say that I ended feeling compelled to seek out and legit-
imate that role for myself. I found here that performing expertise through an
understanding of cybernetics was an incredibly seductive operation. It was a
high-pressured, money-based, overwhelmingly “fun” kind of process involving
figuring out, literally, the body and its relations to other bodies via visual and sta-
tistical computation. I subsequently discovered that the Australian national coach
proposed to try out a far more sophisticated version of the program I wrote to
track opposition bowlers and their actions. But more to the point, my failure to
follow through as an expert at the Pace Foundation was I think mostly the result
of a prior on going negotiation between biomechanical experts and other per-
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haps equally adept participants in the game, ranging from retired players turned
journalists or TV commentators to other coaches and managers.
The computer program I had produced—if it had worked to draw together
bowlers and batsmen at the MRF on a regular basis—might have reinforced the
idea that the particular players adept to biomechanically approved coaching are
exactly those bowlers who end up with predictable actions. Certainly the players
who used the program had no trouble picking exactly where the ball was going
to go, even when the video action they were watching paused well before ball
release. Opposition to biomechanics in cricket—particularly the idea of varying
degrees of plasticity of the body—forms around how biomechanical approaches
require “too much” of such plasticity. The main biomechanical finding on cricket
over the last two decades has to do with categorizing different types of bowling
actions and finding that bowlers who mix types will likely both bowl inefficiently
and also suffer lower back injuries. Batting and fielding are largely untouched.
Many bowlers appear to perform very well by breaking these rules, but the prob-
lem is not that biomechanics might be considered “wrong,” it is that it produces
predictable players who will, therefore, not be as effective as they would hope.
This excursion into the niceties of cricket law and its implementation high-
lights the role that affect plays in cricket. Remember that the law speaks about
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any elbow extension or straightening at all being “unfair.” The ICC document
goes further than this by first putting into place a formal review of any on-field
calls by the umpire. The ICC has recent documents titled “Principles of Natural
Justice” (2005) and “ICC Code of Conduct for Players and Umpires” (2009) that
specifies the multi-step sets of procedures by which disputes about bowlers be-
ing called for throwing by umpires are to be handled by the match referee and
biomechanists. This is precisely why umpires are unlikely to make such calls—to
do so is to invite being both overruled and being told to ignore their judgment
of that bowler in the future. Moreover, the ICC have inserted a provision of 15
degrees as an acceptable upper limit of elbow extension. All of these provisos,
and indeed the law itself, are derived from and couched in a purely perceptual
language. What is acceptable is defined around an apparently unmediated “see-
ing” of a bowler’s arm action—no television slow motion is allowed. It forms, in
short, a nice example of regulation by affect because all compliant bowlers feel as
if they do not extend their elbows, but they do. And umpires are instructed to
perceive whether an action is legal, unmediated by technologies like slow motion
replays, but have their judgment be subject to verification by presumably better,
more objective biomechanics scientists. There has been a simultaneous switch
from umpires upholding laws to umpires enforcing rules and an evacuation of
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the final authority of umpires by the ICC in the form of match referees, appeals
procedures, a variety of technical devices, and biomechanists.
I suggest that affect and the cybernetic science of “biomechanics”—the science
of life and the physical forces that act upon it—can be read against one another
productively. Affect in both recent anthropology and in biomechanics concern a
working out of “human capital.” The latter is an important and interesting devel-
opment of neoliberal theory and practice. If neoliberalism has cybernetic origins
and cricket has changed following increases in the amount of money following
liberalization, it follows that an investigation into how cricket is played, reasoned
about and regulated, illuminates the functioning of both neoliberalism as “ism”
and critical responses to it via concepts like affect.
In her introduction to the edited volume “The Affective Turn,” Patricia Clough,
following Brian Massumi, distinguishes mere emotion from affect—in the Deleu-
zian sense—by arguing that it allows for an attention to a becoming that might
go beyond the body: “[a]ffect is not only theorized in terms of the human body.
Affect is also theorized in relation to the technologies that are allowing us both to
‘see’ affect and to produce affective bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic-
physiological constraints.” Likewise, such experimenting “also inserts the techni-
cal into felt vitality, the felt aliveness given in the preindividual bodily capacities
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to act, engage, and connect—to affect and be affected.” Thus, for Clough, “[t]he
affective turn invites a transdisciplinary approach to theory and method that nec-
essarily invites experimentation in capturing the changing cofunctioning of the
political, the economic, and the cultural, rendering it affectively as change in the
deployment of affective capacity” (Clough and Halley 2007, 2). A theorization of
affect enables, for Massumi and Clough, a move from the becoming of a body
that lies beyond the reach of contemporary capitalism to, nevertheless, a form of
experimentation through affect of the political, economic, and cultural aspects of
human life.
In an important article on affect in critical theory that is informed by the mul-
tiple authors in Clough’s volume, Clare Hemmings argues that a certain kind of
rewriting of the history of cultural theory has enabled scholars to think of the turn
to affect as “cutting edge” research. This turn promotes, according to Hemmings,
a sense that what is needed in the present in cultural theory is merely a more
theoretically productive frame of mind. Hemmings argues that there are three
major impasses in critical theory that affect is supposed to help resolve. First, as
critical theorists she argues that “we doubt the capacity of constructivist models
of the subject to account fully for our place in the world as individuals or groups.”
What is left out here is the “residue or excess that is not socially produced, and
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that constitutes the very fabric of our being.” Therefore, second, “we doubt the
capacity of both quantitative empirical approaches and textual analysis to account
for the fullest resonance of the social world we wish to understand.” And, third,
“we doubt that the oppositions of power/resistance or public/private can fully
account for the political process.” As a result, Hemmings suggests, “affective ties
have been theorized as offering an alternative model of subject formation” (Hem-
mings 2005, 549–550). The contrast Hemmings is drawing here has to do with the
hopefulness she takes to be associated with affect: theorists of affect “emphasize
the unexpected, the singular, or indeed the quirky, over the generally applicable,
where the latter becomes associated with the pessimism of social determinist per-
spectives. . . .” Thus, she argues, for theorists like Massumi, “it is affect’s difference
from social structures that means it possesses, in itself, the capacity to restructure
social meaning” (Hemmings 2005, 550). Massumi, and other theorists who draw
in part from Deleuze, will likely of course disagree with this assessment by Hem-
mings. I argue that the distinction that Deleuze draws between different forms
of subjectification from his interview about Foucault strongly suggests a reading
of Deleuzian that is not predicated only on a move towards residues that are not
socially produced, but rather a use of that residue to reengage with the social.
The distinction between the exceptionality of affect and the determinism of the
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social is important to Hemmings because it enables a framing of the choice that
is presented to such affect theorists. Affect theorists are, Hemmings argues, re-
quired to suppress the question of whether the world is really divided up into
good and bad affects—that is, affects leading to a politics that the theorist does
not endorse—by asking of the reader whether they prefer the optimism and free-
dom enabled by the former to the pessimism and determinism of the latter. Thus,
Hemmings argues, affect “often emerges as a rhetorical device whose ultimate
goal is to persuade ‘paranoid theorists’ into a more productive frame of mind”
(Hemmings 2005, 551).
Neoliberalism seems an apt candidate for paranoid theorists to focus on today.
Certainly one can hardly think of a better example than the changes brought
about by neoliberalism in, as Clough put it, the “cofunctioning of the political, the
economic, and the cultural, rendering it affectively as change in the deployment of
affective capacity” (Clough and Halley 2007, 2). But how useful is the turn to such
an account of affect in critiques of neoliberalism? Much depends on an aspect
of neoliberal theory—the idea of “human capital” that informs much of Michel
Foucault’s understanding of post-war Germany and the United States. Foucault
argues in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures that this novel idea, as developed by
Gary Becker, Richard Posner, and other “law and economics” luminaries, marks
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a transition to an interventionist state that insists on each person being a kind of
self-entrepreneur. Such entrepreneurs must, of course, seek to secure returns on
the unalienable capital they possess.
Two features of Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics are worth noting. First, that
this is the only sustained account directly about his present and recent past that
we have by him, and second, that these notes of the 1978-9 lectures (Foucault
2008) have only recently become available in published form.10 Foucault begins
the lecture series by carefully setting out what he means by a study of the art of
government—studying how sovereign rule has been reasoned about—namely a
method that “is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning uni-
versals by using history as a critical method, but starting from the decision that
universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can do” (Foucault 2008,
3). With respect to liberalism, the primary contrast for Foucault is with the police
of the 17th and 18th centuries and the manner in which limits to raison d’État
were always external to the state. Contrawise, and this is what could only keep a
system of states in equilibrium for Foucault, “there is no limit to the objectives of
government when it is a question of managing a public power that has to regulate
the behavior of subjects” (Foucault 2008, 7). Foucault suggests that attempts at
external limits to raison d’État took the form of juridical reflection—in England,
10First published in French in 2004, translated into English in 2008.
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via state contract theory—on limits “that come from God, or those which were
laid down once and for all at the origin, or those which were formulated in the
distant past of history.” By contrast, the marker of the transformation of govern-
ment into modern government are limits “that will no longer be extrinsic to the
art of government, [but] intrinsic to it: an internal regulation of governmental
rationality” (Foucault 2008, 10). Foucault notes five important points regarding
this internal limit to government. First, it is a de facto limit, not a legal limit.
Consequently, any transgression of the limit is not a sign of the illegitimacy of the
government but rather its inadequateness. Second, the limit is general even if de
facto. That is, it is valid at all times. Third, the limit comes from a consideration
of the best means to meet objectives of government practice itself. Fourth, that a
distinction will be drawn between what must be done and what it is best not to
do. And finally, fifth, as a consequence of the preceding points, the “government
of men is a practice which is not imposed by those who govern on those who are
governed,” but is rather a discovery of limitations “by a series of conflicts, agree-
ments, discussions, and reciprocal concessions: all episodes whose effect is finally
to establish a de facto, general, rational division between what is to be done and
what is not to be done in the practice of governing” (Foucault 2008, 12).
Foucault argues that the outcome of these series of conflicts, agreements,
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and discussions under neoliberal processes is that government comes to be un-
derstood as something that must not intervene on the effects of the market—
correcting the destructive effects of the market on society—but rather that it
should intervene directly on society itself so that a regulation of society by the
market becomes possible. In a discussion of neoliberalism as it arrived in the US
from Germany after World War II, Foucault emphasizes the role of figures like
Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker. He suggests that what is unique to neolib-
eralism in the U.S. is its examination of labor and entrepreneurship as factors
of production—following Adam Smith’s four-fold distinction between land, cap-
ital, labor, and entrepreneurship. Foucault argues that even though the classical
political economists, including Marx, make labor a central component in their
analysis, they do so by reducing labor to a question of labor-time or labor-power.
For neoliberals like Schultz and Becker, Foucault argues that the abstraction that
makes such an analysis possible “is not the product of real capitalism, but of the
economic theory that has been constructed of capitalist production.” That is to
say, “[a]bstraction is not the result of the real mechanics of economic processes;
it derives from the way in which these processes have been reflected in classical
economics” (Foucault 2008, 221).
A focus on the actual capitalist processes involved, for these theorists, would
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start with an analysis on the status of the “income” that a worker generates.
Foucault suggests that for Schultz income is simply the product or return of
capital—“[t]his is not a conception of labor power; it is a conception of capital-
ability which, according to diverse variables, receives a certain income that is
a wage, an income-wage, so that the worker himself appears as a sort of en-
terprise for himself” (Foucault 2008, 225). The result is that rather than homo
œconomicus being a creature of exchange, under classical political economy, or a
creature merely of consumption, as one might find under contemporary accounts
of “late-capitalism,” one finds instead that the “stake in all neoliberal analyses
is the replacement every time of homo œconomicus as partner of exchange with a
homo œconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital,
being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of his earnings”
(Foucault 2008, 226).
The development of neoliberalism is, then, tied directly to idea of human capi-
tal and the resulting emphasis on each individual having to be responsible for the
development of their own human capital. There are two types of important prob-
lems attached to this development. First, if the development of neoliberalism is
an outcome of cybernetics-derived sciences, are there sciences that impact directly
on the development of the idea of human capital? Second, what shape might the
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response have taken, if any, within the humanities and the non-cybernetic sci-
ences?
The example of cricket laws and how they have changed since the mid-1990s
illustrates in miniature the shape legal changes take under this regime. Muralitha-
ran’s career as a bowler did not end after he was “no-balled” for throwing the ball.
Throwing in cricket had been subject both to a great deal of moral pressure—
throwing was treated as tantamount to cheating precisely because it had been
inconceivable that a bowler could unknowingly straighten at the elbow while re-
leasing the ball. This is exactly the domain of affect. The felt liveliness of the
body as a kind of unfolding of human being. Playing the computer game I wrote
likewise highlights the collective event nature of the interaction between bowler
and batsman. This too is a moment that is rendered affectively.
The solution to the problem of throwing in cricket was to bring in biomechan-
ical science to adjudicate claims about who was and was not throwing. Such
science found rather that all bowlers throw and thus drove through legal changes
that removed power from the umpires and redistributed it to a medley of tech-
nical procedures with biomechanists at its center. But biomechanics has little,
as of yet, to say about why or how some coordinated segmental interactions
amount to bowling and others to throwing. Under both interpretations—affect
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or biomechanics—there is an impasse here. However, I have argued that this im-
passe does not lie outside the jurisdiction of neoliberalism. Affect is of little help
here as a critical move against neoliberalism because it is merely the name that
critical theorists give to the mystery of human capital valorizing itself. The end
result is a securitization of cricketing life as human capital.
Chapter 4
Operations Research and predicting
outcomes in cricket
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The 1992 Cricket World Cup, held in Australia and New Zealand, was marked
by a number of new developments in the sport. South Africa, newly re-admitted
into international cricket by the International Cricket Council (ICC) after the fall
of apartheid, was playing its first World Cup. For the first time, the players were
wearing colored clothing with their individual names on the back of their shirts.
And white leather balls were used, instead of the usual red, so that some games
could be played under floodlights—the idea was that the usual red leather balls
did not show up clearly at night, especially if hit up high into the air.
An important further innovation involved a new “rain rule.” Limited overs
games in cricket are designed to produce a definitive result. This in turn means
that some accommodation must be made for any delays that might occur during
the game. In a limited overs game, each side takes one turn each at batting. A
coin toss determines which team can choose whether to bat first or second. One
team bats for about half the day, scoring as many runs as possible in its allotted 50
overs (each over consisting of six legitimate deliveries). Then the other team takes
over. If the second team scores more runs than the first team, the game comes to a
halt as the second team is a winner. If the second team either bats out its allotted
50 overs or loses all its batsmen, but hasn’t scored more runs, it has lost. Some
special rules handle the very rare case of tied scores.
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Given this structure, there is no definitive way to know which team is winning
a game at any arbitrary moment. Indeed to ask the question “who is winning?”
while a match is in progress and expect a simple answer is to mark oneself as
a newcomer to watching cricket. However, even without the continuous scor-
ing available in other sports—football, for example—there are nevertheless some
clues as to which team is doing well. If the first team to bat is scoring at a more
rapid pace than is usual, it seems clear that they may well end up winning the
game. Likewise, if the first team finished their innings on a low score, and the
second team is scoring quickly it will seem likely that the second team will end
up the winner. There are of course many situations when even neutral spectators
will disagree with each other about the prospects of each team. The kinds of fac-
tors relevant to an evaluation of the situation might include everything from the
prevailing weather conditions, to the condition of the pitch—the strip of earth on
which most of the action takes place—, the likelihood of dew or rain later in the
day, which players have been playing well recently or are carrying injuries, pre-
vious results between the two teams, the match situation itself, who is currently
batting, which bowlers have finished their allotted set of deliveries, and so on.
In this chapter, I explain how the Operations Research model that is now
part of the laws of cricket governing match delays derives its persuasiveness as a
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model. The model is an example of a political technology that works on the sec-
ond of the poles of development that Aihwa Ong elucidates through Foucault—
the species body. This Duckworth-Lewis model of cricket is framed around two
distinct concerns—fairness and prediction. I suggest that these two concerns are
somewhat at odds with one another. Moreover, I will argue that the fact that this
is a quantitative model raises an issue surrounding number and community. The
relationship between this model and cricket is worth examining in detail because
it stands in for the manner in which quantitative modes of governmentality might
be constructed for society at large.
The model is opaque in two different ways. First, it is a proprietary model.
Regulators of the game have access to exactly how it calculates how to change
the target that a team will need to win a game, but no one else does. Worse,
the modelers have kept secret, even from the regulators, how they used their
data-set of previous games to calibrate their model. Second, the mathematics
behind the model has been published but is largely incomprehensible to cricket
players, coaches, and fans of the game. Certainly, there have been no journalistic
attempts to explain how the model is constructed nor have there been any other
kinds of public discussions of the internal workings of the model. In the next
chapter I argue that there are a number of interesting features of how the model
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came into being and challenges to its veracity that are worth elucidating. In
this chapter, however, I will suggest that the usual somewhat standard kinds of
arguments against quantitative models of human society can be raised against the
Duckworth-Lewis model. I also argue that the persuasiveness of the model rests
largely on the possibility its performativity. This in turn rests on the cybernetic
notion of teleology and the role that computers have come to play in mathematical
proof. I will suggest more broadly that performativity is a necessary condition of
a technology becoming embedded in the very structure of some given activity—
here, the laws of the game of cricket.
Prior to the 1992 World Cup, the usual rain rules debarred any match result
unless a minimum number of overs were faced by both teams. This meant that
a team batting first could not be declared a winner, no matter how many runs
they scored, unless the second team also had a chance to bat for some time.
Further, in the event of a rain delay, an adjustment would be made according
to the prevailing average run scoring rate in that innings so far. For example,
consider a situation in which the first team has completed its innings—scoring
200 runs in 50 overs—and then a delay occurs that means that the second team
will have to face fewer overs for the game to finish on the same day, say 40
overs. The score that the second team will have to reach to win will be reduced
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by the first team’s average run rate over the course of its innings for each over
taken away from the second team. In this example, the second team will have to
score 161 runs to win. This system has some obvious virtues. It is certainly very
simple. The concept of an “average” is readily understandable and is, perhaps
more importantly, already part of the way that cricket players, commentators,
and spectators keep track of how a game is progressing. While a team is batting
second in a game—“chasing a target”—one might typically hear comments about
whether they are keeping up with the “required run rate” for example. Note that
the move I have made here of bringing out the features of this rain-adjustment
method by giving an hypothetical example of a cricket match in a certain state is
exactly how discussions of such models typically proceed. Readers are meant to
compare their intuitions of how an example of a cricket match might develop over
time both with and without the particular rain-delay adjustment being proposed.
Determining the plausibility of a model being fair and accurate requires a careful
perception of one’s intuition about the dynamics of typical cricket matches. As
we shall see in this and the next chapter, the literature on these models, both in
and out of scholarly journals, is rife with such rhetorical moves.
This rain rule had introduced a number of difficulties over the years. Three
years before the 1992 World Cup, for example, Australia lost to the West Indies
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in the final game of the World Series Cup Final—a tournament in Australia that
pitted that team against two touring teams, in this case the West Indies and Pak-
istan. Australia won the coin toss at the beginning of the game and elected to bat
first. In retrospect, this proved to be the decisive moment in the game. Australia
had scored 83 runs for the loss of two wickets when rain first interrupted play.
Although there was a provision that allowed the final to be replayed on the next
day, that would only occur if the cumulative delay was long enough. In this case,
Australia were soon back on the pitch but now playing a 38 over game, not a 50
over game. In the remaining time, they scored a further 143 runs. This meant that
the West Indies would have to score a challenging 227 runs to win off 38 overs, an
average run rate of 5.97. However, the West Indies’ innings was also interrupted
by rain. They had been on 47 for 2 when it rained. On resumption of play, they
faced a target of only 61 runs from 11.2 overs and achieved it easily (Wisden Al-
manack 1990). Mike Coward, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald called it the
“Great Rain Robbery,” quoting an anonymous member of the Australian team as
saying that “We’ve got ourselves to blame. We knew about the inadequacies of
the rules and did nothing about it.” Coward went on to note that the then captain
of the team, Allan Border, suggested that professional cricket players be invited
to submit proposals to change the rules—ones that did not unfairly penalize the
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team batting second. Coward quotes Border as saying that “It is a very complex
problem and usually someone finds fault with every suggestion . . . But some-
thing has to be done. There was nothing more we could have done last night”
(Coward 1989). A news report noted the reactions printed in local Australian
newspapers, where the match was described as “hollow,” “farcical,” “calculator
cricket;” and “a wet weather rule designed purely to achieve quick results for
television.” The immediate problem was the balance between the commercial
pressure to complete the game within one day, lest further television coverage on
the following “reserve” day be too costly, and the need to have sufficient play as to
lessen the advantage rain rendered to the team batting second. Richard Benaud,
a former player and captain of the Australian team who has been quite influential
in post-war Australian cricket, was quoted as saying “For three years now, I have
pointed out to the administrators the ridiculous advantage enjoyed by the side
batting second in this situation. Perhaps now a final has fallen flat, they will do
more than give it a cursory wave of the hand and put it in the ‘too hard’ basket”
(Times 1989).
The 1992 World Cup organizing committee, including Richard Benaud, intro-
duced a different rain rule for this particular tournament. The new rule would
not take the average run rate from the first team’s innings, but would instead rank
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each over in the first innings by how many runs were scored—the over in which
the least number of runs were scored first, then the next least productive over, and
so on. For each over of reduction in the second innings, the target score would
be reduced by the runs scored in the least productive over from the first innings.
That over would then be struck off the ranked list. Continuing with the example
above, if the first team had, say, only scored 20 runs from its least productive 10
overs, then the second team would have to score 181 runs from the 40 overs now
allotted to them because of the delay. The reason given for this rule change has
to do with a perceived unfairness to the first team under the previous rules. In
general, it is easier to score at some given rate over a small number of overs than
to score at that same rate for a large number of overs. A target of 100 runs in 20
overs is far harder than a target of 5 runs in 1 over, for example.
After a large number of games, the 1992 World Cup had come down to the
semi-final stage. In one of the semi-finals, England played against South Africa.
England were considered one of the stronger teams in the tournament. The South
African team had so far been commended for its play—the game between newly
post-apartheid South Africa and the West Indies was particularly marked out for
its amiable but competitive play. A number of players in the World Cup, including
players in England’s team, had defied a sports boycott of South Africa during
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the 1980s. Cricket was segregated within apartheid South Africa, but the pay
for international cricket players to play in South Africa was much higher than
in regular cricket. Players tempted into playing in South Africa—the so-called
“rebel” tours—had been banned from regular international cricket for some time
but were now playing again. There was in short a great deal at stake in this game,
some of which went well beyond purely cricketing considerations.
On the day of the match, the weather forecast suggested rain. Indeed some
early rain delayed the start of the game. At this point, the number of overs that
each team was to face had not been reduced from the usual 50 overs. The South
African captain won the toss and invited England to start the game by batting
first. England started relatively badly, but then a series of partnerships between
their middle-order batsmen allowed them to score many runs. The South African
team had been somewhat slow in the field, taking their time between overs to
discuss strategy and so on. As a consequence they would be fined a small amount
of their match fees. More importantly, England’s innings was cut short. Instead
of facing a full 50 overs, they only faced 45 overs, scoring a total of 252. South
Africa’s batting innings proceeded in a relatively balanced fashion. Their batsmen
were generally scoring runs freely, but were also getting out before really taking
control of the game. The match appeared to be heading for a very close finish.
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With just 13 balls remaining in their allotted 45 overs, their batsmen needed a
further 22 runs to win. An impartial observer would likely think that they would
lose the game from this position. The game, however, was held up by heavy rain
for 12 minutes—in order to try to preserve the condition of the pitch, covers are
brought onto the field by groundstaff and play suspended temporarily. After the
rain stopped, the new rain-rule came into effect. It turns out that in England’s
innings, one of the South African bowlers bowled particularly well. He managed
to restrict England to just one run in two of his overs. This meant that the new
target for South Africa’s batsmen would be 21 runs off one ball. The maximum a
batsmen can score off one ball is 6 runs, so the game had effectively been ended
by the rain-rule (Miller 2007).
This high profile event forced the rain-rule off the table. And it provided the
motivation for the development of the Duckworth-Lewis model now currently
in use in cricket. The model was first put in place as a rain rule at the end of
1996, with the ICC publishing a guide for the application of the Duckworth-Lewis
method in professional cricket (International Cricket Council 1996, Appendix II,
39–53). Duckworth and Lewis—probably the drafters of the guide—had them-
selves been busy training match officials how to use it. In their first hand account
of the building of the model, Duckworth and Lewis note that in that first year,
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they “had no problems with scorers, umpires, match managers or even the play-
ers,” but that “[m]ost of the adverse comment came from the media.” They note
that they produced an explanation of their method, including several worked out
examples, for the media but that “few, if any, of these parties ever gave any indica-
tion that they had read it, let alone gone through the examples” (Duckworth and
Lewis 2011, 67). The authors suggest that the media were “critical but basically
uncomprehending of the rationale and fairness of the method” and cite unfavor-
able media reports to the effect that their method is “dreaded,” “much vaunted
and complicated,” and, simply, “bizarre” (Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 68). In
response to this media coverage, including a critical editorial piece in the 1998
edition of the Wisden Almanack (Engel 1998, 17–18), that they also quote from,
they decided that they would hold themselves accountable only cricket regulators
and not to the press (Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 69).
By 1999, with the World Cup due to be held in England, their method had
nevertheless begun to be used in almost all the major cricket playing countries—
testament, perhaps, to the clear inadequacies of previous attempts at rain rules.
Some familiarity with the system by 1999 combined with the expectation that rain
might well interrupt key games, meant that commentators, players, and coaches
had begun to think about the implications of the Duckworth-Lewis method. In an
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early pre-tournament game, Australia playedWorcestershire—a local professional
team. Worcestershire batted first and 162 runs in a rain-shortened 44 overs. Aus-
tralia were therefore set a target of 178 to win in 44 overs under the new system.
Chidanand Rajghatta reported that “[t]his World Cup will throw up many such
intriguing reformulations and teams will have to ace such unexpected twists.”
Rajghatta went on to note that “[o]ne consideration which will come into play in
conditions where rain is imminent or expected will be whether to bowl your best
bowlers through” (Rajghatta 1999). The key point here is the expectation that a
cricket team will modify its tactics in the light of possible rain delays. This ap-
plies across different rain rules of course, but previous rules were never taken to
be predictive of final totals or results—indeed that was the source of dissatisfac-
tion with them. Here one had a rule that was meant to be fair and predictive, so
the fact that a team might consider modifying its approach to a game suggests an
attempt to drive a wedge between the claim to fairness and the claim to accurate
prediction. In this case, the tactic is based on the restriction on the amount of
overs each bowler in a team is allowed to deliver. If a rain interruption is likely,
Rajghatta notes, it might make sense to have your best bowlers use up their allo-
cation before it rains thereby temporarily depressing one’s opponents run scoring
and increasing the chance of getting their batsmen out. If successful as a tactic,
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this would improve the side’s position under the Duckworth-Lewis model be-
cause it does not take into account which of your bowlers have bowled only the
total number of overs finished.
The tournament was organized around a pool stage—in which groups of
teams would accumulate points by playing other teams in the same group—and
then a knock-out stage to decide the final winner. India had played particularly
badly against a relative weak team in their group, Zimbabwe, and seemed there-
fore to be out of the tournament early. In an account of this situation titled “India
puts down the remote...,” Anubha Charan reported a number of forlorn Indian
fans still hoping for some way India could squeeze through to the final stage.
Charan noted that “if India beat New Zealand by something like a 150-run mar-
gin, and if South Africa defeated Australia by a similar differential, we would be
tied at four points with Australia and might go through on a higher net run rate”
(Charan 1999). Indeed, there had already been a report of the team’s management
requesting clarification from the organizers of the tournament about precisely
how those the rules governing which team went forward worked (Express News
Service 1999). Charan went on to report that spectators in India “finally switched
to another channel when it was revealed that at the time of rains interrupting play
New Zealand were ahead on the Duckworth-Lewis [method]” (Charan 1999). This
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is an example, not of changes in the tactics within a game, but rather a claim that
spectators were beginning to pay attention to the Duckworth-Lewis method in
order to decide what was worth their attention. An understanding of the under-
lying model and the ability to put it to use in analyzing a game had escaped the
confines of the team’s coaches and the match’s regulators.
In 2002, the West Indies played a series of games against India in India. The
three longer-form Test matches were played first, with a seven game long set of
one-day matches to follow. The first two games, in Jamshedpur and Nagpur,
were marked by some crowd troubles. In the first game, with the West Indies
batting second and just 13 runs short of almost certain victory, the TV commen-
tators announced to viewers that Mike Proctor, the match referee, had awarded
the match to the West Indies using the Duckworth-Lewis method. However, the
crowd calmed down and play continued (Wisden Almanack 2004a,b).
In both these games, spectators had thrown objects, largely bottles and fire-
crackers, onto the playing area thereby preventing the players from competing
with one another safely. In the third game, played in Rajkot, Gujarat—the same
state that had witnessed widespread anti-Muslim riots earlier in the year—things
took a turn for the worse when a couple of the West Indies players were hit by
objects thrown in by the crowd. The captain of the West Indies side took their
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team off the field. They had batted first and scored an aggressive 300 runs from
their 50 overs. India however responded extremely well, scoring 200 runs in just
over 27 overs with just one batsman out when play was interrupted. After a
long delay, the match was abandoned and the match referee awarded the game
to India on the basis of Duckworth-Lewis. The calculations suggested that India
were some 81 runs ahead of where they should have been had the game been
evenly poised. The Wisden match report for that game noted that the West In-
dies team had unsuccessfully objected to the application of the rain-rule and also
that “[l]ocal rumour was that bookmakers had sabotaged the match to stop India
winning, and had been floored by the outcome” (Wisden Almanack 2004c). The
implication was that these bookmakers had expected that the match would be
suspended with no result, rather than be awarded to India. Reuters reported that
the BCCI condemned such crowd disturbances and that the ICC was investigating
the matter. The match referee had awarded the game to India because “players
cannot be held responsible for crowd trouble.” It also went on to quote a for-
mer West Indies player and current commentator, Michael Holding, to the effect
that “[v]ery shortly, spectators will be seen going into the one-day venues with
computers with the Duckworth/Lewis formula in hand and constantly keeping
in touch with proceedings. Whenever their team is in front, they will just throw a
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few missiles, get the game called off and their team ends up the winners” (Reuters
2002). Kanta Murali, writing in Frontline on violence in cricket, also reflected that
this match suggested that unlike the case with the possibility of upcoming rain,
“[c]rowd interruptions are wholly unanticipated and a team cannot account for
this in its strategy, causing the D/L system to be somewhat ineffective. In fu-
ture, spectators with a basic knowledge of the D/L system can choose to influ-
ence match outcomes at opportune times” (Murali 2002). This argument seems
rather wrong-headed given that it postulates the very thing that it says cannot be
anticipated—if crowds did begin to behave like that, players should indeed begin
to anticipate such outcomes.
However, the key point is that the very possibility of players and spectators
deliberately manipulating proceedings—leaving aside whether that had actually
happened in this instance—implies that it was now conceivable that teams were
tracking where they are in terms of the Duckworth-Lewis method during a game,
even when a rain interruption is not a possibility. This is an entirely novel moment
because previous rain rules were not susceptible to such treatment. Rules such
as the average run rate adjustment were known to be inaccurate in almost all
situations, whereas Duckworth and Lewis had come up with a model that was
thought to be accurate. This is what made it feasible, if nevertheless controversial,
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for the match referee to award the match on the basis of their model.
4.1 Probity and probability
The model is statistical in nature. As such, it is part of what Ian Hacking has
suggested is a efflorescence of statistical control in the 20th century. Hacking
has argued that contemporary ideas about statistics and probability emerged in
Europe around 1660 and were based on writings about topics as varied as Pas-
cal’s wager, distinguishing between testimony and evidence, expectation, political
arithmetic, annuities and inductive logic (Hacking 1975). Hacking argues that the
notion of probability that emerged was from the start Janus-faced: “On the one
side it is statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes. . .
On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated to assessing reasonable degrees
of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background” (Hacking 1975,
12). In the first sense, to speak of a probability is to assert an empirical claim
about the relative frequency of occurrences of some particular event. The second
sense, however, does not require that an event has actually ever occurred because
it addresses degrees of belief about knowledge of that possible event. Hacking
suggests that these two aspects of the idea of probability have survived to this
day—in contemporary terminology one would speak of frequentist probability
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versus Bayesian probability. The important point for Hacking is not that there are
two notions here, but rather that from the start the same word was used for both
cases: “Out of what historical necessity were these readily distinguishable fami-
lies of ideas brought into being together and treated as identical?” (Hacking 1975,
12) The connection in one direction is fairly straightforward. The more frequently
an event is observed to have occurred, the greater the confidence one ought to have
in one’s belief about that event. Is it the case, however, that the stronger a belief
regarding an event, the more likely it is to happen? This is where, I argue, perfor-
mativity and probability are tied together. A probable person, one whose probity
is unimpeachable, is a person whose beliefs are likely to be connected to what
actually happens in the world. This is, I think, the point that “reliable testimony”
plays in Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s account of Hobbes and Boyle dispute
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). But in that case testimony can in fact help create the
phenomena in question by helping construct it.
In a later work, Hacking argues that an avalanche of printed numbers—statis-
tical tables—in the 19th century was a necessary condition for the development
of control over a newly conceived of population. Hacking argues that “[s]tatistical
laws that look like brute, irreducible facts were first found in human affairs, but
they could be noticed only after social phenomena had been enumerated, tabu-
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lated and made public” (Hacking 1990, 3). But as these first laws were discovered
by examining numbers that were about newly-discovered social “deviancies” such
as suicide, crime, madness, and so on, he argues that the roots of the contempo-
rary idea of “information and control as a neutral term embracing decision theory,
operations research, risk analysis and the broader but less well specified domains
of statistical inference” lie in the much earlier notion that “one can improve—
control—a deviant subpopulation by enumeration and classification” (Hacking
1990, 3). The control that Hacking writes about here seems directly connected
to the idea of performativity. As printed numbers became available for a variety
of therefore increasingly well-defined and locatable social “phenomena,” the cer-
tainty of belief needed to intervene in those phenomena became easier to attain.
Tables of facts are persuasive.
I will argue, however, that there is an important distinction between the idea
of control developed in the 19th century and the idea of control that is crucial to
cybernetics. The key here is the very definition of information that Shannon and
Wiener developed. Information is defined in terms of uncertainty. Indeed, some
package of information counts as such only if you are not able to predict what is
in the package. Receiving the information changes you in some respect or other.
This does not mean that the Janus-faced nature of probability has been effaced.
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However, as I will argue later in this chapter, subjective, or Bayesian, probability
has made possible an important contemporary method of statistical modeling of
the world that is not susceptible to the kinds of critique most often leveled at
objective frequentist models.
4.2 Information, mathematics and prediction
This chapter uses the application of what has become known as the Duckworth-
Lewis method—the specific formula underlying the model—in cricket as an ex-
ample of a common place attempt to predict the future. The kind of future being
predicted is however structured by, and is at odds with, expectations of fairness.
I argue that the example stands in for a whole set of similar attempts to grapple
with the future across a diverse set of contemporary processes. The Duckworth-
Lewis method is derived from an Operations Research approach to cricket. Oper-
ations Research (OR) as a discipline can be traced to the emergence of cybernetics
in the aftermath of World War II. Claude Shannon, then working for Bell Tele-
phone Labs, wrote a memo on “A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography” that
when declassified founded what is now known as information theory. Shannon’s
entropy measure is a way of quantifying the smallest possible compression of
some given message. To give a simple example, think of the an English language
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written message in which all the vowels have been removed. In almost all cases,
fluent readers have no difficulty in reading the message. Even though there are
approximately 32 basic symbols in written English—the letters of the alphabet
all in lower-case plus some punctuation—or 5 bits (2 raised to the power of 5),
Shannon estimated that the information actually held by each symbol is about
1 bit or perhaps even less. In other words, a compressed pure text file can be
considerably smaller—about five times smaller—that the original file. This is be-
cause most English language text can be imputed from just a few clues about its
content.
What Shannon inaugurated was a way of talking about information as an ar-
tifact which could then in turn be used to model natural processes. Information
is a mathematical construction of unpredictability that is then used to model, for
example, phenomena as natural seeming as DNA and genetic expression. Donald
MacKenzie, a member of the “Edinburgh School” within science studies, has ar-
gued recently that although “the social studies of science and technology. . . has for
several decades been asking how we know the properties of the natural world,”
it nevertheless remains the case that “the corresponding question for the proper-
ties of artifacts is much less often asked” (MacKenzie 2001, 1). This distinction,
between natural and artifact, is precisely of course the issue at stake in Philip
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Mirowski’s rendering of the cyborg sciences. It is not simply that the bound-
ary between the social and natural that might become destabilized, but rather
that the destabilization occurs because each might come to be constructable and
knowable as part of the other. Asking this question of computers, MacKenzie
suggests, is particularly interesting because it “highlights another issue that so-
ciological work on science has not addressed as much as it might: deductive
knowledge” (MacKenzie 2001, 2). MacKenzie notes the peculiar status of deduc-
tive knowledge, in particular mathematical knowledge. MacKenzie takes logic
and mathematics to be both based on deduction, in that it is “granted a status not
enjoyed by empirical, inductive, or testimony-based knowledge.” He argues that
the difficulty here, the wedge that needs to be inserted as David Bloor might put it,
involves the “difficulty for the isolated individual of distinguishing between being
right [about a deduction] and believing one is right” (MacKenzie 2001, 11). This
difficulty provides MacKenzie with the motivation for his delineating “the histor-
ical sociology of machine proof” (MacKenzie 2001, 13). Yet this is not of course a
question that cannot be asked about probability-based knowledge. In both cases,
it is proof itself that forms the locus of belief. The deductive case may be harder
because seemingly more “natural,” yet the inductive case remains relevant in its
own right as a form of knowledge and because one can deduce knowledge from
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and about combinations of inductive beliefs. The ability to control society rests in
large part on the persuasiveness of deductive proof about inductively generated
beliefs. Yet, the outlines of how that persuasiveness operates mathematically have
not been elucidated.
MacKenzie notes that “the application of deductive proof to show that the
text of [computer] programs corresponded to their specifications” can be traced
to von Neumann and Turing, but suggests that “it was only in the 1960s that
sustained interest in formal verification of computer programs began to emerge”
(MacKenzie 2001, 47). This did not mean, however, that such proofs were them-
selves necessarily highly formal in nature. One of the first such proofs by Peter
Naur, for example, was made from “mixtures of ordinary mathematical notation
and English rather than expressions in a formal system” (MacKenzie 2001, 49).
MacKenzie argues that this interest in computer proofs quickly led other partic-
ipants to envisage “the eventual use of proof-checking programs, with at least
a limited capacity to construct the details of proofs, within mathematics itself”
(MacKenzie 2001, 60). MacKenzie introduces the notion of “cultures of proving”
to account for the differences in implementation of such a vision. The most im-
portant of such implementations is, of course, based on the use of computers in
formal proofs: “[i]n formal proof, logical deduction takes the form of syntactic
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pattern matching, with no requirement for ‘understanding’ of the meaning of the
formulae being processed” (MacKenzie 2001, 308). Such an approach “treats the
machine as the trustworthy agent of proof [and] is philosophically orthodox: the
canonical meaning of proof in modern philosophy is formal proof” (MacKenzie
2001, 309). And yet, even within this relatively constrained position, a number of
choices have to be made: “Which formal logic should be implemented? Should
it be classical or constructive? Should the law of excluded middle be permit-
ted? Should the fact that a contradiction implies any proposition whatsoever be
regarded as an elementary theorem, or as a paradox to be avoided by the con-
struction of a logic in which deduction is guided by relevance?” (MacKenzie
2001, 313)
These choices are formulated by MacKenzie as arising from an alternative to
the orthodox formalist position.1 They derive from L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionism,
which under Errett Bishop’s formulation, has come to be known as mathematical
constructivism. It is an alternative to the orthodox position that is now prevalent
within computer science. MacKenzie suggests that “[c]onstructivism’s popular-
ity in computer science, which contrasts sharply with its limited attractiveness to
mathematicians, can be explained by the fact that, to a significant number of com-
1The third possibility, that of founding mathematics on logic, has largely been discredited since
Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead’s failed Principa Mathematica project at the beginning of
the 20th century.
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puter scientists, constructivism appears a productive not a restrictive enterprise,
in particular allowing the extraction of programs from proofs” (MacKenzie 2001,
329).
MacKenzie uses these disputes to establish that “a sociology of ordinary ‘ri-
gorous-argument’ mathematical proof is thus that there is no abstract, context-free
way of demarcating what constitutes a proof; that there is no higher criterion that
the judgment of the adequacy of a putative proof by the members of the relevant
specialist mathematical community” (MacKenzie 2001, 319). In this argument, the
use of the computer has led mathematicians to have to choose between different
notions of proof: the “machine helps one to perform proofs one could not other-
wise perform and, at least in the circumstances of computer system verification,
to perform them with greater dependability than individually one might be able
to.” However, it remains the case that for MacKenzie “[e]ven in the most formal
and most mechanical of domains, trust in the machine cannot entirely replace
trust in the human collectivity” (MacKenzie 2001, 334).
Brian Rotman argues convincingly that the advent of the computer ought to
reformulate what counts as proof for mathematicians and computer scientists
and the over-arching community of deductive proof-seekers they form. As with
Haraway’s attention to “god-tricks,” so also Rotman asks with regard to natu-
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ral numbers—for him mathematics is essentially a practical, semiotic activity—
“[i]sn’t everything—everything corporeal—finite?” He goes on to suggest that
“pursuing the question of writing/thinking of the infinite only raises the ques-
tion of ‘finite’ and how we are to think ‘human making’ in a new way.” Further, in
“the case of numbers, this way points beyond the comforting fixity of the finite-as-
being within the infinitude of God—the view that the whole numbers in all their
endlessness are and were always there before us, natural and God-given objects—
to a view of numbers as open-ended and unfinished, as becoming, needing always
to be counted into an actualized form of ‘being.’ ” (Rotman 1993, xi) For Rotman,
the set of all natural numbers can only be legitimately reasoned about if it is taken
as an actively constructed set. But if the emphasis is on the construction of the set,
an immediate question follows: who or what is it that is capable of constructing
such an infinite set? This question is more difficult still when considering sets of
hierarchies of infinities—the ordinals Georg Cantor “discovered” in the 1880s.
Cantor was a Platonist with regard to sets. As such, for him finite and in-
finite sets are discovered in doing mathematics not constructed by it. Rotman
argues regarding this orthodox formal position that “[f]or most mathematicians
. . . mathematics is a Platonic science, the study of timeless entities, pure forms
that are somehow or other simply ‘out there,’ preexistent objects independent
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of human volition or of any conceivable human activity” (Rotman 1993, 4-5).
Moreover, Brouwer’s intuitionist position is similarly itself immersed “in an un-
examinedly ideal mentalism” (Rotman 1993, 6). Rotman asks, how might one
“refuse the claim that numbers are elemental, mathematical ur-constituents of the
actual or potential order of things?” He finds his answer in the observation that
“numbers are inconceivable—practically, experientially, conceptually, semiotical-
ly, historically—in the absence of counting.” Further, “counting works through—it
is—significant repetition” (Rotman 1993, 6). It is on this point that much of Rot-
man’s argument rests. If mathematics is a practical activity, a construction of
entities, rather than a discovery of them it would follow an understanding of the
work mathematics does can only be found in how it is undertaken as a practical
activity.
Rotman notes that written mathematical proofs are “riddled with imperatives,
with commands and exhortations such ‘multiply items in w, ‘integrate x,’ ‘prove
y,’ ‘enumerate z,’ detailing precise procedures and operations that are to be car-
ried out.” In addition, such proofs are “completely without indexical expressions”
which raises the immediate questions: “[w]ho are the recipients of all these im-
peratives? What manner of agency obeys the various injunctions to multiply,
prove, consider, add, count, integrate, and so on? How is the. . . lack of indexical-
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ity related to the impersonal, transcultural nature of mathematical knowledge?”
Rotman argues that the implication of this for formal, classical, mathematics
and its conceptualization of the infinite must be something like a “disembod-
ied Agent. . .—as near to God as makes no difference—[which] is a spirit, a ghost
or angel required by classical mathematics to give meaning to ‘endless’ counting”
(Rotman 1993, 10).
An alternative to this mathematical “insistence on the corporeality of the one-
who-counts is to start rewriting the connections between God, Number, the Body”
(Rotman 1993, 11). Rotman goes on to argue that what is needed here is “a sys-
tematic reading of mathematical signs, one rigorous enough to make the appro-
priate distinctions between various kinds of mathematical agency and sufficiently
external to the way whole numbers are habitually cognized to resist the view of
them as ‘natural.’ ” (Rotman 1993, 52) Rotman further suggests with regard to
the problem of the infinite, of endless counting, that it is indeed possible “to put
forward a scheme of counting and hence of constructing—significantly creating—
the numbers and interpreting them arithmetically which denies the necessity of
one-more-time, yet does not fall into unreason and irrationality.” Doing so re-
quires a refusal of the “idea of an unqualified, decontextualized, exception-free,
universal identity between real or imagined human actions” (Rotman 1993, 54).
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Thus, Rotman disputes here both Brouwer’s intuitionism—“there is no prelin-
guistic mathematical meaning, no pure primary intuition, no origin of geometry
or arithmetic waiting to be expressed”—and, with regard to formalist, orthodox
mathematics, that “there is no such thing as a pure signifier,. . . no coherence in
the attempt to understand mathematics as the manipulation of such marks prior
to or independent of any possible interpretation” (Rotman 1993, 143).
The solution for Rotman is, of course, the computer. He argues that “computer
science signals the instatement of the slave—the one-who-counts—onto the math-
ematical scene” where “an essential part of this instatement is the recognition
that any act of counting/calculating, whether by fingers, abacus beads, written
marks, or electronic pulses, requires energy, space, and time for its realization.”
Recognizing the computer in this way, however, is a “normative decision on the
part of the mathematical community” and the “basis for such a decision is in-
separable from the larger question of what meaning and status the mathematical
community is to assign to empirical/experimental mathematics” (Rotman 1993,
152). Rotman does not address the implications of positing the computer as the
indexed entity addressed by mathematical proof. Computers are quintessentially
rule-following beings that are, here, thinking mathematics. It is also not clear why
mathematicians should take the normative decision suggested by this argument,
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however science studies is particularly amenable to treating mathematics in this
way.
One foundational argument for much science studies today can be traced, I
would argue, to David Bloor’s understanding of rule-following. Rotman has, in
effect, returned us to MacKenzie position on the social. But this is itself derived
from Bloor’s understanding of Wittgenstein on rule-following. Bloor developed
his theory of the social in Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (Bloor 1983).
He aimed to give “a description and an analysis of all the main themes of the later
philosophy in such a way that the sociological and naturalistic Wittgenstein stays
clearly in view” (Bloor 1983, 2). Taking Wittgenstein’s example of completing the
sequence “2, 4, 6, . . . ” Bloor suggests that a “Platonist has no trouble describing
this example in terms of his theory” for “the correct continuation of the sequence,
the true embodiment of the rule and its intended application, already exists.” All
that is needed is to “continue the sequence in the same way, and we can do this,
and know what it means, by stating the rule of the sequence to ourselves.” But,
suggests Bloor, the “Platonist is actually presupposing the very competence that
he is meant to be explaining” because the number sequence is itself the rule: “its
reality extends no further than our actual practice” (Bloor 1983, 85). There are in
fact an unbounded number of rules that fit the case “2, 4, 6, . . . ” with each number
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supplying different subsequent numbers that “fit” that beginning sequence. For
Wittgenstein, an appeal to simplicity of rules is of little use because one would
have to have some other principle that allowed you to order the possible rules
by their degree of simplicity. What sort of grounds could there be for such a
principle? Furthermore, Bloor states that “Wittgenstein’s rejection of Platonism is
intimately connected with his finitism” and that the “reason why it seems to pre-
exist is because our use of the rule has become a mechanical routine” (Bloor 1983,
88). Bloor explains that the force with which simple rule-following presents itself
(and, more generally, mathematical proof), makes “them appear fundamentally
different from empirical happenings.” This force is due to the “form taken in
our consciousness by the social discipline imposed upon their use” (Bloor 1983,
93). It is that social discipline that grounds the correctness of some putative rule-
following practice.
What these considerations suggest is that a mathematical model like Duck-
worth-Lewis brings together a cricket community through the persuasion it exerts
on that community. This is a persuasive force built out of rules about number.
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4.3 Rule following, numbers, and community
Cricket games depend on accurate score-keeping and those numbers are the only
means by which a game under dispute because it is incomplete can be settled. But
following cricket is, in addition to this basic dependency, comprised to a large ex-
tent through an appreciation of number. Cricket fans can readily state the batting
and bowling averages of their favorite players. Various other measures such as
the average rate at which batsmen score or the rate at which bowlers get batsmen
out are also readily available to fans. Discussions about cricket use these numbers
as a way of grounding the conversation. They have the air of empirical fact. Yet,
administrators, coaches, players, and fans alike never confuse the numbers for
the quality of the performances they index. The result is that numbers—batting
averages and the like—undergird all conversations about cricket because they al-
ways available, yet never determine the outcome of those conversations. It is this
ambivalent stance taken towards numbers in cricket that the Duckworth-Lewis
method successfully disturbed.
Ian Hacking argues that what he calls the avalanche of numbers depended
and helped create the idea of probability, starting in the late 17th century. Indeed,
Hacking suggests that David Hume’s skeptical argument about induction was it-
self not possible until the question of causes and effects could be dissociated from
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knowledge, that is, demonstrable knowledge, and placed firmly in the camp of
opinion. The analytic problem of induction, Hacking argues, was already avail-
able. Here the problem is one of distinguishing between good and bad reasons to
argue from induction. But the skeptical problem was new. For Hume:
An expectation that the future will be like the past must be either
knowledge or opinion. But all reasoning concerning the future must
be based on cause and effect. Reasoning concerning cause and effect
is not knowledge. Therefore it must be opinion, or probability. But
all probable reasoning is founded on the supposition that the future
will resemble the past, so opinion cannot be justified without circu-
larity. Knowledge and probability are exhaustive alternatives. Hence
expectation about the future is unjustified. (Hacking 1975, 181)
The question Hacking asks is what makes this skeptical argument possible.
Hacking argues that the transformation of the low sciences into the high sciences,
for example the shift from alchemy into chemistry, involved the development of
the idea that there were no true necessary connections among primary qualities
(that could in turn be investigated via secondary qualities). Thus, “[c]ause and
effect—the paragon of the old knowledge that was demonstration—and signs, the
purveyors of opinion, have become one” (Hacking 1975, 183). Leibniz, Hacking
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suggests, was the first philosopher of probability and had gathered together all
the innovations in thinking about probability from his contemporaries in the late
17th early 18th centuries, but had not been able to make this leap. The reason
is simple: for Leibniz, believed that there were no interactions between physical
bodies in the world, there was only an expression of one by another: “one thing
expresses another, in my use of the term, when there is a constant and regulated
relation between what is true of the one and what is true of the other” (Hacking
1975, 184, cited in). Hume’s skeptical problem could only arise, and therefore
inaugurates, the movement of causation from knowledge to opinion.
Over the 19th century, this transformation from knowledge to opinion made
room for the development of ideas about probability. For Hacking, Leibniz mark-
ed the beginnings of modern probability and Hume marked the setting in place
of the possibility of inductive knowledge through reasoning about probabilities.
The result was the bringing together of ideas about the physical world with a
statistical concept of society. A society that had a population constructed out of
normal people.
C.S. Pierce in turn stands in for an altogether different but equally transfor-
mative moment. Hacking argues that by the end of the 19th century it became
possible to think of the world not as something known probabilistically—a form
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of understanding that used to be called mere opinion—but rather that the world
itself might be probabilistic. It is in this sense that one can think both of normal
people in a given population and also of probabilistic laws of nature. Hacking
suggests that Peirce was the first person to use randomization in the design of
his experiments while at the Coast Survey: “he used the law-like character of ar-
tificial chances in order to pose sharper questions and to elicit more informative
answers” (Hacking 1990, 200). This technique becomes the standard method of
gathering knowledge about social phenomena in the 20th century.
Peirce, of course, wrote about three different ways of making inferences—
deduction, induction, and abduction. His well-known example of the last of these
three involves an account of him landing on a sunny day at a Turkish seaport
and seeing a man on a horse with four other horsemen holding a canopy over his
head. He infers this is the governor of the province (passage quoted in Hacking
1990, 207). It is clear that this can be no deduction. Yet neither is it clear that it
is a species of induction. What manner of previous experience is he drawing on
to make abduce (or, in an alternative formulation, hypothesize) that the man is
the governor? A person committed to deduction and induction as exhaustive cat-
egories could argue that Peirce is really just making an inductive inference. This
may be the first time he has visited a Turkish seaport or seen a man on a horse
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surrounded by others holding a sun canopy for him. Yet, perhaps the induc-
tion is from previous generic experience of the deferential treatment of important
people. Peirce would have found this line of reasoning unacceptable because the
important point on which he labored was that inductive inferences could be quan-
tifiable. One could in fact precisely weigh the amount of evidence for believing
in some inductively generated inference. It is the notion of quantities of reason
that Peirce preserves by making the distinction between deduction, induction,
and abduction.
However, as Hacking argues, it is not the case that for Peirce an inductive in-
ference could lend a probability to the conclusion of the inference. Rather, the
inferential reasoning itself is probable to some possibly quantified degree. As
Hacking puts it, deduction for Peirce is such that “the conclusion of the argument
is true whenever the premises are true” but for induction the “conclusion is usu-
ally true when the premises are true. . . .” When precise odds can be ascribed
to the premises, Hacking suggests, “the conclusion is reached by an argument
that, with such and such probability, gives true conclusions from true premises”
(Hacking 1990, 209). Peirce’s model of scientific inquiry follows these distinctions.
One creates hypotheses and then tests them inductively. Hacking quotes Peirce’s
formulation of what is now better known as Popperian falsification: a scientist
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should “ardently desires to have his present provisional beliefs (and all his beliefs
are merely provisional) swept away, and will work hard to accomplish that object”
(Hacking 1990, 210).
Yet, what is often at stake is not the knowledge that a particular method of
reasoning leads to truth more often than not, but rather that some particular given
inference is reliable or not. Hacking quotes a passage from Peirce that makes the
quandary that he had backed himself into quite clear:
An individual inference must be either true or false, and can show
no effect of probability; and, therefore, in reference to a single case
considered in itself, probability can have no meaning. Yet if a man had
to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty-five
red cards and a black one, or from a pack containing twenty-five black
cards and a red one, and if the drawing of a red card were destined to
transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to consign him
to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the
pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although from the
nature of the risk it could not be repeated. It is not easy to reconcile
this with our analysis of the conception of chance. (quoted in Hacking
1990, 211)
Operations Research and predicting outcomes in cricket 201
As Hacking notes, Peirce’s solution to this problem is quite remarkable. Peirce
finds solace in a notion of community:
It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably re-
quires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our
own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community,
again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with
whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. . . .
(quoted in Hacking 1990, 211)
Peirce is trying to resolve his quandary by focusing on the part of the hypo-
thetical situation he set up that limits the drawing of the card to one instance (and
then transporting one immediately to hell or heaven). If a community of beings
are each individually drawing cards, it would be better for them collectively if
they drew them from the pack containing more red cards. For Hacking, this is
evidence that Peirce was committed to an ontology and metaphysics of chance
through and through. Thus Hacking writes that “Peirce did not think that first
all there is the truth, and then there is a method for reaching it. . . . His theory of
probable inference is a way of producing stable estimates of relative frequencies.
But on the other hand the real world just is a set of stabilized relative frequencies
whose formal properties are precisely those of Peirce’s estimators” (Hacking 1990,
Operations Research and predicting outcomes in cricket 202
213). This is why Peirce needs to postulate a community of beings with a collec-
tive interest in order to resolve the problem he sets himself. The truth about the
world just is the result of applying inductive methods because, for Peirce, mind
and matter evolve together. For Peirce, the world is made up of probabilities and
those quantifiable numbers are grounded in and depend on an expansive sense
of community.
The idea of open-ended belonging to a community that grounds a disposition
towards the world has become immensely influential in the social sciences since
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (Anderson 1983). Writing on Benedict Anderson’s distinction be-
tween bound and unbound seriality, Chatterjee argues that “the most significant
addition that Anderson has made to his analysis. . . is his attempt to distinguish
between nationalism and the politics of ethnicity” where “[o]ne is the unbound
seriality of everyday universals” and the “other is the bound seriality of govern-
mentality. . . ” (Chatterjee 1999, 128). Further, whereas unbound serialities “afford
the opportunity for individuals to imagine themselves as members of larger than
face-to-face solidarities. . . , of transcending by an act of political imagination the
limits imposed by traditional practices,” bound serialities “can operate only with
integers” such that “for each category of classification, an individual can only
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count as one or zero, never as a fraction. . . .” Bound serialities suggests Chatter-
jee are, in Anderson’s account, “constricting and perhaps inherently conflictual”
(Chatterjee 1999, 128).
Anderson locates the difference between bound and unbound seriality in the
Hegelian distinction between good and bad infinity. Chatterjee suggests that
“Hegel’s idea of a true infinity is an example of the kind of universalist critical
thought characteristic of the Enlightenment that Anderson is keen to preserve”
(Chatterjee 1999, 130). And, Chatterjee argues, Anderson’s utopianist thought be-
longs to that “dominant strand of modern historical thinking [that] imagines the
social space of modernity as distributed in empty homogeneous time” (Chatter-
jee 1999, 131). Moreover, Anderson’s endorsement of “ ‘unbound serialities’ while
rejecting the ‘bound’ ones is, in fact, to imagine nationalism without modern gov-
ernmentality” (Chatterjee 1999, 132). Chatterjee goes on to connect the insistence
on the heterotopia of modernity to a refusal to endorse one kind of seriality over
another: “it is morally illegitimate to uphold the universalist ideals of nationalism
without simultaneously demanding that the politics spawned by governmentality
be recognized as an equally legitimate part of the real time-space of the modern
political life of the nation” (Chatterjee 1999, 134).
Anderson argues, regarding the relationship between the bound seriality of
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integers and the operation of the census, that “this does not at all mean that
each countee does not anonymously reappear in dozens of other classificatory
enumerations within the same census, in each instance as an integer, but it does
mean that this complex fractionality is inscribed in invisible ink” (Anderson 1998,
37). Thus while they both appear to agree that number and community are in-
extricably connected, Chatterjee argues that governmentality is a necessary part
of modern life and that it is—in Andersonian terms—an outcome of bound se-
rialities of belonging. Anderson’s cryptic remarks about Hegelian infinities and,
apparently alternatively, complex fractionality, notwithstanding, the Duckworth-
Lewis model seems to fall directly in line with the idea of bound serialities. I will
suggest in the next chapter this may not be the case for more complex forms of
modeling cricket.
4.4 A cyborg mathematics of science studies
Philip Mirowski makes a very convincing case for a cyborg rendering of all the
sciences generally after World War II. But Mirowski fails to develop an account
of the implications of cyborg science for deductive knowledge. Here MacKen-
zie develops the argument that the very practice of proving has been modified
through the use of computers. However, Rotman’s suggestion that the philoso-
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phy of mathematics ought itself to be modified to accommodate this development
is compelling. This leaves the question of the social, “our” culture, or community.
Bloor presents an argument about such a notion of the social, made through his
contentious interpretation of Wittgenstein on counting, that grounds the “Strong
Program” and its insistence on causal, symmetric, and reflexive explanation. His
suggestion that one might either render Latour as trivially different from his own
position—here the emphasis is on Latour’s semiotic actor-network theory as a
semiotic system—or as an entirely obscure theory of entelechies, quasi-objects, etc.,
is itself convincing. Doubly so, for Latour himself seems to prefer this reading,2
This theory surely counts as a cyborg theory, but is undoubtedly insufficiently
attentive to, and incorporative of, the constitution of such theories through the
long history of the cyborg sciences.
The quintessential cyborg science, cybernetics, involves what came to be known
as “purposive systems” or “teleological methods.” In popular literature today, the
term “feed-back” stands in for these terms. Margaret Mead and Gregory Bate-
son were deeply involved with the first post-War meetings—the famous Macy
Conferences—at which these different strands were pulled together. Mead had
already become somewhat famous from her earlier work on Samoa. Most of
2See for example, his laudatory references to Isabelle Stenger’s work on Whitehead meta-
physics (Stengers 1997, vii-xx).
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the literature on the Macy Conferences underplays Mead and Bateson’s roles—
treating them largely as interested bystanders. This may be largely correct. How-
ever, it is reasonably clear that the impact of this discussion on Mead was quite
large. To give one example, she began to argue that the institute she founded—
the Institute for Intercultural Studies which was based out of her war-time work
on understanding different national cultures—should promote cybernetics as a
language or medium of exchange between otherwise embattled nations. She was,
of course, thinking in particular about the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
More importantly, Mead gave a paper on the “Cybernetics of Cybernetics” to
the American Association of Cybernetics in 1967. The paper dealt largely with
the application of cybernetic principles to the organization of that association
itself. However, the general idea, that cybernetics could and should be applied
to itself marked a break, and possibly even a break-down, in the then nascent
discipline. Cybernetics of cybernetics, or second order cybernetics, folds within
the system to be examined the observer or cybernetician. There is a sense which
this follows immediately from classic anthropological concerns. A discipline that
claims participant-observation as one of its central methodologies could hardly be
more cognizant of the importance of tracing the interaction between observers of
a system and other participants in that system. The problem is that move makes
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analysis of that system much harder to enact. There are no fixed points here
against which one might gain some traction.
A few years after Mead’s death her influence both within anthropology and
outside it was greatly diminished by Derek Freeman’s account of his own research
on Samoa. The resulting kerfuffle tarnished her reputation as a scholar, possibly
correctly even if in a rather vituperative fashion. It is clear however that Mead
was an important public intellectual who was actively involved in US politics.
This too fits neatly with the idea of second-order cybernetics. If a cybernetician is
necessarily to be concerned with the system being analyzed, and that cybernetic
system is US society or some aspect of it, it must follow that the cybernetician
is also involved in formulating a teleology or purpose for that system. Being a
public intellectual follows directly from being a second-order cybernetician whose
own central purpose quickly becomes entangled in making claims about what
are and ought to be the purposes of that society itself. This in turn provides, I
argue, a useful understanding of the relationship between performativity of all
cyborg models and the aspects of society that they simultaneously represent and
intervene in.
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4.5 Embedding performativity
In a paper in 2005,3 MacKenzie examines the question of performativity more
closely. In particular, he traces the effects of arbitrage pricing theory in its most
important field—derivatives markets—from the early 1970’s to the present. He
suggests that the 1973 paper by Fisher Black and Merton Scholes on options pric-
ing, along with Robert C. Merton’s paper in the same year, was “a defining—
perhaps, the defining—achievement of modern financial economics. . . ” (MacKen-
zie 2005, 8). Previous models of options contracts, MacKenzie notes, “involved
parameters the values of which were extremely hard to determine empirically,
notably investors’ expectations of returns on the stock [or other asset] in question
and the degree of investors’ risk-aversion. . . ” (MacKenzie 2005, 6). This options
model, I argue, provides a nice case of what I call embedded performativity.
MacKenzie, following Michel Callon, suggests that performing the discipline
of economics itself can affect markets: however, “[f]or a claim of performativity
to be interesting—for the use of economics to constitute what I call ‘effective’
performativity—an aspect of economics must be used in a way that has effects
on the economic processes in question. . . economic processes incorporating the
aspect of economics must differ from their analogues in which economics is not
3The paper was delivered at a meeting of the History of Economics Society, Tacoma, WA.
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incorporated” (MacKenzie 2005, 11). MacKenzie suggests that the Black-Scholes-
Merton pricing theory “disentangled options from the moral framework in which
they were dangerously close to gambling, and framed them by showing how
they could be priced and hedged as part of the normal operations of mature,
efficient capital markets” (MacKenzie 2005, 18). This was presumably an enabling
condition of the rapid spreading of options markets—geographically, across asset
classes, and, most importantly, in the terms of the volume of trading in options
markets. MacKenzie notes that “[b]road features of the Black-Scholes-Merton
model were indeed already present in the patterns of prices in markets prior to
the formulation of the model,” however, “there were also significant discrepancies
between the model and the pre-existing price patterns” (MacKenzie 2005, 19).
But prices did later conform very closely to that predicted by the model. This
MacKenzie terms “Barnesian” performativity, which is the “claim that the market
prices informed by the model altered economic processes towards conformity
with the model” (MacKenzie 2005, 23).
MacKenzie suggests that the success of the model was due to “[f]inancial
economists quickly [coming to] see the Black-Scholes-Merton model as supe-
rior to its predecessors. . . it involved no non-observable parameters except for
volatility, and it had a clear theoretical basis, one closely linked to the field’s
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dominant viewpoint: efficient market theory” (MacKenzie 2005, 27). Most impor-
tantly, MacKenzie argues, for options traders the “underlying mathematics might
be complicated, but the model could be talked about and thought about rela-
tively straightforwardly: its one free parameter—volatility—was easily grasped,
discussed, and reasoned about” (MacKenzie 2005, 27). Further, given that such
traders tended to sell options to institutional buyers of options, the “availability
of the Black-Scholes formula, and its associated hedging and risk-measurement
techniques, gave participants the confidence to write [sell] options at lower prices,
helping options exchanges to grow and to prosper” (MacKenzie 2005, 36).
MacKenzie argues, however, that the U.S. stock market crash in October 1987
forms an important break in the performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton mo-
del: “The fall was a grotesquely unlikely event on the assumption of log-normali-
ty.” This had an important consequence, for the “subsequent systematic departure
from Black-Scholes option pricing—the so-called ‘volatility smile’ or ‘volatility
skew’—is more than a mathematical adjustment to empirical departures from log-
normality: it is too large fully to be accounted for in that way” (MacKenzie 2005,
38). Thus, for MacKenzie, the history of options pricing has three phases. The
first is of little options trading activity and a loose fit between the Black-Scholes-
Merton model and actual traded prices; the second demonstrates a Barnesian
Operations Research and predicting outcomes in cricket 211
performativity fit of model to prices; and in the third “from 1987 to the time
of writing—option pricing theory is still performed in the generic and effective
senses (it is used, and its use makes a difference), but it has lost its Barnesian
powers” (MacKenzie 2005, 39).
Regarding the 1987 crash, MacKenzie raises the “intriguing possibility that
amongst the factors exacerbating the 1987 crash was an application of options
pricing theory” in the form of portfolio insurance. This, MacKenzie suggests,
“is Barnesian performativity’s opposite: the use of an aspect of economics al-
tering economic processes so that they conform less well to their depiction by
economics” (MacKenzie 2005, 39). This possibility and subsequent changes in op-
tions market prices reinforces MacKenzie’s claim of the historical contingency of
the 1973–1987 period.
Emanuel Derman, who contributed to the well known Black-Derman-Toy op-
tions pricing model, has argued that, following the 1987 crash, “[o]ver the next
15 years the volatility smile [has] spread to most other options markets, but in
each market it took its own idiosyncratic form.” Derman suggests that the rapid
growth of options markets themselves—some options markets are now larger
than the markets on which they are based—implies that the problems Black and
Scholes faced are no longer pertinent. Whereas Black and Scholes attempted to
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derive the price of an options contract from the price movement of the underly-
ing stock, a “better model of the smile should be capable of calibration to liquid
stock, bond and options prices.” But, Derman concludes, the problem is in fact
much deeper: “All financial models are wrong, or at least hold only for a little
while until people change their behavior” (Derman 2003). MacKenzie’s emphasis
on the importance of the 1987 stock market crash has, then, been confirmed by at
least some leading financial theorist practitioners.
In MacKenzie’s argument, Black-Scholes-Merton ceases to be important after
1987. It had its prior period of Barnesian performativity in which a world of
options prices came to fit the model’s outputs more and more closely because
traders used the model. And then a somewhat opaquely rendered period of
negative performativity in which prices diverged from the model because the
model was being used. But, as Derman hints, Black-Scholes-Merton is still in fact
being used to characterize different markets by the kind of “smile” they exhibit.
Its one free parameter—implied volatility—is in fact now used by traders to quote
options prices to each other in a variety of derivatives markets. As options prices
are very sensitive to the underlying security’s price that their value is derived
from, traders find it convenient to reason about an option in terms of its implied
volatility with each other, using a previously agreed upon standard model like
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Black-Scholes-Merton. When a trade occurs it is settled between the two traders
by working backwards from such an implied volatility to an actual cash value.
This, I argue, is embedded performativity. A model that is not used as a model of
the world, but rather as a means with which to reason about the world.
4.6 Computer models in cricket
As I indicated earlier, an important consequence of the rapid influx of money into
the game of cricket after liberalization in India has been a greater and greater em-
phasis on “limited overs” cricket, which is to say cricket games that are designed
to produce a definitive result in some given limited amount of time—usually
either one whole day or, more recently, a mere three hours. However, the require-
ment that a result be produced runs into conflict with a crucial feature of the
game. As I argued in the previous chapter, the central micro-action in cricket is
between a batsman and bowler. It is acted out on a strip of closely mown turf
called a wicket. The bowler aims to “pitch” the ball into the turf just in front of
the batsman. The latter waits for the ball to bounce up off the turf before striking
it. All of this frequently happens at similar speeds to that of a baseball game,
say 90 miles per hour. The relevant point here is that the condition of the pitch
matters a great deal. In particular, changes in the condition of the pitch between
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the first half of the game and the second half caused by rain can and often appear
to change what might seem like a certain outcome to the game. For example,
on a dry day, the second team looks to be easing to victory when a sudden rain
shower changes the nature of the wicket. After the rain stops, the second team
finds batting much more difficult and, perhaps, loses.
This kind of change in outcomes is usually thought to be unfortunate, but
never actually unfair. However, delays due to rain can also alter games in an
unfair manner. This results from the requirement—largely attributable to prime-
time televsion led demands—that each game be completed in a fixed amount of
time. A rain delay during, say, the second team’s innings will mean that once they
resume their batting they will now have less time in which to surpass their rival’s
score. The pressing question for cricket’s match officials is: how much should the
target—the first team’s score—be reduced by in order to maintain a fair game?
John Haigh’s Taking Chances aims to be an introduction to probabilistic reason-
ing for laymen. Haigh’s book illustrates the widespread position of importance
that the Duckworth-Lewis model now commands in cricket by using it to talk
about statistics in society. He introduces the Duckworth-Lewis method by noting
that “the place of statistics [had been] confined to recording the scores, evaluat-
ing averages, and being the source of trivial information. . . ” (Haigh 1999, 247).
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Haigh suggests that “[t]he main idea behind the Duckworth/Lewis (D/L) method
is that, after the interruption, the relative positions of the two teams should be as
little affected as possible. They proposed that not only should the target be re-
vised to take account of how many overs were lost, it should also take account
of how many wickets the team had left, as that also affects their chance of reach-
ing the target” (Haigh 1999, 248). I will demonstrate in the next chapter that
this evaluation—that D/L aims to leave the relative positions of the two teams
intact—is in fact inaccurate. Haigh gives as an example an hypothetical game
between India and Pakistan. Indeed these hypothetical examples are the primary
method by which Duckworth and Lewis and the authors commenting on them
reason about fairness and prediction in cricket. It is a species of thought experi-
ment aimed at eliciting from the reader their intuitions about fairness, reasonable
predictions, and the relationships between them.
Haigh considers a case in which India bat first and score 250 runs in 50 overs.
After 20 overs of Pakistan’s innings a rain delay occurs with Pakistan having
scored 100 runs. After the delay, there is time for only a further 10 overs. Haigh
argues pace the D/L method, that “[i]f the aim is to set a fair target—and cricket
is the epitome of fairness—we need to know how many wickets Pakistan had lost
at the time play was suspended. If the opening pair were still together, Pakistan
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would have been very confident of winning, having 30 overs to score 151 runs to
win and all wickets in hand.” The more batsmen that were out, the harder a win
would have been: “Before the D/L method, the revised target would have been
calculated without reference to these differences. The original pro rata method
would have asked Pakistan to score 50 more runs in ten overs to tie.” However,
Haigh argues, “...even with six wickets lost, that suddenly becomes a target they
would expect to reach” (Haigh 1999, 248).
What is this model, how is it constructed, and why does it carry the per-
suasiveness that Haigh suggests it does? Frank Duckworth and Anthony Lewis
published “A fair method for resetting the target in interrupted one-day cricket
matches” in the Journal of the Operational Research Society (1998). Their article is
one of the most downloaded articles in the journal’s history, but certainly not
the most-cited. It was awarded the Goodeve Medal of the Operational Research
Society the following year (Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 83). The problem they
addressed concerns the difference between cricket’s usual, longer form of play
which often ends in a draw, and the shorter one-days forms which are designed
to produce a result. The Duckworth-Lewis model the authors derive has been pre-
sented as a fairer because scientific alternative to the previous attempts at a “rain
rule” which all depended on various cricketing rules of thumb—basically any in-
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terruption or series of interruptions during the course of the game which prevent
the game from being completed also thereby prevent a definitive result from being
enacted. The model works by probabilistic prediction of what a team would have
scored if play had not been interrupted, and was very quickly taken up by the
ICC as a necessary part of adjudicating all international one-day cricket games.
Other operations research articles focus on how to improve on the manipulation
of the players available to the team—the players are designated as resources to be
invested optimally such that victory is secured—and so on.
The central move the authors make, the move that now, after their work, seems
all too obvious, is to treat a team that is batting as if they have a certain quantity of
“resources” that they can deploy to score runs. A team starts with 100 percent of
those resources and then as time begins to run out those resources also run down
(but certainly not at a linear rate). Furthermore, if the team’s initial batsmen get
out, the amount of resources remaining will dip dramatically. Those are their two
variables, time (or, more precisely, overs) remaining and the number of wickets
or “outs” remaining. Note that this is a compression of all available information
into just two factors—overs and wickets remaining. Rather than looking at a
whole slew of possibly relevant data, the D/L method suggests that only those
two factors are relevant. Using this method one can predict how many runs a
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team will score given how many they have scored so far.
The D/L method did not have an easy entry into the world of cricket con-
sumption, but this was mostly due to the difficulty of understanding how the
method was supposed to work. Previous methods had used simply rules like
taking the average run scoring rate until the rain delay and simply extrapolat-
ing that scoring rate during the delay for example. The D/L method required
a higher level of statistical knowledge. Furthermore, the players themselves fre-
quently evinced a lack of understanding of how the rules were supposed to work.
In one well-known case, a team favored to win in a crucial World Cup game lost
because the captain thought that his team was ahead on the D/L method—rain
clouds had been building up for some time while his team was batting. He had
miscalculated. The general case here is telling. If a weather forecast suggests that
rain is likely, each team will closely monitor their D/L predicted score and adjust
their batting style to suit. The key is to not risk trying to get too far ahead of one’s
opponent for doing so risks losing too many “resources.” After all, a close but
big victory counts only just as much as a close but certain victory.
Note however that the D/L method most assuredly does not purport to pro-
vide a fully accurate prediction of a team’s score. For example, a team that has
been historically relatively weak might by chance happen to start their innings
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well, but no one betting on that game would suppose only on this game’s evi-
dence that they will continue to score well in their current innings. Further, as
outlined earlier, a wet wicket can itself have effects on the outcome of a game. The
D/L method does not attempt to make use of either of these sets of information.
It does not do so because, it would seem, doing so would be considered unfair.
For a regulatory point of view, each contest can only be considered de novo.
As I have argued, it is not clear why the D/L method has been as successful
as it clearly has in cricket. I suggest that its success lies primarily in the very
fact that it is based on a mathematical model of cricket. In Peircean terms, it has
worked to shift thinking about the state of a game—who is winning and who is
not—but a process of abduction to a process of quantifiable induction. The D/L
method is now not just part of how the game is regulated, but is also embedded
in how the game is played even in the absence of a chance of rain delay. It seems
to have become performative—a team is considered to be winning if it is ahead on
the D/L method. Further, if it is not ahead that ought to be good reason for the
team to do something drastic to try to get ahead. How did this happen given the
proprietary and, as we shall see in the next chapter, entirely obscure nature of the
model itself? I have argued that the performative nature of the D/L method is of
a piece with the cybernetic notion of teleology. The goal of getting ahead on the
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D/L method is now also the goal of winning a game of cricket. As with the Black-
Scholes-Merton options pricing model, the D/L method has become part of the
means by which cricket players, coaches, and so on, can reason about the game.
It is an example of embedded performativity. The model built by Duckworth and
Lewis has become a black-boxed technology that can be deployed in the world
and used in a number of ways unintended by its authors. It is a model that has
become embedded in the very structure of reasoning about the phenomena that
it is designed to intervene in.
Chapter 5
Simulating cricket: the limits of data
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Frank Duckworth, a statistician, and Tony Lewis, a mathematician, first met
in January 1995. They had already been collaborating with one another at a
distance since 1993. Duckworth had previously given a short paper on a new
rain-interruption rule at a conference. A colleague of Lewis’ had attended the
conference and reported on the paper to him. Duckworth had worked out an
initial formulation and computer program implementing it and Lewis, with the
aid of a student, had worked out some of the details using a small amount of data
on cricket matches in England. By August 1995, they were meeting regularly at a
pub equidistant from their homes to refine the model, pending a presentation to
the Test and County Cricket Board (Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 31–34).1 Duck-
worth and Lewis set out this story in their book, along with a personal first-hand
account of the process by which their model came to transform how cricket is
played. They suggest that Duckworth had in fact begun with the wrong kind
of question, asking “how many runs on average should one have made after y
overs with w wickets down?” rather than “how many runs can be made, on
average, with u overs remaining and w wickets down?” (Duckworth and Lewis
2011, 31) The former is prescriptive—what ought to have happened so far—and
the latter is predictive—what will happen now. Duckworth, in other words, had
1The board that has a de facto monopoly on organized cricket in England and is responsible
for the national team. It is now the England and Wales Cricket Board.
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shifted the task at hand from one of evaluating how well a team has done so
far to evaluating its future. This corresponds in fact to the shift from theories of
value in classical and 19th marginalist economics that predicated that value on
something—whether labor, corn, or something other substance—to a theory of
value that rested on the future–predicted—usefulness of a good (Mirowski 1989,
1991).
Duckworth and Lewis set up a meeting with Tim Lamb, the TCCB’s secretary,
and Dave Richards, the chief executive of the ICC for October 1995. They list the
various formulations of the formula at the core of the D/L method they went















Where Z(u,w) is the number of runs scored from a point at which u
overs are remaining and w wickets have been lost; F(w) is the aver-
age proportion of the total runs contributed by the remaining batsmen
when w have been lost; and b is a constant. (Duckworth and Lewis
2011, 35, and appendix, 198)
The successive changes in the formula are interesting because they were en-
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tirely ungrounded in any explicit empirical considerations. What they are after
is a formula that describes how cricket teams use up overs and wickets to score
runs in a kind of ideal setting. The crucial innovation that they highlight is Duck-
worth’s initial intuition that previous rain rules were deficient because they did
not take into account both overs and wickets. Subsequent proposed models, dif-
ferent as they may be, all retain that core insight.
In this respect, the model is a significant improvement on both the commonly
used average run rate method and the “parabola” method. The former method
simply compares the rate at which the team batting first has scored its runs to the
rate at which the second team has scored its own runs. After a rain interruption of
the second innings, if the former is higher than the latter, the first team has won.
By the time Duckworth and Lewis met Tim Lamb, the rain rule for the upcoming
1996 World Cup had already been set. The ICC was going to use a different rule
created by Wayne do Rego. do Rego fitted a parabola formula to data from a large
number of cricket matches:
y = 7.46x− 0.059x2
Where y is the number of runs scored and x the number of overs lost
so far. (Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 27)
There were no interrupted matches at the 1996 tournament so the rule did not
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come into play. However, Duckworth and Lewis give an example of its application
in a match in 1998 between two Australian state teams. Victoria had scored 223
in their 50 overs. In response Western Australia had gotten to a score of 188 runs
in 43.2 overs, with the loss of only one batsman. Needing just 36 runs to win,
it was clear to all participants that Western Australia were very likely to win.
However it rained sufficiently hard and long for the match to have to be halted
at that point. Under the parabola method, the target Western Australia would
have faced if they only had 43.2 overs would have been 210 runs (Duckworth
and Lewis 2011, 28–29). Duckworth and Lewis supply a quote from the coach
of the Western Australian team: “We’d had the game all wrapped up. . . It (the
rain) was one of those unfortunate things which was out of our control. We were
certain of winning—with nine wickets in hand and needing five runs an over
and with Langer and Martyn batting so well there’s no way we could have lost”
(Duckworth and Lewis 2011, 29).
Duckworth and Lewis quote the passage because they want to highlight the
coach talking about wickets in hand—that is, the nine batsmen Western Australia
have in hand—as well as the relatively modest runs per over still needed. The
third factor the coach mentions, however, is of some interest. The batsmen Justin
Langer and Damien Martyn were batting “well.” A rain-rule must be indifferent
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to the particular named batsmen who are scoring well or else not be fair and the
underlying model could never be used directly for gambling on a game for it must
treat both teams as equally likely to win the game at the onset. The particular
personnel involved is crucial from a gambling point of view, but strictly irrelevant
from a fairness perspective. However, I will argue later that the fact that there
were two top-order batsmen who had already scored many runs—regardless of
past records of them in particular—is relevant. I suggest that it is implausible that
taking that into account could be deemed unfair.
5.1 The Duckworth and Lewis argument
Duckworth and Lewis published their paper—outlining the method that had al-
ready been put into operation in international cricket—in 1998. The journal they
published their paper in—the Journal of the Operational Research Society—is
ranked quite highly with operations research. As a result of the popularity of
their paper, the journal has published two further papers, both discussed below,
on the same topic of rain-delays in cricket. Duckworth and Lewis responded in
detail to the first of these, but not yet to the second. They frame their original
paper by noting that operations research had already been applied to cricket by
some previous scholars, notably to schedule fixtures, optimize run scoring strate-
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gies, and comparing player performances. Their focus was on how to set a target
run score for a team batting second in the event of interruptions to a limited overs
game. Such games are designed to produce a result. “Tied” games very occa-
sionally occur in this form of the game, but with nothing like the frequency that
“drawn” games occur in the longer multi-day long format known as Test cricket
(when played between national teams).
In a limited overs game, one team bats first and scores as many runs as they
can in their innings—their allotted number of deliveries of, typically, 50 overs
unless they lose 10 wickets first. A set of six deliveries is known as an over. When
batsmen get out, they are said to have lost their wicket. There are 11 players on
each side but batting occurs in pairs at all times, so losing 10 wickets suffices for
a team to have to end its innings. Once the first team has finished its innings, the
second team takes over and tries to “chase” the target they have been set. If they
succeed in their allotted number of deliveries, and without losing 10 wickets, they
will have won the game. However, cricket is sensitive to rain in a variety of ways.
As a result play is suspended when it rains. The umpires may even allow some
time to elapse after it has stopped raining to give the ground time to dry out as
much as possible. As one team bats first and the other second, rain at one point in
time have an asymmetric effect on the course of the game. Restoring order to that
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potential asymmetry is the task that Duckworth and Lewis set out to address.
Their core insight is set out in terms of an optimization problem:
The optimization exercise in either team’s task involves choosing some
compromise between scoring fast and hence taking higher risks of los-
ing wickets, and playing carefully and hence risking making insuf-
ficient runs. Whatever strategy a team adopt, they are always com-
promising between the constraints on their two resources, overs and
wickets. But when an innings has to be shortened, only one of these
resources, overs, is depleted and the balance is upset. (Duckworth and
Lewis 1998, 220-1)
With respect to various previous attempts at adjusting for interruptions, the
key choice is simply focusing on the two factors of overs remaining and wickets
remaining. However, with respect to the intervention made in general by an
operations research approach to cricket the important move is to think in terms of
risk/reward and scoring runs. This approach mimics, of course, the modern
financial theory approach to understanding asset pricing. To be sure, cricket
players and fans already reasoned about a game in similar terms but here in
the Duckworth-Lewis method, for the first time, was a systematic quantitative
approach to that basic insight. The parallel to the economic realm is made explicit
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when Duckworth and Lewis characterize their method as asserting the existence
of “a relationship for the proportion of the runs of an innings which may be
scored for any combination of the two resources a batting side possesses, overs to
be faced and wickets in hand” (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 221).
They list five criteria which they believe to be important for any fair target
resetting rule. The last two of these are about simplicity: how easy the rule should
be to apply and how easy it should be to understand by everyone involved. The
first three are as follows:
1. It must be equally fair to both sides; that is the relative positions
of the two teams should be exactly the same after the interruption
as they were before it.
2. It must give sensible results in all conceivable situations.
3. It should be independent of Team 1s scoring pattern, as indeed is
the target in an uninterrupted game. (Duckworth and Lewis 1998,
222)
The authors set out the formula they had settled on, noting the importance
of the exponential decay embedded in their formula, and then state flatly that
“[c]ommercial confidentiality prevents the disclosure of the mathematical defini-
tions of these functions” (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 222). What they mean is
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that they are unable to give the reader the actual constants they use in the formula,
only the general form which the formula takes, for commercial reasons. The con-
stants themselves had been, they say, “obtained following extensive research and
experimentation” (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 222). The details of this research
and experimentation is also undisclosed. However in their book they repeatedly
make it clear that they have not profited materially from the application of the
D/L method in cricket. It seems from this that they attempted to commercialize
their findings—selling the model to the ICC—but failed to do so at any price but
zero or close to it. The result is a set of specific variables that are crucial to the
game but closed to further scrutiny.
The bulk of the remainder of the paper is taken up with a variety of exam-
ples, hypothetical or actual, that illustrate how the method works and, implicitly,
comparing the reset targets that their method would set against the intuitions of a
cricket-knowledgeable reader. The simpler examples typically pick out situations
in which the team batting first has completed its innings, then rain strikes, leaving
a now reduced number of overs which the second team will have to bat. In these
circumstances the application of the D/L method is particularly straightforward.
Suppose the first team scored 250 runs in their 50 overs. Rain causes enough of
a delay to allow the second team only, say, 30 overs in which to bat. The usual
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old rule would reduce the target for the second team to 150 runs (because the
first team scored at an average of 5 runs per over). The D/L method asserts that
whereas the first team used up all its resources in scoring 250 runs, the second
team will only have, using the data tables they make available in their paper, 77.1
percent of their original resources. Therefore, the D/L method suggests, their
target ought to be revised downward—250 runs multiplied by 77.1 percent (and
then rounded up to the nearest integer), giving 193 runs to win. This general
procedure applies just as well to situations in which the second team has already
started batting and then rain ensues. The key is look up what percentage of their
resources were available to them at the start of the interruption and compare that
to the resources that will be available to them at the resumption of the game. Re-
sources available will be sensitive to the number of wickets they have lost as well
as the overs finished at the interruption and overs remaining at the restart.
However, Duckworth and Lewis note a possible incongruity. If there is an in-
terruption in the first team’s innings, the target set for the second team might be
rather unrealistic following the method outlined above. This is because it might
be the case that the first team lost more of the resources available to them than
the second team. They give the following hypothetical (and extreme) example:
the first team bats for 10 overs and scores 80 runs with no loss of wickets. Ac-
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cording to their calculations, the team will have used up about 10 percent of their
resources (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 223). Should rain then intervene, curtail-
ing the first team’s innings and giving the second team only 10 overs to bat, the
second team will only have 10 overs to bat with all their wickets in hand. This
will correspond to about 34 percent of the resources they would have had in they
had a full 50 overs to bat. A directly scaling would give a target of approximately
3.4 times the initial score of 80, meaning the second team would have to score
about 282 in 10 overs to win. This is, as they point out, well above an intuitively
reasonable target. More importantly, the reason they give has more to do with the
first team’s score in their 10 overs: “Although there may be factors which affect
all players’ scoring capabilities equally, such as the condition of the wicket, the
speed of the outfield and short or long boundaries, it is highly unlikely that Team
1 would have been able to sustain such a high early scoring rate. . . ” (Duckworth
and Lewis 1998, 223-4). In other words, the method as it stands give an unrealistic
target because it would be unrealistic to extrapolate directly from the first teams
good start to their putative entire innings. The solution they implemented simply
scales the target according to the average team score—about 225 runs at the time
they wrote the article—by the difference, not the ratio, between resources used
up by the first team and resources available for the second team wherever the for-
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Wickets lost 0 2 4 9
Overs left 50 100.0 83.8 62.4 7.6
40 90.3 77.6 59.8 7.6
30 77.1 68.2 54.9 7.6
25 68.7 61.8 51.2 7.6
20 58.9 54.0 46.1 7.6
10 34.1 32.5 29.8 7.5
Table 5.1: Extract of a percentage of innings resources remaining table (Duckworth
and Lewis 1998, 223)
mer is less than the latter. The model, therefore, works to tame potential cricket
scores by assuming that good starts to an innings will likely revert to an average
performance.
Duckworth and Lewis go on to provide a slew of real examples of the applica-
tion of their method, both to cases in the past and actual applications after their
method came into effect as a regulation. The example that framed their account of
the method—the World Cup semi-final between England and South Africa I wrote
about in the last chapter—is illustrative of the improvement of their method over
the previous system of “most productive overs”. With England scoring 252 runs
off their 45 overs and South Africa reaching 231 runs with 2.1 overs to go, rain
curtailed South Africa’s innings to precisely one delivery remaining. The pre-
vious system set them an impossible 21 runs to win, whereas the D/L method
would have set them a target of 3 runs (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 225).
The actual table of resources they construct from their formula would have
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entries on a ball-by-ball basis (for each of the possible 10 wickets available to a
team). See Table 5.1 for a extract of a summary table they give in the paper for
illustrative purposes. As they assert by way of conclusion, they have “derived
a two-factor relationship which gives the average number of runs which may be
scored from any combination of these two resources and hence have derived a
table of proportions of an innings for any such combination.” Further, “[t]hrough
the examples given, both hypothetical and real, we have shown that our method
gives sensible and fair targets in all situations” (Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 227).
They also note, in passing, that the “parameters of our relationship might change
as the nature of the game changes, due, for instance, to changes in rules or pos-
sibly changes in team selection and playing strategy” and that they therefore
think it “important that the method of correction keeps abreast with the game”
(Duckworth and Lewis 1998, 227). The model that they intuited before looking at
any data itself will remain stable, but over time the parameters they started with
might no longer fit current data so well and will therefore need to be adjusted on
an on-going basis.
In a 2004 article in the same journal, Michael Carter and Graeme Guthrie
have provided the strongest challenge to the D/L method. They also write about
the problem from the point of view of fairness, but attack precisely the issue
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Duckworth and Lewis worry about in their conclusion, namely possible changes
in cricket strategy in the future. However, their core argument is that such changes
might come about in response to the D/L method, not independently of it. In the
name of fairness, they propose an “iso-probability rule that aims to reduce the net
cost of an interruption to zero, by preserving each team’s changes of winning the
match” (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 823). Their proposal is constructed in a similar
fashion to Duckworth and Lewis in the sense that they accept the basic idea of
a two-factor relationship—what matters in a cricket innings are the number of
deliveries and number of wickets remaining. They also argue from examples, both
real and hypothetical. Their first example—hypothetical, but with a real referent
to make it plausible—nicely highlights the differences between their method and
the D/L method:
Suppose team 2, chasing 250 runs, gets off to a flying start and scores
143 without loss in the first 20 overs. (Chasing a target of 214, South
Africa reached 143 without loss in the 21st over in their match against
Zimbabwe on 28 September 1999.) Clearly, at this point, team 2 is in a
strong position and has a high probability of winning. But, victory is
not certain. The match is not over and fortunes may change. (Carter
and Guthrie 2004, 824)
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If 20 overs are then lost to rain, they argue, under the old average run rate
rule, in the 10 overs remaining team 2 would have to score a further 8 runs to win
as they would have been set a target of 150 runs. However, importantly, under
the D/L method victory is not very likely but in fact already in place. The revised
target would have been 143, not 150, so in fact team 2 would automatically be
the winner of the game. The rain interruption in fact removes all uncertainty
from this particular hypothetical game. Under Carter and Guthrie’s model, the
probability of a win for team 2 works out to 99 percent, and “[t]o preserve this
probability, team 2 should be set the task of scoring 56 runs off the last 10 overs
(with 10 wickets in hand) to win the match” (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 825).
The core of their argument builds on the same observation that Duckworth
and Lewis make about the risk/return trade-off in constructing a team’s innings—
the more risk you take, the more runs you score per delivery used up but with an
attendant greater risk of losing a wicket. Carter and Guthrie, in other words, have
here reinforced the connection Duckworth and Lewis made between models of
cricket games and models of market security evaluation. The main difference they
introduce between their model and Duckworth and Lewis’s lies in the possibility
of players expecting an upcoming interruption in an innings. They note that
“Existing rules—such as ARR and Duckworth-Lewis—change the trade-off faced
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by the batting team. When an interruption is anticipated, team 2 can afford to bat
more aggressively, since the opportunity cost of losing a wicket is lower” (Carter
and Guthrie 2004, 825).
The authors proceed to give a number of real examples from the past to il-
lustrate this point, using them to further contrast the kinds of targets their rule
would give compared to the D/L model. One in particular stands out because
it highlights that their iso-probability rule gives a probability of the second team
winning even at the start of their innings. In 1997, New Zealand batted first
and scored 253 runs. England batted for 6 overs, scoring 47 runs without los-
ing a wicket—a very good start—before rain intervened. When play restarted,
they were allocated a further 20 overs by the umpires. The old average run rate
rule was applied, giving them a target of 86 runs off those 20 overs. Carter and
Guthrie assert that the D/L method would have produced a somewhat harder to
get target of 117 runs off 20 overs, whereas their iso-probability rule would have
give England a target of 148 runs (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 828). They note that:
While this may appear an unreasonable target, it recognizes England’s
commanding position having all 10 wickets in hand. At the beginning
of their innings, England’s estimated probability of winning the match
was only 0.28. Their excellent start increased this to 0.66 at the point of
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interruption. The iso-probability rule preserves this probability, while
the Duckworth-Lewis rule increases the probability of winning to 0.94.
England would obtain a significant boost from the Duckworth-Lewis
rule.
Their emphasis is on the interaction between the D/L method and the prob-
ability of winning. As their rule attempts to preserve the probability of winning
across interruptions, they argue that a team will not be able to change strategies
such as to “game” the system in the likelihood of rain. Certainly, the Duckworth
and Lewis say nothing about the predictability of rain itself. It is almost as if
rain is always an external event that impinges on the process of playing cricket.
But any follower of cricket anxiously scanning the skies for rain clouds knows
that this is not at all the case. Every game in which rain is a possibility proceeds
with that knowledge at the forefront of the minds of players, coaches, fans, and
commentators alike. In general, a team which knows that, in the event of rain,
the D/L method will favor their chances of winning will play more conservatively
than they otherwise would. Similarly, a team that would fall further behind under
the D/L method, would want to take more chances if the rain clouds are looming.
However, Duckworth and Lewis were certainly cognizant of the possibility
of an iso-probability approach to rain interruptions. In their response to Carter
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and Guthrie’s proposal, published in the same journal, they agree that if one
side has already established an advantage over the other, that advantage will be
accentuated by a rain delay. The problem, they suggest, is that a rain interruption
rule:
should not in any way be based upon the runs scored by the team
batting second at the point of the interruption. We will show that such
an approach leads to the use in cricket of a ‘socialist’ concept in that
the more or fewer runs that a team have already scored, the more or
fewer they still have to make. In other words, maintaining probability
has the effect of taxing the run-rich to aid the run-poor. (Duckworth
and Lewis 2005, 1335)
Their argument about the supposed socialist tendencies of the rival proposal—
they hint here that socialism is completely described by progressive resource
redistribution policies and that such a thing is unfair—is of course constructed
around another hypothetical example. Suppose, they argue, two matches, on
grounds A and B, are going on at the same time. In both cases, the teams bat-
ting first scored 250 runs from their 50 overs. Also in both cases, both the teams
batting second receive 20 overs and lose 3 wickets. The rain delay is 10 overs
so both teams now only have a further 20 overs in which to bat. Suppose that
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on ground A, the second team had scored 120 runs for the loss of 3 wickets and
that on ground B, the second team had scored only 50 runs for 3 wickets. Duck-
worth and Lewis state that their unmodified method would set identical targets
of 221 runs. However, a modified version that mimics Carter and Guthrie’s iso-
probability approach would set the second team’s target at 226 runs on ground A
and 213 runs at ground B. Hence, the reference to “socialism” as the second team
on ground A has in effect, they argue, been penalized for having scored 120 runs
compared to the second team on ground B who only scored 50 runs. This seems
odd, they argue:
If the Team 2 on Ground A went on to make 224, they would lose,
whereas if the Team 2 on Ground B went on to make 213 they would
win. Thus, in directly comparable situations, the side that has scored
more runs has lost and the side that has scored fewer runs has won.
(Carter and Guthrie 2004, 1335)
On the other significant issue that Carter and Guthrie raise about the D/L
method, Duckworth and Lewis state that they see no incentive effects whatsoever.
They state flatly that a team batting second either has to exceed the first team’s
total or, “[i]f there is a possibility that Team 2’s innings might be shortened or
curtailed, their corresponding sole objective is to get ahead and stay ahead of the
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D/L par score, which is public information at all stages of the match” (Duckworth
and Lewis 2005, 1336). But this is in fact precisely Carter and Guthrie’s argument.
What the second team in fact should always be trying to do is maximize the
chances of winning the game, not chase a given target. Therefore, all changes in
the target should preserve the probability of winning.
In their reply to Duckworth and Lewis’s comments, Carter and Guthrie note
that the “two most important issues that Duckworth and Lewis raise are whether
the adjustment to an interrupted innings should depend on the number of runs
scored by the batting team, and whether the threat of a rain interruption adju-
dicated by the DL rule distorts the optimal strategy of the batting team” (Carter
and Guthrie 2005, 1337). In particular, they suggest that discerning whether two
different matches are in similar positions is the “fundamental difference” between
their two methods (Carter and Guthrie 2005, 1337). Adding to the proliferation of
hypotheticals, they suggest a further Ground C, in addition to A and B, on which
the first team scores just 180 runs. The second team on Ground C are in the same
position in terms of overs and wickets lost, but have only scored 50 runs: “We
argue that this match is a far stronger contender to be ‘directly comparable’ to the
situation on Ground A than is the match on Ground B. On both Grounds A and
C, immediately before the interruption Team 2 needed to score an additional 131
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runs off 30 overs with seven wickets in hand” (Carter and Guthrie 2005, 1338).
Thus, they argue, the D/L method treats games A and B as being in the same
situation, but their iso-probability (or IP) approach treats games A and C as be-
ing in the same situation. Moreover, there are some key differences in how those
equivalences are treated:
When assessing the state of a match interrupted in the second innings,
the DL rule uses the number of runs required at the start of the second
innings. The IP rule looks at the number of runs required at the time
of the interruption.
The DL rule ensures that the number of runs required over the entire
adjusted innings is the same for matches that they deem to be in equiv-
alent situations. In contrast, the IP rule ensures that the runs required
off the remainder of the adjusted innings is the same for matches in
equivalent situations. (Carter and Guthrie 2005, 1338)
On the question of the “socialist” tendencies of their approach, they note that
it is true that under their approach the “compensation received by Team 2 for
overs lost in its innings is a decreasing function of the number of runs it has
scored thus far,” however it also true, they argue, that under the D/L method the
“compensation received by Team 2 for overs lost in an innings is an increasing
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function of the number of runs scored by Team 1 in its innings” (Carter and
Guthrie 2005, 1338). They illustrate this argument with their example of the match
on Ground C. According to the DL rule, they state, Team 2 would be set a target
of a further 109 runs off 20 overs. This means that:
Team 2 is compensated for its loss of overs by having its target re-
duced by 22 runs on Ground C and by 30 runs on Ground B. A rela-
tively poorly performing Team 2 receives more compensation for overs
lost. Presumably Duckworth and Lewis regard the DL rule as being
socialist, too! (Carter and Guthrie 2005, 1338)
On the question of the incentives to change strategies, Carter and Guthrie find
the responses made by Duckworth and Lewis rather unclear. They state that the
“objective function of both teams is the probability of winning” and also that
a “rain interruption does not alter this probability—that is, the teams’ objective
functions are invariant to interruptions.” They argue that in general, however,
“only in very exceptional circumstances will a strategy that maximizes a team’s
expected score also maximize the probability that their score exceeds the team’s
batting target” (Carter and Guthrie 2005, 1339). Put rather more concretely, the
point of playing cricket is to win the game, not maximize the score that you will or
might have scored. Roughly speaking, in the model of cricket that these authors
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use, there is no difference between losing by a lot or losing by a little. Likewise,
there is no advantage to winning by a big margin. Aside from the niceties of
playing tournaments of cricket where the margin of victory or defeat might be-
come relevant, it seems reasonable that margins of wins and losses should not in
fact be a factor in modeling rain interruptions. These considerations bring out the
difference between the two approaches as Duckworth and Lewis assume that the
task is to predict runs that may be scored, whereas Carter and Guthrie are trying
to track the probability of scoring.
5.2 An interlude on crime
Both of these approaches share the idea of a set of resources that can be “cashed
out” as runs. An effective team will do so efficiently. Those resources are wholly
described by the number of overs and wickets remaining to the batting side. The
D/L method’s table will tell you immediately how much of its resources a team
has used so far in scoring the runs that they already have. A simple linear ex-
trapolation from there will predict their final score. Indeed, the model depends
on that manner of reasoning about the relationship between resources and scores.
Although they target probabilities rather than runs, the iso-probability model as-
serts that a team that has scored a certain number of runs so far, given overs and
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wickets remaining, will be on a particular iso-probability curve. Therefore, on the
assumption that they remain on that curve, their table can be used to extract a
predicted score too.
Importantly, neither model is designed to use all the available information to
predict final scores. The D/L method, for example, is designed with the idea that
any team batting second, regardless of the target it has been set by the team bat-
ting first, has an even chance of winning the game. The iso-probability method
does assert a non-even chance from the beginning of the innings. That fact alone
seems to cut against the usual notion of fairness in cricket, even though the prob-
ability they derive here has nothing to do with previous performance records of
either team. Cricket followers are no different from all sports enthusiasts in liking
to think that, as the popular cricket phrase has it, “anything can happen on the
day.” This sentiment alludes to a notion of randomness in sport that, I will argue
below, is crucial to the notion of fairness.
This discrepancy is rather minor compared to all the information that nei-
ther model makes use of. In other applications of statistics, there is usually no
question of deliberately not taking available information into account. Bernard
Harcourt has written in some detail about the history of what he calls actuarial
methods in criminal law. Harcourt locates the development of these methods in
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the criminal domain proximately to Ernest W. Burgess, a sociologist at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, who completed a survey of 3000 inmates paroled in Illinois in the
1920s. Burgess proposed a “twenty-one-factor test that would determine, based
on group recidivism rates, the likelihood of success or failure of any inmate eli-
gible for parole” (Harcourt 2007, 1). Although Illinois remained the only state to
use such predictive methods from the 1930s to the 1950s, Harcourt demonstrates
that the number of states using such methods for parole and other criminal jus-
tice purposes climbs rapidly from then on. Currently, about 30 states use such
methods (Harcourt 2007, 9). Harcourt argues that these methods are actuarial
because:
[T]hey use statistical methods—rather than clinical methods—on large
datasets of criminal offending rates in order to determine the differ-
ent levels of offending associated with a group or with one or more
groups traits and, on the basis of those correlations, to predict the
past, present, or future criminal behavior of a particular person and
to administer a criminal justice outcome for that individual. (Harcourt
2007, 16)
Harcourt uses the term to narrow down the subject area. Probabilistic reason-
ing is used in a variety criminal justice domains such as the notion of “probable
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cause” in effecting arrest, the use of various kinds of scientific evidence in trials,
and even the determination by a jury of the “reasonable doubt” standard. Har-
court asserts that, aside from the question of racial profiling on highways, the
increasing use of these actuarial methods is viewed by “[m]ost of us . . . [as a]
trend with hope, rather than alarm” (Harcourt 2007, 2). Harcourt notes that in a
Foucaultian framing of contemporary penal systems, “the modern administrative
state metamorphosed from a social welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s into a
correctional administrative state at the turn of the twenty-first century—a state
that manages the margins of society by means of social control and correctional
supervision.” Moreover, these scholars “usually portray the trend toward more
managerial and administrative methods in dark terms” (Harcourt 2007, 19).
Harcourt contrasts this position with the “general public and most academics
[who] generally support the use of prediction in policing” on common sense
grounds. He asks, rhetorically, “[w]hy would we not use our best social sci-
ence research and most advanced statistical methods to improve the efficiency
of police investigations, sentencing decisions, parole practices, treatment efforts,
and general correctional procedures?” for it would be “crazy not to take ad-
vantage of what we now know about the propensity to commit crime” (Harcourt
2007, 21). Harcourt argues that the usual argument against actuarial methods
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and in favor of a clinical approach incorrectly posits that actuarial methods ig-
nore the individual over group generalizations: “the fact is that the actuarial
impulse derives precisely—and very paradoxically—from the desire to individual-
ize” (Harcourt 2007, 21). Both methods are directed towards the just treatment
of each individual case, it is the approach that differs. Harcourt suggests that
the problem with prediction lies, rather, in three different areas: “mathematics,
identifiable social costs, and social and epistemic distortions” (Harcourt 2007, 21).
The mathematical argument is an argument about the elasticity of the propen-
sity to commit crime. As such, the argument is resolutely in the law and eco-
nomics genre of argument pioneered at the University of Chicago by Richard
Posner and Gary Becker. Harcourt states that the rational choice argument about
racial profiling on highways makes the following assumptions. The first is that
“police officers seek to maximize the success rates of their stops and searches,
given the cost of these interventions” (Harcourt 2007, 112). The second is that
“suspects are also rational and try to maximize their own payoff associated with
criminal activity.” The third, most striking premise, is that “racism is reflected
in the fact that the racist police officer experiences a lower cost for stopping or
searching minority suspects than for searching white motorists” (Harcourt 2007,
113). The premise is striking in the sense that it is difficult to envisage what
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that “cost” might look like other than by some notion of affect. In this model of
racism, a racist police officer literally does not feel like stopping white motorists.
Further, Harcourt argues, there is a hidden assumption that the argument relies
on: “minorities offend at higher rates than whites under conditions of color-blind
policing, in other words, in the absence of racial profiling” (Harcourt 2007, 113).
Given these assumptions, rational police officers will target minorities at a
higher rate than white motorists because rate of successful stops will be higher.
However, doing so will gradually reduce offending rate among those minorities
and thereby reduce the success rates. In particular, Harcourt argues, “[p]olice
officers will continue to search members of the higher-offending group dispro-
portionately until the point of equilibrium, where minority and white offending
is at the same level” (Harcourt 2007, 113). At this point of equilibrium in the
model, a racist police officer will be easily discernable because their success rate
for minorities will be lower than for white motorists. Thus, in the absence of
racism, the argument proceeds, the police will now be maximizing the use of
their resources. Harcourt’s critique of this argument proceeds from the observa-
tion that if the relevant minority does in fact offend at a higher rate in the absence
of racial profiling, this is good evidence for the possibility that their elasticity to
commit crime is different—in particular, lower—than for the general population:
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Whether the different offending rates are due to socioeconomics, his-
tory, cultural forces, or path dependence, the fact is that we are pre-
pared to stipulate that there is a difference in offending. Nonspurious
racial profiling rests on the nonspurious assumption that members of
one racial group offend more than members of another racial group,
holding everything else constant. If their offending is different, then
why would their elasticity be the same? (Harcourt 2007, 123)
However, if it is true that their elasticity to commit crime is lower, for ex-
ample if they are “offending more because they are socioeconomically more dis-
advantaged” it follows immediately that racial profiling would in fact increase
the amount of crime in society as a whole. The added attention directed at mi-
norities reduces offending rates for them less than it allows offending rates for
non-minorities to increase (Harcourt 2007, 123).
Harcourt’s mathematical argument against the use of racial profiling as a pre-
dictive method works from within the assumptions of the rational choice law
and economics movement. The second argument Harcourt puts forward works
through a “ratchet effect” that continuously increases the social costs involved in
predicting crime through race. Harcourt points out that if an identifiable group
has a higher offending rate, they will be disproportionately represented in the
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prison population. This is because policing in this model is in effect a sam-
pling of the different groups at different rates: “Instead of sampling randomly,
which would be the only way to achieve a proportional representation of the of-
fending population, the police are sampling in greater numbers from within the
higher-offending group, thereby skewing the sampling results in favor of frequent
offenders” (Harcourt 2007, 147). Random sampling would result in a prison pop-
ulation that is driven by the different offending rates amongst minorities and
non-minorities. A profiled sampling, however, creates a further pressure toward
a higher minority representation in the prison population, assuming that the of-
fending rate is higher in that minority: “there will be far more members of the
higher-offending population in jail and prison then there are even among the of-
fending population” (Harcourt 2007, 149). This is where Harcourt’s ratchet effect
goes to work. Harcourt suggests that if the police use in yet more profiling of
the minority group, the corresponding distortion in the prison population will
increase further. Profiling, Harcourt concludes, “accentuates the apparent corre-
lation between the group trait and criminality by skewing the carceral population,
which is what we all use to proxy criminality” (Harcourt 2007, 156). Moreover,
the resulting skewed distribution and the success associated with such profiling
in turn makes it significantly harder for members of that group to recover from
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incarceration: “The deadly combination of prison and unemployment fuels a cy-
cle of detrimental consequences for the community that then feed back on the
community members” (Harcourt 2007, 161).
The third argument Harcourt presents against predictive methods in criminal
justice is a broad one. Harcourt suggests that the shift from a justice system that
was organized around rehabilitation to one organized around incapacitation is
a “case of philosophical and legal notions of justice following technical progress”
(Harcourt 2007, 173). In particular, Harcourt argues that this technical shift was
exogenous to the legal system and “came from the field of sociology and from
the positivist desire to place human behavior on a more scientific level—from the
desire to control human behavior, just as we control nature” (Harcourt 2007, 173).
Harcourt differentiates this from an argument about a shift from a welfare state to
a penal state which focuses on managing an “underclass” that requires “this new
probabilistic or actuarial episteme involving a style of thought that emphasizes
aggregation, probabilities, and risk calculation” (Harcourt 2007, 174). Harcourt
suggests that an important factor is simply the desire to predict criminality. For
Harcourt, this is a “drive to operationalize and model future behavior in the most
parsimonious way, the quest for more efficient ways to anticipate crime” (Har-
court 2007, 174).
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The solution to the problem of prediction in the justice system is to random-
ize. Harcourt notes that the problem with the ratchet effect is not limited simply
to racial profiling, rather what the effect does is “violate a core intuition of just
punishment—the idea that anyone who is committing the same crime should face
the same likelihood of being punished regardless of their race, sex, class, wealth,
social status, or other irrelevant categories” (Harcourt 2007, 237). The solution
cannot be, in Harcourt’s estimation, a return to clinical methods because that will
merely be a return to “the hunch rather than the regression.” Instead, a process
of policing by randomization will “neutralize the perverse effects of prediction,
both in terms of the possible effects on overall crime and of the other social costs”
(Harcourt 2007, 238). Similarly, with respect to sentencing, the solution is not ran-
domizing sentencing lengths, but rather “eliminating the effect of predictions of future
dangerousness” (Harcourt 2007, 238). Harcourt has successfully, I think, marshaled
a series of rational choice arguments against what he calls the “positivistic desire”
to be scientific about human behavior in arguing that justice needs to be based on
a randomization of enforcement.
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5.3 Two methodologies
Duckworth and Lewis approached their rain interruption rule by positing a model
describing the rates at which teams score runs, given the number of overs and
wickets they have remaining. They used an exponential function. Methodologi-
cally, this is similar to the parabola method however the latter took only overs into
account, not wickets lost. In both cases, having established a function that they
deemed intuitively likely, they then sought to optimize their formula against some
past cricket matches to find the “right” parameters. This approach is susceptible
to some rather standard kinds of critique one might proffer towards quantita-
tive models in general. It picks formula apparently rather arbitrarily and then
attempts to fit the phenomena that is being modeled to that formula. As long
as sufficient numbers of free parameters are available, fitting such a formula to
cricket data will likely be easy.
Carter and Guthrie use precisely the two-factor approach that Duckworth and
Lewis pioneered but argue that they are preserving the wrong measure across
rain interruptions. Instead of preserving the current estimate of the margin of
victory or defeat across an interruption, one should instead preserve the proba-
bility of victory or defeat. Perhaps more importantly, although they do not note
this difference in their article, Carter and Guthrie employ a different methodology.
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Instead of testing a given formula directly against available data, they first build
a model of run-scoring in limited overs cricket. The model is based on the idea
that, given the number of deliveries and wickets remaining in an innings, there
are individual probabilities of one of three mutually exclusive possible events.
Either an extra is given away by the bowling side (a no-ball or wide that adds to
the batting side’s score but does not change the number of deliveries remaining),
a wicket is taken, or runs are scored (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 825). They appear
not to notice that it is possible, but very unlikely, for runs to be scored and a
wicket to fall on the same delivery or for multiple wides and no-balls to be scored
off the same delivery. However, neither of these issues are likely to be particularly
important. Carter and Guthrie also note some boundary conditions that shape
these probability functions. Using data from the 1999 World Cup, “[e]ach deliv-
ery in the first innings of each of these matches was classified” according to their
schema (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 826). They estimate that the probability of an
extra is about 0.055. For the wickets process, they assume that each delivery is an
independent event and that a wicket falling can be modeled as a variable from a
normal distribution. The result is that they estimate that the probability of losing
a wicket in a delivery in the first over is about 0.02 and that this rises to about 0.06
per delivery in the last over (Carter and Guthrie 2004, 827). A similar estimation
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process was used for the probabilities of different numbers of runs being scored
off each ball. These per delivery transition estimations allow them to construct
a table of probability values for a wicket falling or different amounts of runs be-
ing scored for each combination of deliveries and wickets remaining (Carter and
Guthrie 2004, 828).
This two step approach to constructing a rain-interruption rule uses a rather
more rigorous approach to thinking statistically about cricket. However, a more
recent article employs a non-parametric approach to modeling games of cricket.
Bhattacharya, Gill, and Swartz make all the assumptions that Duckworth and
Lewis do about the structure of the game. In particular, they are seeking merely
to update the resource tables that Duckworth and Lewis generate for Twenty20
cricket (Bhattacharya et al. 2011). The authors note that this relatively new form of
the game is “seen as a more explosive game where the ability to score 4’s and 6’s
is more highly valued than in 1-day cricket” and therefore that the D/L method
might not be suitable for it (Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1952). As the D/L method
requires separate curves for each of the 10 possible wickets remaining and has
some constants that need to be found for each such combination, it is in fact a
20 parameter model. Bhattacharya et al approach the problem of resource table
construction entirely differently from both Duckworth and Lewis, and Carter and
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Guthrie. They note that there are many different sets of curves that can satisfy
the criteria that Duckworth and Lewis set out. In particular, their choice of an
exponential function to model run-scoring leads to asymptotic maximal values
that lie well beyond the range of limited overs cricket and, therefore, any data
available to them (Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1953).
They start by simply constructing a table from the raw data then available to
them—85 matches of Twenty20 cricket between national ICC teams. For example,
they calculate the average number of total further runs scored in those matches
(out of the set of 85) in which, say, 15 overs and 8 wickets are remaining. In
constructing this table of values, the denominator is set as the average number of
total runs scored across all the matches. Thus the first value in the matrix, when
20 overs and 10 wickets are remaining, is set at 100 percent (i.e. all “resources” are
available). They note however that this table “does not exhibit the monotonicity
that we expect” (Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1954). In other words, they expect that
the amount of resources available to a team should decrease as the number of
overs remaining decreases, and likewise for the number of wickets remaining. In
general, the fewer opportunities you have to score runs and the fewer wickets you
have remaining, the worse your situation is. They highlight one particular entry
where 19 overs and 8 wickets are remaining. Only two matches fit those criteria
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and those teams happened to have averaged a higher total score than the average
score across the 85 matches they examine. Therefore, their raw resources table
shows a value greater than 100 percent of resources remaining (Bhattacharya et al.
2011, 1954). Instead of trying to fit some specific formula to “smooth out” these
data, they instead stipulate a squared-error minimization function along with the
monotonicity constraints. Each entry in this table of differences is weighted by the
amount of variance for that entry divided by the sample size in order to represent
the intuition that the function should err towards the raw data wherever there
are relatively more games that fit that table position. This newly generated table
preserves the raw data to the extent possible given the monotonicity constraints.
However, as with the D/L resources table, it misses entries whenever no games
fit those states. For example, it is extremely unlikely that any team will ever play
a game in which they might have, say, 19 overs and only 1 wicket remaining.
The authors “therefore consider a Bayesian model” in which “Gibbs sampling
can be carried out via sampling” from a full conditional Normal distribution
(Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1955). Further, they assert that in “cases of missing
data, we impute the missing [raw resource data] with the Duckworth-Lewis table
entries” because this “imputation is in the spirit of a Bayesian approach where
prior information is utilized” (Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1956).
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Wickets lost 0 2 4 9
Overs left 20 100.0 93.0 81.3 17.6
16 83.5 75.3 66.4 12.0
12 68.3 60.2 52.9 9.1
8 54.0 44.3 38.9 6.6
4 30.8 26.1 22.4 3.5
1 13.7 9.7 7.3 0.9
Table 5.2: An extract of percentage of innings resources remaining for Twenty20
cricket (Bhattacharya et al. 2011, 1956)
This final table of resources for Twenty20 cricket—see Table 5.2—differs from
the D/L method’s table in several respects. They list one area of the table in
particular:
The more interesting discrepancy occurs in the ‘middle’ of an innings
(8–13 overs available with 3–6 wickets lost). In this stage of an in-
nings, the non-parametric approach based on Gibbs sampling suggests
that there is up to 5% fewer resources remaining than provided by the
Duckworth-Lewis method. This coincides with our intuition as we be-
lieve that up to this stage in an innings, batting is more aggressive in
Twenty20 than in 1-day cricket. . . . We remark that a difference of 5%
resources may be very meaningful as a target of 240 runs diminished
by 5% gives 228 runs.
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5.4 Monte Carlo and Bayes
Where did this conception of modeling come from and what set of technological
advances enables it? Bayesian statistics forms a crucial part of this story because it
lends itself to analyses that do not depend on particular specified models. It is an
eminently practical approach to modeling the world that, I suggest, is compatible
with Benedict Anderson’s view of what he calls the “complex fractionality” of the
appearance of “good” nationalism in such technologies of governmentality as the
census. It speaks to and depends on a different imagining of community.
In the 1940s Nicholas Metropolis, John von Neumann, and Stanislaw Ulam
jointly developed the “Monte Carlo” method for simulating neutron multiplica-
tion in nuclear fission devices. Their work would have been impossible without
access to the first electronic computer, ENIAC, then housed at the University
of Pennsylvania. ENIAC’s precursors during the war were built solely to help
decrypt messaging systems used by the Axis powers, but here was a novel and
pressing use for such devices. The idea of, and the set of institutions and practices
surrounding, a computer simulation—broadly, a computer program imitating an
abstract model of some particular system where analytical solutions to the model
are not possible—has now become available across a number of academic disci-
plines. It has been and continues to be a key disruptive technology in the natural
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and social sciences since the middle of the 20th century. As computation con-
tinues to become dramatically cheaper from one decade to the next, computer
simulation has transitioned from one science to the another. In the process, the
discipline of computer science and computational practices themselves have also
changed. In the realm of supercomputers, much of this dynamic was driven by
the exigencies of Cold War nuclear sciences (Galison and Stump 1996, MacKenzie
1996). Computer simulations mimic other natural and social systems. The key re-
cursive point—a system imitating another system—had been theorized initially by
the mathematician Kurt Gödel in his proofs on the limits of sufficiently powerful
mathematical formalizations. Moreover, in the light of Gödel’s proofs, Alan Tur-
ing had hypothesized what came to be known as “Universal Turing Machines”—
machines that were capable of emulating any given Turing Machine, namely a
machine for manipulating arbitrary symbols on a serial tape. It was Turing’s
work that led to designing and building computers as practical devices during
the war and computer science as an academic discipline afterwards.
This initial moment of collaboration between the then nascent nuclear science
and computer science has continued to the present. Simulations of this type have
been used in a diverse array of natural science disciplines—cosmology, fluid dy-
namics, chemical kinetics, genetics, cognitive neuroscience, robotics, engineering,
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and so on—that readily identifiable as cyborg sciences. Although there were some
uses of simulations from the early 1960s in the social sciences, much of the cur-
rent interest in this technology starts in the mid-1980s with the advent of personal
computers. Computer simulations of systems existing in time formally provide
predictions of future states of the system being studied. If the inputs are chosen
so as to mimic current conditions, the result—if the system is useful—will be pre-
dictions of the state of the modeled world in the future. However, much of the
interest in simulations, I suggest, rests on the manner in which simulations sit
between theory and experiment. On the one hand, designing a simulation nec-
essarily includes putting together a formal theory of the world being simulated
that picks out what the researchers deem to be the relevant features of that world.
On the other hand, much of the efficacy of simulations comes directly from the
surprise that often results as features of the simulated world become apparent on
multiple runs of the simulation. It is this mode of reflection that comes out of
the proliferation of thought experiments in arguments about fair predictions of
cricket games. This notion of surprise or emergence does the same kind of work
that Andrew Pickering has argued cybernetics once did (Pickering 1995). In both
cases, repeated runs of the system and reflections on those systems help produce
surprises that disturb the initial research agenda of the participants and therefore
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subsequent research practices in that field.
Michel Callon has argued that economics formats the economy (Callon 1998a).
The recent credit crisis is a good example of precisely this phenomenon. Much
of the dynamics of the credit crisis depended on the correct pricing of complex
financial products developed by finance practitioners, sanctioned in turn by reg-
ulators, and traded on over-the-counter markets run by large banks. When the
models failed, markets did too (Derman 2011). A recognizable originary point
for this moment involves Fisher Black and Merton Scholes’ contribution in the
late 1960s and early 1970s to options pricing theory (MacKenzie 2005). Monte
Carlo simulations became a key part of the resulting financial infrastructure, par-
ticularly with respect to pricing complicated—“exotic”—derivatives. In addition,
such simulations are used to examine the risks involved in portfolios of multi-
ple assets across multiple asset classes. Large banks are required to maintain
“Value-at-Risk” measures of the risk that they might lose substantial amounts of
money in short periods of time. Monte Carlo simulations are usually needed for
these non-parametric estimation problems. Much of the current discussion by
economists, whether in academia, banking, or in government, swings precisely
on whether such tools are adequate to the tasks asked of them—do banks and
other financial institutions have sufficient funds to safeguard themselves from ad-
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verse movements in the prices of the interlocking assets they collectively hold
(Bookstaber 2008)?
5.5 Numbers and models
Hacking’s “avalanche of numbers” is proceeding apace in the modern world.
Monte Carlo simulations and the practical Bayesian approach to a probability
underlying it have swept through a variety of sciences. One key determinate has
been the collaborative development of the software package Bayesian inference
Using Gibbs Sampling (“BUGS”) since the early 1990s that can be used easily
on personal computers. Bhattacharya et al probably used exactly that software
package in modeling Twenty20 cricket.
In general, these approaches to thinking about rain-interruption in cricket de-
pend on a series of assumptions that do not fit cricketing intuitions at all well.
Bhattacharya et al are the least restrictive in the assumptions they make:
1. The state of a team’s innings is completely described by the runs they have
made and the number of deliveries and wickets remaining
2. The resources available to a team decrease with respect to decreasing num-
bers of deliveries and wickets
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3. The resources available given the innings’ state is normally distributed
4. The result of each delivery is independent of the previous one
The first assumption listed above is particularly at odds with normal cricketing
intuition. To pick a trivial example: a team that has scored 80 runs in 15 overs
for the loss of two wickets where those losses were incurred in the previous over
would be regarded as being in far worse a situation than a team with the same
score that had lost its two wickets near the beginning of the match. The second
assumption appears to be irrational and is, for all that, quite likely to be true
on occasion. There are certainly plenty of instances where a fielding side is quite
unhappy to have taken the wicket of a batsman who has been batting quite slowly.
The next, more aggressive, batsman might in fact “kick-start” their team’s attempt
to set a high target. The third assumption is likely false, but as long as information
about some specifiable distribution can be found it is in principle easy to overcome.
The fourth, and last, assumption requires rather more care. To fit a Monte Carlo
simulation approach a cricket innings is best modeled as a Markov chain—each
innings state should wholly determine the probabilities of moving into the next
state. In sports statistics, this corresponds in part to the “hot hand” problem.
Is a player who has been doing well more likely to continue to do well than
one who has not, all else held equal? This problem corresponds exactly to one
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version of the efficient markets hypothesis. Does the fact that a market price has
been going up recently, suggest anything about its future movement, whether up
or down? Most economists would baulk at this notion, but, analogously, most
sports followers would not baulk at the idea that a player who has been doing
particularly well recently will, for that reason, continue to do well.
The problem that this suggested “improvement” to modeling cricket raises has
to do with the relative lack of data available on cricket. Modeling overs, wickets,
and batting partnerships explodes outwards the space of possibilities in cricket
matches. Consequently the sort of method that Duckworth and Lewis pursued
would not work at all well. But this analytical intractability does not pose a prob-
lem for a Monte Carlo simulation approach to modeling cricket. As Harcourt’s
analysis of crime suggests, the primary driver of changes in the modern world
stem from the blind application of new statistical technologies with little thought
about what form of justice in society is actually at stake. Monte Carlo simula-
tions are all the more powerful because they seem neutral with respect to those





Scholars such as Lydia Liu, Céline Lafontaine, and others, have written re-
cently about the connections between post-World War II cybernetics and French
theorists popular in the US like Lacan, Derrida, Lévi-Strauss, Deleuze, and Fou-
cault. The general argument is that cybernetics as it developed in the US was
partially formative of the problem-spaces that those scholars shaped and worked
within. These are not hidden or submerged influences that authors like Liu and
Lafontaine need to discover. Rather, they are explicitly made moves of theoretical
dependency on cybernetic concepts in published academic literature.
The influence that this French scholarship has and continues to have on work
in anthropology and cognate disciplines in the US is quite marked. The connec-
tion between cybernetics and anthropological theory raises the following pressing
question: is it possible to construct an account of contemporary capitalism that
centers on the novel forms that it has taken as both a set of theories and a set of
practices since World War II? Most accounts of these novel developments work
from a wholly Marxist understanding of a pejoratively-understood neoliberalism.
In this framing, neoliberalism is taken to merely be a kind of further extension
and intensification of already existing political and economic practices. These ac-
counts incorrectly take at face value economics’ own story of a continuous intel-
lectual tradition stretching back to Adam Smith. Scholars influenced by Foucault
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add to such accounts a concern with how these changes in political and economic
practices have reshaped social life around the principle of market competition. In
both cases, there has been insufficient attention paid to what is truly new about
the theories underpinning neoliberalism. As I demonstrated in the Introduction
through an account of Norbert Wiener’s seminal popular account of cybernetics,
there are close connections between cybernetics and the post-War Chicago school
of economics—the principal target of Foucault’s account of US neoliberalism in
The Birth of Biopolitics. For Wiener, the term cybernetics was broad enough to en-
compass both the fields of study he collaborated on with the other participants of
the Macy Conferences and the new form of neoclassical economics that took spec-
ulative, future-oriented financial theories of values to be crucial to reorganizations
of post-War political economies in the West.
As Norbert Wiener’s work makes clear, cybernetics was a nascent, and then
ultimately failed, discipline that took experimenting with forms of life, particu-
larly the connection between machines and human being, to be at its core. This
impulse—working at and reshaping the boundaries between the natural and the
social—has come to form a crucial part of one strand of science studies in the
US. Bruno Latour has posited a notion of constructivism that focuses on the man-
ner in which sciences draw together and reconfigure the social and the natural as
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they manipulate and build theories about the world. In this context, such a notion
emphasizes the irreductive feel of the historical connections between cybernetics
and anthropology theory, including Latour’s own theoretical moves quite possi-
bly, without inviting a dismissal of that work. In similar fashion, suggesting that
post-War economic theory and recent critiques of that theory share a connection
to intellectual developments during and shortly after the War is not a dismissal
of those critiques but is rather, to borrow from Pickering, a call to appreciate the
mangle that this strand of academic practice works through.
Cricket is, I have argued, an apt if rather surprising arena in which to investi-
gate the consequences of the connections that cybernetics may have engendered.
It is a sport with a long history going back to the early 18th century in England.
Many of the core features of the game have remained intact over that time period.
There have, however, been a number of changes to the game recently. In this dis-
sertation, I tracked two particular changes in how cricket is coached, played, and
regulated that involved the cybernetics-derived sciences of biomechanics and op-
erations research. In doing so, I connected together these changes with Foucault’s
understanding of governmentality as being organized around the twin of poles
of the body as machine and the species body.
I argued in chapter 2, through an account of the coaching of fast bowlers at an
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academy in India, that such bowlers now conceive of the movement of their bod-
ies through a cybernetics-derived feedback loop tying them together with video
cameras and computers. The habits that these bowlers are trying to reform are
difficult for them to work on without that feedback loop. Biomechanics as used
by coaches at the academy works on fast bowlers’ bodies through this loop by
separating and isolating the act of bowling from its intended target—a batsman. I
argued that this moment can be conceptualized as a Deleuzian collective event. In
carving out this space of application, however, the discipline simultaneously lim-
its its usefulness. In chapter 3, I continue to track the application of biomechanics
to bowling in cricket through an account of a recent controversy over “throwing”
in cricket. The manner in which this purported act of cheating by bowlers is now
regulated has shifted significantly. It has become a problem to be regulated and
remediated off the field of play rather than adjudicated on during a game. I lay-
ered onto these considerations an account of bowling’s complement—batting—
and the relationship between the two via a strand of affect theory deriving from
Deleuze, whilst trying to retain the insight that recent use of this theory can be
thought of as motivated by concerns over the intrusive effects of neoliberalism.
In this account, affect is the social residue outside of an actively reformulated so-
cial life. Professional cricket players struggle to maintain their competitive edge
Conclusion 272
by working and reworking their bodies for a game rendered as a market-place.
Seemingly disparate sets of practices drawn from biomechanics and affect theory
can be applied to such moments of changes in habits. Pointing to the possibility
of a shared cybernetic history does not reduce biomechanics to affect, but rather
serves to complicate both sets of academic theory and practice when they are
applied to cricketing attempts to improve stocks of human capital on a playing
field.
An operations research derived model by Frank Duckworth and Anthony
Lewis is now used to govern shortened forms of cricket in the event of rain in-
terruptions to any given game. Previous rules of thumb worked by projecting
forward simple statistical features of each game. I demonstrated in chapter 4 that
their model instead works through a constrained evaluation of possible future
trajectories of each game. The kind of constraint at issue is governed by claims
to fairness—what they sought was a model that was sensitive to the dynamics of
previous completed games of cricket but did not pick out features of the particular
players or teams involved in an interrupted game. Their model is both too simple
to account for some interesting features of cricket and has too many parameters
to make fitting it to statistical histories of cricket games meaningful. I argued in
chapter 5 that more recent operations research models that build on this work
Conclusion 273
by Duckworth and Lewis are not susceptible to these kinds of critique. Indeed,
These new models that simulate cricket games in order to build non-parametric
estimators of rain interruptions are significant analyses that are not amenable to
the kinds of critiques that some scholars have made about the role of statistics in
contemporary governmentality.
The example of cricket and two recent cybernetics-derived changes in how it is
now played, coached, and regulated has, I hope, provided a broadened and deep-
ened account of the role that cybernetics plays in both shaping the contemporary
world and how it has been studied.
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